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Abstract
Apart from the introduction and conclusion, this thesis consists of three chapters
focusing on taxation in the model with entrepreneurship. Using a simplified life-
cycle structure, these three chapters aim to give policy implications regarding various
kind of taxes in the U.S. economy. The focus is more involved with tax at the top
wealth or income distribution, which necessitates the model capable of capturing the
wealth distribution correctly. Including entrepreneurship in the model is one of the
available approaches for replicating the U.S. wealth distribution.
In chapter 2 (joint with Çagri Kumru) we study the interaction between es-
tate taxation and annuity demand both analytically and quantitatively. Having en-
trepreneurs yields a novel finding for annuity demands of non-entrepreneurs (work-
ers) and entrepreneurs. The simple analytical model shows that lower estate tax
rates result in lower annuity demands. The quantitative model shows that annu-
ity demand is indeed sensitive to the changes in the estate tax system. Removing
the estate tax rate reduces the annuity demand substantially when the government’s
budget is balanced with an increase in the proportional income tax rate. Removing
the exemption level generates the most striking result that if all individuals face the
estate tax, the annuity ownership rate increases dramatically.
In chapter 3 (joint with Ayse I˙mrohorog˘lu and Çagri Kumru), we study optimal
income taxation in a model with entrepreneurial activity. We conduct two types of
changes in tax policy: changing the overall progressivity of taxes versus changing
the tax rate of the richest one percent of the population. We study the implications
of these tax policies on welfare, inequality, and government revenues. The results
indicate that increasing the overall progressivity of taxes results in lower wealth in-
equality and higher welfare relative to increasing the tax rate on the richest one
percent of the population.
In chapter 4, I analyze the implications of the capital income tax, the wealth tax,
and the estate tax on economic aggregates and welfare and search for the optimal
wealth tax rate. When capital income tax is replaced by the wealth tax, there is
a modest welfare gain. In contrast, replacing the current estate tax system with
a wealth tax system leads to an overall welfare loss. The highest welfare gain is
realized when the capital income tax is replaced by wealth tax at the top. Finally, the
optimal wealth tax rate as 5.75 percent. Although the optimal wealth tax increases
welfare substantially, it makes wealth inequality even worse.
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x
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Abstract ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Annuity and Estate Taxation in an Entrepreneurship Model 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Simple Two-Period Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.3 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.4 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.5 Household’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.6 Annuity Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.7 Equilibrium Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.8 The Transition Path between Steady States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.1 Annuity Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.2 Policy Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.2.1 Abolishing the Estate Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.2.2 Additional Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.3 Transitional Dynamics and Welfare Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Adjusting the Proportional Income Tax Rate . . . . . . . . 35
Adjusting the Consumption Tax Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Adjusting the Government Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
xi
xii Contents
3 Revisiting Tax on Top Income 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.1 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.2 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.3 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.4 Credit Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.5 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.6 Household’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.7 Equilibrium Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 Features of the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.1 Revenue-Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.2 Welfare Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4 Implications of Wealth Taxation and Entrepreneurs 85
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.1 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.2 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.3 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.4 Credit Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.5 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.6 Household’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.7 Equilibrium Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4 Features of the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5 Conclusion 117
5.1 Main findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2 Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
List of Figures
2.1 Distribution of wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Annuity ownership among those who buy annuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Time path of proportional income tax, capital, and annuity ownership rates
when eliminating the estate tax and increasing proportional income tax . . . . 36
2.4 Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and in-
creasing proportional income tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Time path of consumption tax, capital, and annuity ownership rates when
eliminating the estate tax and increasing consumption tax . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and in-
creasing consumption tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Time path of capital and the annuity ownership rates when eliminating the
estate tax and decreasing government expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8 Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and de-
creasing government expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.9 Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and in-
creasing proportional income tax in the economy without annuities . . . . . . 46
2.10 Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and in-
creasing consumption tax in the economy without annuities . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.11 Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and de-
creasing government expenditure in the economy without annuities . . . . . . 47
3.1 Tax Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Changes in Output, Labor Supply, and Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Welfare Maximizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.1 Welfare gain for optimal wealth tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2 Welfare gain when switching from capital tax to wealth tax . . . . . . . 111
4.3 Welfare gain when switching from estate tax to wealth tax . . . . . . . . 112
4.4 Welfare gain when switching from capital tax to top wealth tax . . . . . 113
4.5 Welfare gain when switching from estate tax to top wealth tax . . . . . 114
4.6 Welfare gain when switching from capital tax to optimal wealth tax . . 115
xiii
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
List of Tables
2.1 Fixed parameters and their sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 Calibrated parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Target moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Wealth distribution from the top (SCF(2013) data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Abolishing the estate tax and annuity ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Minimum and maximum net worth to buy annuities and minimum and max-
imum contract for annual payment (in dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 Annual contract payment for those having net worth at 1 and 2 millions . . . 32
2.8 Counterfactual analyses when the proportional income tax is adjusted . . . . 34
2.9 Minimum and maximum net worth to buy annuities and minimum and max-
imum contract for annual payment (in dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.10 Sensitivity analysis when the degree of altruism decreases . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.11 Target moments for benchmark and other experiments under original
parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.12 Target moments for benchmark and other experiments when σ changes 44
2.13 Target moments for benchmark and other experiments when replace-
ment rate decreases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 Fixed Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Calibrated Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Target Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Macroeconomic Aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Income Distribution in the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6 Wealth Distribution in the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.7 Share of Tax Payments in the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.8 Changes in Progressivity-Revenue Maximizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.9 Changes in Tax for Top 1% - Revenue Maximizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.10 Average and Marginal Tax Rates and Share of Tax Payments . . . . . . . 70
3.11 Changes in Wealth and Income Distribution - Revenue Maximizing . . 71
3.12 Changes in Progressivity - Welfare Maximizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.13 Consumption and Hours - Welfare Maximizing Progressivity . . . . . . 74
3.14 Changes in Tax for Top 1% - Welfare Maximizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
xv
xvi LIST OF TABLES
3.15 Consumption and Hours - Welfare-Maximizing Tax at the Top . . . . . 76
3.16 Changes in Wealth and Income Distribution - Welfare Maximizing . . . 78
3.17 Share of Tax Payments and Tax Rates - Welfare Maximizing . . . . . . . 78
3.18 Change in Tax at the Top 1% earnings - Welfare Maximizing . . . . . . . 80
4.1 Fixed Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2 Calibrated Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 Target Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 Macroeconomic Aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5 Income Distribution in the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.6 Wealth Distribution in the Benchmark Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.7 Statistics for each tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.8 Wealth distribution for each tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.9 Wealth tax rate and CEV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.10 Statistics for top tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.11 Wealth distribution for top tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.12 Wealth tax rate and CEV for top tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.13 Statistics for the optimal tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.14 Wealth distribution for optimal tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.15 Wealth tax rate and CEV for optimal wealth tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.16 Target Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.17 Wealth tax rate and CEV for wealth tax reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.18 SCF and PSID data regarding relevant moments usually used in en-
trepreneurship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.19 Capital Taxes, selected OECD countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the United States, there has been an increase in wealth inequality as is shown
in the Survey of Consumer Finances. From 1989 to 2013, the Gini coefficient of
wealth has continuously increased from 0.79 to 0.85 in 2013. The wealth is highly
concentrated as the share of wealth of the richest one percent has also increased
from 29.9 percent in 1989 to 35.5 percent in 2013. The Gini coefficient of income also
exhibits the same trend, increasing from 0.55 in 1989 to 0.58 in 2013. As seen in the
Gini coefficient, income is much less concentrated than wealth.
It is well known that the standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type models fail
to produce the wealth distribution and income distribution correctly. Such models
produce wealth and income owned by the rich less than that in the data. This implies
that any governmental policy involving the rich, both income rich and wealth rich,
can be misleading in generating a false policy implication. Hence there has been a
number of literature that attempt to correct this drawback. Among notable literatures
is Krusell and Smith [1998] using aggregate uncertainty. Moreoever, a seminal paper
by Castaneda et al. [2003] can replicate the wealth distribution correctly using the fact
that individuals with highest productivity shock is more than 100 times productive
than individuals with the second highest productivity shock.
This thesis is inspired by another remarkable papers by Quadrini [1999] and
Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] to incorporate the importance of entrepreneurs as a
main mechanism generating the correct wealth distribution. Since this thesis ana-
lyzes the policy implication of the estate tax1, the top income tax, and the wealth
tax, it is appropriate to use one of the models capable of replicating the U.S. wealth
distribution correctly. Furthermore, there are two major reasons why modeling en-
trepreneurial activities may give us more insight in analyzing taxation at the top.
First, although entrepreneurs represent only 7 percent 2 of the population, they earn
21 percent of the total income. Second, 46 percent of the top 1 percent of income
1According to Cagetti and De Nardi [2009], due to tax avoidance behavior, only the top 2 percent
households are responsible for the estate tax.
2The notion of entrepreneurs in this paper follows that in CagettiDenardi2006.
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earners and 58 percent of the top 1 percent of wealth holders are entrepreneurs (see
Survey of Consumer Finances [2013]). Hence, taking entrepreneurs into account
could be potentially important for understanding the implications of top taxation on
welfare, inequality, and government revenues.
Chapter 2 examines the role of the estate tax with annuity contract. As the estate
tax is collected at the time of death and annuities is to insure against longevity risk,
there can be interesting relation between these two options. Annuities hedge against
longevity risk but reduce bequests. Thus, the choice of buying annuities should be
seen as the choice of buying annuities against leaving bequests. Since the presence
of estate tax affects the level of bequests and the bequest motives affect individuals’
annuity decisions, it is of interest to study the interaction between estate taxation
and annuities on individuals’ saving decisions. This chapter analyzes the interac-
tion between estate taxation and annuities in a model with bequest motives and
entrepreneurship decisions. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first pa-
per to distinguish the annuity demand of workers and entrepreneurs separately. One
of the striking results comes from the fact that the estate tax decreases the demand
for bequests and increase that of annuities. The study finds that exposing everyone
to estate tax leads to a substantial increase in annuity demand, which is very thin in
the U.S. economy.
Chapter 3 enriches the entrepreneurship with endogenous labor supply for both
workers and entrepreneurs. Although a standard entrepreneurship model can repli-
cate the wealth distribution quite nicely, it usually overshoots the income concen-
tration in the hand of the rich. Adding endogenous labor supply, along with the
luck factor in productivity shocks for both workers and entrepreneurs, the income
distribution can then be matched. This chapter conducts two main experiments,
i.e., the revenue maximizing and welfare maximizing optimal tax. Two parameters
are changed one at a time to examine counterfactual analysis when the income tax
progressivity changes and the tax at the top one percent of the income distribution
changes. The results show that if the purpose is to maximize tax revenues, increasing
the top marginal tax rate for the top one percent income rich is more effective than
increasing the overall progressivity of taxes. In contrast, if the purpose is to maxi-
mize welfare, an increase in the overall progressivity is more effective. This chapter
is successful in addressing the differences in top marginal tax rate among the litera-
tures. This chapter discovers that the source that is taxed, whether it is earnings of
income, plays an important role for the welfare-maximizing top tax rate.
Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of capital income tax, wealth tax, and es-
tate tax on economic aggregates and welfare and searches for the optimal wealth tax
rate. This is due to recent interest in taxing wealth which is the stock concept, com-
3pared to taxing capital, which is the flow concept. This chapter considers various
tax switching regimes when either the proportional capital income tax or the estate
tax is replaced with the wealth tax. Replacing the estate tax leads to welfare loss
while replacing the capital income tax with the wealth tax otherwise leads to welfare
gain. The optimal wealth tax used to replace the capital income tax generates a huge
welfare gain, although it worsens the wealth inequality.
The last chapter provides the concluding remarks and the direction for the future
research.
4 Introduction
Chapter 2
Annuity and Estate Taxation in an
Entrepreneurship Model
2.1 Introduction
People live much longer than before, especially in developed countries, owing
to medical advancements and overall improvement in living conditions. Therefore,
individuals face more complicated saving decisions to insure themselves against
longevity risk. One way to insure against longevity risk is to buy annuities, which
offer higher returns than risk-free assets but pay nothing when agents die. However,
the annuities market is very thin. There is substantial literature that tries to under-
stand the reasons behind this reality. Individuals’ desire to leave bequests is often
acknowledged as an important reason for the thin annuity market.
There is also an interesting debate regarding the proper taxation of inherited
wealth. The public debate is mainly about the equity versus efficiency trade-off. The
economic debate is about the optimal taxation of inherited wealth and implications
of the estate tax. Although the literature seems to have a sort of disagreement on the
optimal tax rate, there is consensus on the importance of bequest motives to study
tax on inherited wealth.
Annuities hedge from the risk but reduce bequests. Thus, the choice of buying an
annuity should be seen as the choice of buying an annuity against leaving bequests.
A bequest tax should thus decrease the demand for bequests and increase that of
annuities. In our paper, we show that this effect is quantitatively relevant. Under
the current US system, most estates are shielded from the estate tax because the
exemption levels are high. If we were to eliminate exemptions, a much larger fraction
of people would buy annuities.
The literature on the interaction of estate tax and annuities is surprisingly limited.
This interaction cannot be analyzed independently from the bequest motives since
they have important roles in determining the annuity demand and taxes on inherited
5
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wealth would affect the bequest amount.
Both estate taxation and annuities are of greater interest to relatively wealthy in-
dividuals. Hence, quantitative models that deal with estate taxation and annuity
issues should be capable of matching the extreme concentration of wealth observed
in the data. The existing literature has also shown that entrepreneurship is a key de-
terminant of investments, savings, wealth holdings, and wealth inequality (see Evans
and Jovanovic [1989], Quadrini and Ríos-Rull [1997], Quadrini [1999] and Quadrini
[2000], Gentry and Hubbard [2004], and Cagetti and De Nardi [2006], and Kitao
[2008]).
Since the presence of estate tax affects the level of bequests and the bequest mo-
tives affect individuals’ annuity decisions, it is of interest to study the interaction
between estate taxation and annuities on individuals’ saving decisions. This pa-
per analyzes the interaction between estate taxation and annuities in a model with
bequest motives and entrepreneurship decisions. Explicit modeling of entrepreneur-
ship allows us to analyze the implications of estate tax on annuity decisions in a
model that generates wealth distribution realistically. In addition to this, our frame-
work allows us to understand the dynamics behind the annuity demand better. In
other words, we can distinguish between the annuities demanded by entrepreneurs
and workers.
The seminal paper of Yaari [1965] establishes the well-known result: if the annu-
ity is actuarially fair and there is no bequest motive, people should fully annuitize
all their assets. However, Yaari’s result holds under restrictive assumptions such as
no uncertainty except at the time of death. Davidoff et al. [2005] generalize Yaari’s
result. While the price of annuities does not need to be actuarially fair, it needs to
offer a positive premium over the risk-free asset so that the complete market is a
sufficient condition for full annuitization. However, these results are not supported
by data, that is, annuity markets are very thin. This is a well-known annuity puzzle.
There are numerous explanations for the thin annuity markets. Individuals’ desire
to leave bequests is well established as an important factor for thin annuity mar-
kets. More precisely, people with bequest motives do not value annuities as much
as those without bequest motives because annuities cannot be bequeathed (see Lock-
wood [2012] and Pashchenko [2013]). This implies that annuities increase agents’
consumptions at the expense of bequests. The most recent literature on annuities
contradicts both Yaari [1965] and Davidoff et al. [2005]. By allowing a household’s
mortality to be stochastic because of health shocks, Reichling and Smetters [2015]
show that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities and many
should hold negative amounts.1
1The literature on annuities is very rich and explores various aspects of annuities. The following
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Estate tax is an important public finance instrument that would affect the amount
of bequests substantially. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the impli-
cations of estate taxation on savings. This is driven by the substantial heterogeneity
in individuals’ bequest motives (see Laitner and Juster [1996] and Kopczuk and Lup-
ton [2007] for a detailed discussion). Kopczuk [2003] studies the insurance role of
the estate tax: the estate tax can substitute both private annuities and social secu-
rity. A strand of the literature on estate taxation shows that a higher estate tax rate
leads to a decrease in the amount of bequests, that is, estate taxes reduce the level
of altruistically motivated savings (see Stiglitz [1978], Kotlikoff and Summers [1981],
McCaffery [1994], and Laitner [2000]). Although this is a possibility, Kopczuk [2003]
states another important mechanism. Altruistic individuals would want to increase
their savings to meet their bequest requirements when the estate tax rate is increased.
Hence, the net effect of the estate tax on overall savings is undetermined. Blumkin
and Sadka [2004] examine the properties of the optimal estate tax in a Ramsey-type
model where both altruistic and accidental bequests would arise. They find that the
relevance of estate taxation depends on the relative importance of the two bequest
motives. Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] study the implications of the estate tax break by
using a model that incorporates business investment, borrowing constraints, estate
transmission, and wealth inequality. They find that the estate tax distorts the saving
and investment decisions of the very rich who hold a large fraction of total wealth.
Thus, it reduces aggregate output and savings. Farhi and Werning [2010] show that
the optimal estate tax should be progressive and marginal estate taxes should be
negative. Piketty and Saez [2013] study the optimal inheritance tax and find that
low net worth households benefit from high inheritance tax rates, while relatively
large groups at the top income benefit from inheritance subsidies. De Nardi and
Yang [2016] use an earning process proposed by Castaneda et al. [2003] to evaluate
the increase in the estate tax rate by merging bequest motives and inheritance ability
is a short survey. Brown [2007] provides potential behavioral explanations on why individuals rarely
annuitize. Hansen and Imrohoroglu [2008] explore the implications of the longevity risk and a lack of
annuity markets for the consumption profile over the life cycle. Heijdra and Mierau [2012] study the ef-
fects of an annuity market imperfection on individuals’ life-cycle decisions and on the macroeconomic
growth rate in an overlapping generations model with a single-sector. Pecchenino and Pollard [1997]
examine the effects of introducing actuarially fair annuities to the overlapping generations model of
endogenous growth. Sinclair and Smetters [2004] generate an overlapping generations model to com-
pute the demand for annuities under health shocks. Hong and Rull [2007] analyze the role of life
insurance and joint annuities for families. Bruce and Turnovsky [2013] construct a continuous time
overlapping generations model to study the impact of pay-as-you-go social security with or without
annuities. Ameriks et al. [2015] construct a life cycle model with heterogeneity in health risks for the
retirees. Caliendo et al. [2014] show that common belief about social security is based on a benefit-only
analysis and thus it cannot be a substitute for annuity markets. Hosseini [2015] studies the role of
social security in providing annuity insurance in the presence of adverse selection where agents have
private information about their mortality. Reichling and Smetters [2015] allow health shocks to affect a
household’s mortality risk and show that most households should not hold annuities.
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across generations.
In order to understand the impacts of the estate tax on annuity purchases, we
first create a simple analytical model that gives us an idea regarding the direction
of the relation. Then, we generate a quantitative model similar to that of Cagetti
and De Nardi [2009], which is an extension of the standard Bewley model. The es-
tate tax has a greater effect on those in the top half of the wealth distribution and
it is best analyzed at the top of wealth distribution where interpersonal external-
ities from bequest motives are irrelevant (see Kopczuk [2010]). Thus, we need a
model that is capable of replicating the wealth distribution in the economy. The de-
tailed modeling of entrepreneurship has been proved useful to capture the wealth
distribution realistically. In addition, modeling entrepreneurship helps understand
the differences between annuity demand across workers and entrepreneurs. We as-
sume that annuities are supplied infinitely and the old cohorts can buy annuities
only once. There is a social security system that provides a public insurance against
longevity risk. In the model, only the old retirees receive transfers from the govern-
ment, while old entrepreneurs do not receive any transfer but both have an option
to buy annuities. Advanced payment in annuity purchase enhances the choice set
but decreases the available resources for bequests. If the old buy annuities, they face
the following tradeoff: an increase in guaranteed annual income and a decrease in
the amount of bequests left. We also study the transitional dynamics between steady
states generated by different levels of tax and transfer policies to investigate how
annuity purchase and ownership change over time along the transitional path with a
change in the estate tax system. In addition, we investigate the effects of the level of
preannuitized assets, the minimum annuity purchase requirements, and the degree
of altruism on the annuity ownerships.
We find that in our benchmark economy, retirees are responsible for most of the
annuity purchase. The annuity ownership rate is 5% as in the data. Individuals
whose net worth falls within a certain interval buy annuities. In most cases, the
upper bound is lower than the estate tax system’s exemption level. Since bequests
can be considered luxurious goods, those with high net worth are better off not
annuitizing any wealth. This is because they lose relatively more when they use some
of their wealth for the up-front annuity investment. The annuity purchase behavior
of the entrepreneurs is new to the annuity literature. Since entrepreneurs receive an
entrepreneurial income even when they are old, the additional annual income from
purchasing an annuity contract is not material because they prefer to use the up-front
investment required to buy annuities in their businesses. Even if entrepreneurs can
use annuity payout as a part of collateral for borrowing more capital, we find that
this fact does not encourage entrepreneurs to invest more in annuities. Our model-
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generated annuity payout is consistent with the average annual payment found in
the data.
When the estate tax rate is changed, we need to adjust the proportional income
tax rate, the consumption tax rate, or the government spending to balance the budget.
We find that the annuity demand decreases substantially when the estate tax break
is financed by an increase in the proportional income tax rate. The annuity demand
increases moderately when the estate tax cut is financed either by an increase in
consumption tax rate or by a decrease in government expenditure. We also find that
old retirees are responsible for almost all changes in the annuity demand. When we
remove the estate tax exemption level by maintaining the estate tax rate at the same
level and adjusting the proportional income tax rate, the annuity ownership rate is
increased from 5.45% to 24.1%. This striking result shows that making everybody
pay a tax on estates would promote the annuity ownership substantially.
We also compare changes in welfare when the estate tax is set to zero. As in
above, this tax break financed through one of the following three options: increasing
the proportional income tax rate, increasing the consumption tax rate, or decreasing
the government spending. Increasing the proportional income tax rate would make
the majority of old retirees worse off, while old entrepreneurs gain because they are
not involved considerably in buying annuities. Only retirees who have a greater net
worth than the estate tax exemption level benefit from the estate tax break. Since
retirees who buy annuities have a lower net worth than the exemption level, their
welfare loss mainly comes from the decrease in the annuity ownership resulting
from the estate tax break and increase in the income tax rate. In other two experi-
ments, the annuity ownership changes minimally, and thus, the welfare effect comes
mostly from the change in the estate tax rate and in the relevant policy instrument.
When we finance the estate tax break with an increase in the consumption tax rate,
most households lose because of the higher consumption tax rate. When we finance
the estate tax break with a decrease in the government spending, the workers lose
because of the decrease in the interest rate.
In summary, this paper contributes to the literature from at least four perspec-
tives. First, it presents the directions of the interaction between bequest motives,
estate tax, and annuities. Second, it quantifies the changes in the annuity ownership
rates because of the changes in the estate tax system. Third, it analyzes the annuity
demand in a model that gets the wealth distribution right. In turn, this gives us
greater confidence in understanding the reasons behind the low annuity demand.
Fourth, this paper sheds light on the structure of annuity demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the simple
model. Section 2.3 describes the computational model. Section 2.4 discusses the
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calibration of the model parameters. Section 2.5 discusses the results. Section 2.6
discusses sensitivity analysis. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Simple Two-Period Model
In this section, we set up a two-period partial equilibrium OLG model with annu-
ity choice and intergenerational altruism. Our model set up follows that of Lockwood
[2012]. Our aim here is to demonstrate the impacts of estate taxation on consump-
tion, saving, and annuity purchase decisions. Individuals are allowed to buy an
actuarially fair annuity in the first period.2 For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that there is no uncertainty except the time of death and that there is no population
growth.
V(by,nett ) = max
cyt ,c
o
t+1,st,b
os
t+1,∆t
{
u(cyt ) + βpu(c
o
t+1) + βη
[
pV(bos,nett+1 ) + (1− p)V(bod,nett+1 )
]}
subject to
2There are three different approaches in formulating annuities.
First, the return from the subsequent period’s risk-free asset is multiplied by the survival probability
(or the return from the current period’s risk-free asset is divided by the survival probability) to indicate
that annuities offer a higher return than that of the risk-free asset (see Hansen and Imrohoroglu [2008],
Platoni [2010], and Heijdra and Mierau [2012]).
Second, an additional choice variable for annuities is created. In this case, the price of the annuity
contract is given exogenously (see Pecchenino and Pollard [1997], Sinclair and Smetters [2004], Hong
and Rull [2007], and Lockwood [2012]).
Third, although there is an additional annuity choice variable, the price of the annuity contract
corresponds to the annuity providers’ beliefs under the adverse selection (see Hosseini [2015] and
Pashchenko [2013]).
We follow the second approach because our focus is not on the adverse Selection, although it is one
of the factors contributing to the resolution of the annuity puzzle. However, Pashchenko [2013] shows
that it does not have a significant effect on the determination of the annuity demand. We do not follow
the first approach because we want to distinguish between savings in terms of the risk-free bonds and
the annuitized assets. This allows us to determine the annuitized wealth endogenously.
According to Mitchell et al. [1999], private annuities can be bought for a one-time premium payment
(single premium) or a flow of premium payments (flexible premium). They also show that the annuity
price in the data is close to being actuarially fair. Annuity load is around 10%–15%. In section 3, we as-
sume that annuities are the single-premium immediate annuities and the annuity load is approximately
10%.
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cyt + st + ∆t = wt + b
y,net
t (2.1)
cot+1 + b
os
t+1 = (1+ rt+1)st +
(
1+ rt+1
p
)
∆t + Tr (2.2)
bodt+1 = (1+ rt+1)st (2.3)
bj,nett =
{
bjt − τbt (bjt − ext) if bjt > ext
bjt if b
j
t ≤ ext
, j = od, os, (2.4)
where cyt and c
o
t+1 are the levels of consumptions when young and old in periods t
and t+ 1, respectively. st,∆t, and wt stand for saving, annuity purchase, and wage
rate in period t. τbt and τ
b
t+1 are the estate tax rates in period t and t+ 1. ext is the
estate tax exemption level. p is the survival probability from period t to period t+ 1.
η captures the strength of altruism towards the subsequent generation. rt+1 is the
interest rate in period t+ 1. Tr is the transfer from the government, which can also
be considered as the amount of preannuitized assets. byt is the amount of bequest
received by the young in period t. bodt+1 is the amount of bequest made by the old
agent in period t+ 1 when she dies early. bost+1 is the amount of bequest made by the
old agent when she dies later. Notice here that both bodt+1 and b
os
t+1 are made in period
t+ 1.3 The Inada conditions on u(·) are given as follows: limx→0 u′(x) = +∞ and
limx→+∞ u′(x) = 0. u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0.
The first-order conditions are given as follows:
st : u′(c
y
t ) = βp(1+ rt+1)u
′(cot+1) + βη(1− p)(1+ rt+1)(1− τbt+1)V ′(bod,nett+1 )
(2.5)
bost+1 : u
′(cot+1) = η(1− τbt+1)V ′(bos,nett+1 ) (2.6)
∆t : u′(c
y
t ) = β(1+ rt+1)u
′(cot+1) (2.7)
Envelope condition: V ′(by,nett ) = u
′(cyt ) −→ V ′(by,nett+1 ) = u′(cyt+1) (2.8)
We assume that bt > ext, ∀t.4 The optimality conditions reveal that bequests left
by the old are equal to the bequest received by the young, that is, byt+1 = b
o
t+1 = bt+1.
Hence, we do not need to distinguish between these variables. We also have bost+1 =
bodt+1, meaning that bequests when individuals die early are equal to bequests when
they die later. Old age consumption is given by
3We can think of period t+ 1 as a retirement period where the old are likely to die before the end
of period t+ 1 when their offspring retire.
4When bt ≤ ext, the estate tax would not bind, that is, the model would be the same as that of
Lockwood [2012].
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cot+1 =
(
1+ rt+1
p
)
∆t + Tr, (2.9)
where
(
1+rt+1
p
)
∆t is the amount of privately annuitized assets and Tr is the
amount of publicly annuitized assets (governmental transfer).
This means that under the actuarially fair price, individuals annuitize all future
consumption and set aside what they wish to bequeath, that is, consumption in old
age is equal to all annuitized assets. This equation implies that people plan their
bequests ahead and intend to bequeath the same amount regardless of whether they
die early or late. However, in reality, individuals leave bequests much less than the
amount they would leave if they died earlier, that is, bodt+1 > b
os
t+1. This implies that
individuals consume a part of bost+1. In other words, they consume more than the
amount of their annuitized assets, that is, cot+1 >
(
1+rt+1
p
)
∆t + Tr. This situation
arises when the price of the annuity contract is not actuarially fair (see Lockwood
[2012] for further details). Throughout this section, we retain the assumption that the
price of the annuity contract is actuarially fair.
We focus on the comparative statics to analyze how the annuity demand changes
because of changes in the exogenous factors such as the estate tax rate, the exemption
level, the wage rate, the amount of transfer payments, and the degree of altruism.
We take the total derivatives of the equations (6), (1), (9), and (7), respectively.
The resulting equations include the second derivative of the value function V ′′(·),
which does not exist in general. Thus, we need to assume for now that the second
derivative exists and V ′′(·) < 0. Taking total derivatives on both sides yields the
following equations:
u′′(cot+1)dc
o
t+1 − η(1− τbt+1)2V ′′dbt+1 = (1− τbt+1)V ′dη − η[(1− τbt+1)(bt+1 − ext+1)V ′′ +V ′]dτbt+1
+ η(1− τbt+1)τbt+1V ′′dext+1 (2.10)
dcyt +
1
1+ rt+1
dbt+1 + d∆t = dwt + (1− τbt )dbt − (bt − ext)dτbt + τbt dext (2.11)
dcot+1 −
1+ rt+1
p
d∆t = dTr (2.12)
u′′(cyt )dc
y
t = β(1+ rt+1)u
′′(cot+1)dc
o
t+1 (2.13)
We can substitute dcyt =
β(1+rt+1)u′′(cot+1)
u′′(cyt )
dcot+1 from equation (13) into equation (10).
We define β(1+rt+1)u
′′(cot+1)
u′′(cyt )
as Φ for simplicity and use the implicit function theorem to
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conduct comparative statics.
Now, we look at the change in the annuity demand as a response to the change
in the estate tax rate in the subsequent period, τbt+1. Notice that this change is antic-
ipated that is, individuals make their annuity purchase decisions knowing that the
estate tax rate in t+ 1 would change.
d∆t
dτbt+1
=
η
1+rt+1
[(1− τbt+1)(bt+1 − ext+1)V ′′(·) +V ′(·)]
−
[
u′′(cot+1)
p + η(1− τbt+1)2V ′′(·) +
η(1+rt+1)Φ(1−τbt+1)2V′′(·)
p
]
The denominator is always positive. Let us denote it by Λ. Then, the sign of
every comparative statics depends only on the numerator. In this case, the sign of
d∆t
dτbt+1
depends on the sign of the following equation:
(1− τbt+1)(bt+1− ext+1)V ′′((1− τbt+1)bt+1+ τbt+1ext+1)+V ′((1− τbt+1)bt+1+ τbt+1ext+1).
= bnett+1V
′′(bnett+1) +V
′(bnett+1)− ext+1V ′′(bnett+1).
d∆t
dτbt+1

> 0 if db
net
t+1V
′(bnett+1)
dbnett+1
− ext+1V ′′(bnett+1) > 0
= 0 if db
net
t+1V
′(bnett+1)
dbnett+1
− ext+1V ′′(bnett+1) = 0
< 0 if db
net
t+1V
′(bnett+1)
dbnett+1
− ext+1V ′′(bnett+1) < 0
In order to provide a meaningful interpretation here, we need to assume a simple
CRRA functional form for the value function, that is, V(bnett ) =
(bnett )
1−σ
1−σ . This leads to
the following equation:
d∆t
dτbt+1

> 0 if σ < b
net
t+1
bnett+1−ext+1
= 0 if σ = b
net
t+1
bnett+1−ext+1
< 0 if σ > b
net
t+1
bnett+1−ext+1
If individuals are highly risk averse (that corresponds to being more altruistic),
the increase in the estate tax rate would decrease the annuity demand (or increase
the bequests left). This is in line with Kopczuk [2003]: higher estate taxes lead
higher bequests because altruistic individuals would want to increase their savings
to meet their bequest requirements, and hence, they would leave more bequests.
If individuals are moderately risk averse (less altruistic), then the annuity demand
would stay unchanged or increase. To provide more intuitive explanation, let us look
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at the special case in which the exemption levels is set to zero (ext = 0). This leads
us to the following equation:
d∆t
dτbt+1

> 0 if σ < 1
= 0 if σ = 1
< 0 if σ > 1
When σ < 1, the substitution effect dominates. Therefore, an increase in τbt+1
leads to a higher annuity purchase. When σ > 1, the income effect dominates.
Hence, an increase in τbt+1 reduces the annuity purchase. When σ = 1, the income
and substitution effects cancel each other and the amount of annuities bought does
not change.
Next, we look at the change in the amount of intended bequests in response to a
change in the estate tax rate.
dbt+1
dτbt+1
= −η
{
[(1− τbt+1)(bt+1 − ext+1)V ′′(·) +V ′(·)]
(
1+
(1+ rt+1)Φ
p
)}
/Λ
dbt+1
dτbt+1

> 0 if db
net
t+1V
′(bnett+1)
dbnett+1
< 0, or σ > b
net
t+1
bnett+1−ext+1
= 0 if db
net
t+1V
′(bnett+1)
dbnett+1
= 0, or σ = b
net
t+1
bnett+1−ext+1
< 0 if db
net
t+1V
′(bnett+1)
dbnett+1
> 0, or σ < b
net
t+1
bnett+1−ext+1
As one can easily see, there is a negative relation between the signs of dbt+1
dτbt+1
and
the signs of d∆t
dτbt+1
. This is because when the estate tax increases, bequests are more ex-
pensive than purchasing annuities. The substitution effect suggests that individuals
bequeath less.
Next, we consider the change in consumption when τbt+1 changes.
dcot+1
dτbt+1
=
{
η
p
[(1− τbt+1)(bt+1 − ext+1)V ′′(·) +V ′(·)]
}
/Λ
The expression in the above brackets is similar to the case of d∆t
dτbt+1
. This means the
signs of dc
o
t+1
dτbt+1
follow the same pattern as those of d∆t
dτbt+1
. This is because higher annuity
payouts increase consumption.
Now, we examine the implications of a change in the estate tax exemption level
on the annuity demand, the amount of bequests left, and the level of consumption,
respectively.
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d∆t
dext+1
= −
{
η
1+ rt+1
(1− τbt+1)τbt+1V ′′(·)
}
/Λ > 0
dbt+1
dext+1
=
{(
1+
1+ rt+1
p
Φ
)
η(1− τbt+1)τbt+1V ′′(·)
}
/Λ < 0
dcot+1
dext+1
= −
{
η
p
(1− τbt+1)τbt+1V ′′(·)
}
/Λ > 0
The tax burden is given by τbt+1(bt+1 − ext+1). This means that when the exemp-
tion level increases, the tax burden decreases. The decrease in the tax burden leads
to an increase in annuity purchases.5 However, the increase in annuity purchases
negatively affects the amount of bequests left. The level of consumption increases
because of an increase in the income stream generated by annuities.
Here, we analyze the implications of a change in the wage rate on annuities,
bequest, and old-age consumption, respectively.
d∆t
dwt
= −η(1− τ
b
t+1)
2V ′′(·)
Λ
> 0
dbt+1
dwt
= −
{
1+ rt+1
p
u′′(cot+1)
}
/Λ > 0
dcot+1
dwt
= −
{
η(1− τbt+1)2V ′′(·)
p
}
/Λ > 0
Not surprisingly, when individuals receive higher wages, they spend more on
annuities and simultaneously leave higher bequests. Higher wages along with higher
annuitization also lead to more consumption.
Here, we look at the relationship between the amount of preannuitized assets
(transfers) and the levels of annuities, bequest, and consumption.6
d∆t
dTr
=
{
u′′(cot+1)
1+ rt+1
+Φη(1− τbt+1)2V ′′(·)
}
/Λ < 0
The above equation states that when individuals have higher preannuitized as-
sets, they buy less annuities. Higher preannuitized assets also lead to higher bequests
and higher consumption levels.
5This is because bequests become cheaper (substitution effect) and individuals become wealthier
(income effect). The effect on the annuity demand depends on the relative strengths of income and
substitution effects. Our result here shows that the income effect dominates the substitution effect.
6It is what households are entitled to receive without engaging in purchasing annuities.
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dbt+1
dTr
= −u
′′(cot+1)
Λ
> 0
dcot+1
dTr
= −η(1− τ
b
t+1)
2V ′′(·)
Λ
> 0
Finally, we look at the implications of a change in the bequest strength parameter
on the levels of annuity, consumption, and bequest.
d∆t
dη
= −
{
1
1+ rt+1
(1− τbt+1)V ′(·)
}
/Λ < 0
dbt+1
dη
=
(1− τbt+1)V ′(·)
[
1+ 1+rt+1p Φ
]
Λ
> 0
dcot+1
dη
= −
{
(1− τbt+1)V ′(·)
p
}
/Λ < 0
If individuals care for the subsequent generations more, they buy fewer annuities
to leave more bequests. This in turn decreases their levels of consumption.
In this section, we had a very stylized partial equilibrium model that does not
have any uncertainties except the time of death. The main aim of this section is
to explore the direction of the relation between the estate tax system parameters
and the levels of annuity demand, bequest, and consumption. In the next section,
we have a full general equilibrium model with various uncertainties. The model is
realistic enough to generate important moments in the data, allowing us to quantify
the relationship between annuities and estate tax system parameters.
2.3 Model
In this section, we generate a computational model that includes the annuity
purchase decision.
2.3.1 Demographics
The model is a simplified life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. The
model period is one year. We assume that there are young and old cohorts in the
economy and aging is stochastic. The young remain young with a constant proba-
bility piy and get old with a probability 1− piy in the subsequent period. The old
continue to live with a constant probability pio and die with a probability 1− pio in
the subsequent period. These probabilities are calibrated to match the proportion of
young and old households in the economy. When the old die, their offspring receive
§2.3 Model 17
after- tax bequests and enter the economy in the subsequent period. For simplicity,
we assume that each household has only one offspring. We do not consider the case
that differentiates between single households, married households, or households
with no offspring. The measure of households is normalized to 1.
2.3.2 Preferences
We assume that preferences are time-separable with a discount factor β. The
instantaneous utility function is CRRA: u(ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ . Each household is perfectly
altruistic. Young households provide labor inelastically and receive equilibrium wage
rate.
2.3.3 Technology
Following Quadrini [2000], we assume that there are two production sectors: cor-
porate sector and entrepreneurial sector. Each person has two types of abilities.
Types are stochastic, positively correlated over time, and uncorrelated with each
other. Entrepreneurial ability (θt) represents the capacity to invest capital and labor
largely productively by using one’s own production function. Working ability (yt)
represents the capacity to produce income out of labor by working in the corporate
sector.
At the beginning of the period, current ability levels are revealed to individuals.
Subsequent periodï¿ 12 s ability levels remain unknown. A young individual with
assets at, entrepreneurial ability θt, and worker ability yt makes a decision regarding
whether she would be a worker or entrepreneur in the current period.
Entrepreneurs can borrow, invest capital, hire labor, and run a technology. The
return from the production technology is dependent on the entrepreneurï¿ 12 s ability.
When the entrepreneur invests kt, the output is given by
f (kt, nt) = θt
(
kγt (1+ nt)
1−γ)ν ,
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the share of entrepreneurial capital. ν < 1 indicates the
decreasing returns to scale from investing in capital and labor as in Lucas [1978].
Capital depreciates at a rate of δ. Entrepreneurs provide their own labor, which is
normalized to 1. They also hire labor at the amount of nt ≥ 0.
The corporate sector consists of many firms that are not run by a single En-
trepreneur, and hence, they do not face the same financial restrictions. The corporate
sector is represented by a Cobb–Douglas functional form:
F(Kct , L
c
t) = A(K
c
t )
α(Lct)
1−α,
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where KCt and L
C
t are total capital and labor inputs used in the corporate sector. A
represents the level of technology and it is a constant.
2.3.4 Government
The government is assumed to live forever. It collects taxes, pays a pension benefit
p to each retiree, provides goods and services, g, and pays interest on the debt, (1+
rt)D. Note that g does not enter the household’s utility function. The government
runs a balanced budget in each period. We use Gouveia and Strauss [1994] functional
form to model the progressive income tax schedule. The total amount of federal
income tax, Tit (Yt), for total taxable income Yt is given by
Tit (Yt) = b
i
[
Yt −
(
Y−p
i
t + s
i
)− 1
pi
]
+ τbalt Yt,
where i = e,w denotes entrepreneurs and workers, respectively. τbalt is a proportional
income tax rate (other than the federal income tax rate) that captures state and other
income taxes. The government taxes consumption at τct . Finally, estates larger than
the exemption level, ex, are taxed at rate τb only for the amount that exceeds ex.7
2.3.5 Household’s Problem
Households are divided into two: young and old. A young individual can choose
to be either a worker or an entrepreneur. An old individual can choose to stay as an
entrepreneur or become a retiree.
In our model, the young do not need to hedge against the longevity risk by pur-
chasing annuities because they do not die. As we formulated in the earlier section,
the annuity payout depends on the probability of being alive in the subsequent pe-
riod. If this probability is equal to 1, the annuity product generates the same return
as the risk-free asset. However, in this section, we introduce the annuity load that
makes the annuity product actuarially not fair. This in turn reduces the return from
the annuity product if the young engage in buying annuities. Since the annuity prod-
uct yields a lower return than that of the risk-free asset, it is reasonable to exclude
the annuity decision from the young’s saving decisions.
The value function of a young individual is given by
VYt (at, yt, θt) = max
{
VY,et (at, yt, θt),V
Y,w
t (at, yt, θt)
}
.
7ex, τb, and other variables not subscripted are kept fixed throughout all experiments.
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The young individual decides whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur at
the beginning of the period. VY,et (·) is the value function of a young individual who
becomes an entrepreneur and VY,wt (·) is the value function of a young individual
who becomes a worker.
We assume that young workers and old retirees cannot borrow, that is, at+1 ≥ 0.
The size of capital that entrepreneurs can borrow depends on their current net worth.
Default is not an option in this setting.
The young worker’s problem can be written as
VY,wt (at, yt, θt) = maxct,at+1
{u(ct) + βpiyEt
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
+ β(1− piy)WO,rt+1(at+1)},
(2.14)
subject to
Ywt = wtyt + rtat, (2.15)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = wtyt + (1+ rt)at − Twt (Ywt ), (2.16)
0 ≤ at+1. (2.17)
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate and rt is the equilibrium interest rate. The term
WO,rt+1(at+1) is the value function of the retirees after the annuity purchase decision.
The young entrepreneur’s problem can be written as
VY,et (at, yt, θt) = maxct,at+1,kt,nt
{u(ct)+ βpiyEt
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
+ β(1−piy)EtWO,et+1(at+1, θt+1)},
(2.18)
subject to
Yet = θt
(
kγt (1+ nt)
1−γ
)ν − δkt − rt(kt − at)− wtnt, (2.19)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tet (Yet ) + at, (2.20)
0 ≤ at+1, (2.21)
0 ≤ nt, (2.22)
0 ≤ kt ≤ (1+ d)at. (2.23)
Working capital kt includes own and borrowed assets. Yet is the entrepreneur’s
total profit. Following Evans and Jovanovic [1989], we set d as an exogenous bor-
rowing limit. The term WO,et+1(at+1, θt+1) is the value function of the old entrepreneur
at the beginning of the subsequent period, before deciding whether to stay as an
entrepreneur or retire, after the annuity purchase decision. This is different from the
young worker’s decision because he has no choice but to retire.
20 Annuity and Estate Taxation in an Entrepreneurship Model
The old individual’s problem is given as follows:
VOt (at,∆, θt) = max
{
VO,et (at,∆, θt),V
O,r
t (at,∆)
}
VOt is the value function of the old individual in the current period before deciding
whether to stay as an entrepreneur or retire. VO,et is the value function for the old
entrepreneur who stays as an entrepreneur and VO,rt is the value function for the
retirees. VOt is different from W
O
t in that V
O
t has ∆ as its argument, while W
O
t does
not. ∆ is the annual annuity payment received and hence a state variable for the old
individual. Individuals who have the same amount of assets (and possibly same θt if
they are entrepreneurs) would save differently if their ∆ differ.
The old retiree’s problem is given by
VO,rt (at,∆) = maxct,at+1
{u(ct) + βpioVO,rt+1(at+1,∆) + β(1− pio)Et[VYt+1(anett+1, yt+1, θt+1)]}
(2.24)
subject to
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = (1+ rt)at + p+ ∆− Twt (rtat + p+ ∆) (2.25)
0 ≤ at+1 (2.26)
0 ≤ ∆ (2.27)
The old retired individual receives a social security transfer payment p in every
period along with an annuity payment ∆. The annuity payment is a consequence of
the annuity contract made immediately after the young individual turned old. Once
the annuity contract is made, ∆ is a constant throughout the old individual’s entire
life. We assume as in Pashchenko [2013] that the annuity purchase decision is made
only once at the time of retirement. anett+1 is the amount of the net intended bequests.
anett+1 =
{
(1− τb)(at+1 − ex) + ex if at+1 > ex
at+1 if at+1 ≤ ex
.
The expected value of the offspring’s value function is taken with respect to the
joint invariant distribution of yt and θt. This reflects the fact that the offspring’s
ability does not depend on her parent’s ability. The old entrepreneur’s problem is
given by
VO,et (at,∆, θt) = maxct,at+1,kt,nt
{u(ct)+ βpioEt[VOt+1(at+1,∆, θt+1)]+ β(1−pio)Et
[
VYt+1(a
net
t+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
},
(2.28)
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subject to
Yet = θt
(
kγt (1+ nt)
1−γ
)ν − δkt − rt(kt − at)− wtnt + ∆, (2.29)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tet (Yet ) + at, (2.30)
0 ≤ at+1, (2.31)
0 ≤ nt, (2.32)
0 ≤ ∆, (2.33)
0 ≤ kt ≤ (1+ d)at. (2.34)
The expected value of the offspring’s value function with respect to yt is com-
puted using the invariant distribution of yt. The expected value of the offspring’s
value function with respect to θt is conditional on the parent’s θt and evolves accord-
ing to the same Markov process. This reflects the fact that the offspring may inherit
her parent’s entrepreneurial ability and business.
2.3.6 Annuity Contract
Now, we explain how to construct the annuity contract and the value function
when the old decide to purchase annuities: WO,rt (at) and W
O,e
t (at, θt). When the
young turn old, they have an option to buy annuity contracts. Here, we assume
that annuities are immediate (income) annuities, that is, annuity payments are made
immediately after the contract is bought. We assume that the contract is made imme-
diately after the young turn old and before the old make any saving decisions. The
annuity contract is defined as in Lockwood [2012]:
A(∆) =
∞
∑
t=1
∆
(
pio
1+ rt
)t
1− λ
A(∆) stands for an annuity premium paying a constant real income of ∆ until
the individual dies. Since individuals can live forever with a positive probability, we
define the contract as an infinite sum. λ is the annuity load. If λ = 0, the annuity
product is actuarially fair. An annuity with 10% load (λ = 0.1) pays on average 90
cents per dollar of the premium.
The value function of the old retirees making an annuity purchase decision is
given by
WO,rt (at) = max∆
VO,rt (at − A(∆),∆),
where VO,rt is defined in the equation (24). If an individual’s current net worth is
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less than A, that individual cannot afford to buy such a contract. We assume for
simplicity that individuals purchase annuities if A < at. In reality, annuity providers
can apply different restrictions than the one we imposed here. In the equation above,
retired individuals choose an annuity contract to maximize their lifetime utilities.
WO,rt enters the young workers’ value functions when they turn old. This is because
they need to make a decision regarding their annuity purchases before making saving
decisions.
The value function of the old entrepreneur making an annuity purchase decision
is given by
WO,et (at, θt) = max∆
VOt (at − A(∆),∆, θt)
= max
∆
[
max
{
VO,et (at − A(∆),∆, θt),VO,rt (at − A(∆),∆)
}]
.
Immediately after turning old, entrepreneurs make an annuity purchase decision.
This decision is made before other economic decisions such as whether entrepreneurs
remain so or become a retiree and how much they save during the rest of their lives.
2.3.7 Equilibrium Definition
Each individual’s state vector is given by st = (at,∆, yt, θt, ξt). at stands for
the current asset holdings. ∆ ∈ R+ is the annuity payment received each year. The
income process, yt ∈ Y = {y1, y2, y3, y4, y5}, is an AR(1) process. θt ∈ Θ = {0, θ}
is an entrepreneurial ability. We can think of θt as an idea to start or maintain a
business. An individual with no idea or ability to maintain a business has θt = 0.
ξt ∈ Ξ = {YW,YE,OE,OW} stands for an occupational status: young workers,
young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retirees, respectively. Note that ∆
appears as a state variable for old individuals only because young individuals do
not buy annuities. The entire state space is given by S = R+ ×R+ ×Y× Θ × Ξ.
We can generate the transition matrix, Γt(st, st+1), by using the decision rules that
solve the maximization problems and the exogenous Markov process for income and
entrepreneurial ability. The transition function provides the probability distribution
of the subsequent period’s state conditional on the current state.
A stationary equilibrium is given by a risk-free interest rate rt, wage rate wt, tax
functions Twt (·) and Tet (·), tax rates τct , τb, and τbalt , social security payment p, alloca-
tions of consumption, ct(st), savings, at(st), investment, kt(st), entrepreneurial labor
hiring, nt(st), annuity purchase, ∆(st), and a constant distribution of households
over the state variables, Φ∗ such that given, rt,wt, and taxes, the following apply.
• The allocations ct, at,∆, kt, nt solve the individual’s optimization problem for
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each state st ∈ S.
• rt = ∂F(K
c
t ,L
c
t )
∂Kct
− δ: the marginal product of capital net depreciation in the cor-
porate sector is equal to the risk-free interest rate. wt =
∂F(Kct ,L
c
t )
∂Lct
: the marginal
product of labor employed in the corporate sector is equal to the wage rate.
• The capital markets clear.∫
st
kt(st)dΦt(st) + Kct + Dt =
∫
st
at(st)dΦt(st) +
∫
st
∆(st)dΦt(st)
• Total assets, ∫st at(st)dΦt(st), are equal to the sum of the total capital in the
entrepreneurial sector,
∫
st
k(st)dΦt(st), the total capital in the corporate sector,
Kct , and the total government debt, Dt.
• Labor markets clear.∫
st
nt(st)dΦt(st) + Lct =
∫
st
l(st)dΦt(st)
• Total efficient labor, ∫st l(st)dΦt(st), is equal to the sum of the total hired labor
in the entrepreneurial sector,
∫
st
nt(st)dΦt(st), and the total labor employed in
the corporate sector, Lct .
• The government’s budget is balanced: income, consumption, and estate tax
revenues plus net borrowing equal government purchases, total transfers, and
interest payments on debt. 10 is the indicator function, which equals to one
if the person is old, and zero otherwise. ∆r is the fraction of retirees in the
population determined endogenously. In the steady state, we must have Dt =
D¯.∫
st
(
Tst (Y
s) + τct ct(st) + 1o(st)τ
b(1− pio)max{0, anett+1(st)− ex}
)
dΦt(st) + Dt+1
= g+ p∆r + (1+ rt)Dt
• The distribution of people, Φ∗, is the invariant distribution for the economy. It
is determined by
Φ′t+1 = Γt(st, st+1)
′Φ′t
In the steady state, Φt = Φ∗.
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2.3.8 The Transition Path between Steady States
We first compute the initial steady state with estate taxation. In order to un-
derstand the relationship between annuity holdings and estate taxation, the estate
tax is abolished. We do one of the following to balance the government’s budget:
adjusting the proportional income tax rate, adjusting the consumption tax rate, and
adjusting government purchases. Notice that when we adjust one instrument, the
other instruments are kept fixed.
When one of the tax instruments is used to balance the budget, we assume that
the government adjusts it for ten years. After the tenth year, the tax rate is set to its
final steady state value. The level of the tax in the first ten years is determined by
satisfying the government’s budget constraint in the present value. The tax schedules
are assumed to be piecewise linear and continuous over this ten-year period. We use
the tax rate at the fifth year as a free parameter to balance the budget.8 When we use
government spending to balance the government’s budget, the reduction in spending
is determined from the budget balance in terms of the present value as well.
Individuals reoptimize their behavior after the abolition of the estate taxes and
the changes in governmental instruments. Between the initial steady state and the
final steady state, the economy is in transition. In order to compute the optimal
decision rule during the transition, we initially guess the time path for the interest
rate. We solve the optimization problem backward from the final steady state to
the initial steady state. Then, the implied time path for the interest rate is computed
from the optimal decision rules. The transition period is much longer than the period
when the tax changes because the distribution and prices would take time to adjust
to the final steady state.
2.4 Calibration
Table 2.1 lists the parameters that are taken as given from the existing literature
and data. Table 2.2 lists the parameters of the model chosen by us. These parameter
values are chosen in such a way that the moments generated in the initial steady
state are approximately equal to those in the observed data. Since our model is an
extension of Cagetti and De Nardi [2009], we intentionally ascribed mostly the same
parameter values those reported in their study to ours.
The first set of parameters is related to preferences, technology, and demograph-
ics. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is set equal to 1.5 as in Attanasio et al.
8One can assume other kinds of tax schedules. For example, the tax rate can be constant over the
ten-year period and then become equal to its final steady state value.
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Parameters Values Sources
σ 1.5 Attanasio et al. (1999)
δ 0.06 Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
α 0.33 Gollin (2002)
A 1.0 Normalization
piy 0.9778 Average working life 45 years
pio 0.911 Average retirement life 11 years
y, Py See text Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
p 40% average yearly income Kotlikoff et al. (1999)
g 18.7% of GDP Economic report of the president (2000)
D 3% of GDP Altig et al. (2001)
τc 11% Altig et al. (2001)
bw 0.32 Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
be 0.26 Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
sw 0.22 Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
se 0.42 Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
pw 0.76 Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
pe 1.4 Cagetti & De Nardi (2009)
Table 2.1: Fixed parameters and their sources
[1999]. The depreciation rate is set to 6% as in Stokey and Rebelo [1995]. The capital
share in the corporate sector is 0.33 as in Gollin [2002]. The technology level, A, is
normalized to 1. The probabilities of staying young, piy, and staying old, pio, are set
to 0.9778 and 0.9110, respectively, to make the average lengths of working life and
retirement life equal to 45 and 11 years, respectively. The second set of parameters
are related to the labor income process and social security payments. The logarithm
of labor income process, y, is assumed to follow AR(1) process. Following Storeslet-
ten et al., we set its persistence to 0.95. The variance of income process is chosen to
match the Gini coefficient of earnings, which is calculated as 0.38 by using the PSID
following Cagetti and De Nardi [2009]. The AR(1) process is approximated with a
five-point discrete Markov chain by using Tauchen and Hussey [1991] algorithm. The
social security payment, p, is equal to 40% of the average yearly gross income as in
Kotlikoff et al. [1999]. The third set of parameters is related to public expenditures,
government debt, and taxes. The government expenditure is set equal to 18.7% of
GDP following Cagetti and De Nardi [2009]. We set the consumption tax rate to 11%
as in Altig et al. [2001]. Following Altig et al. [2001], we set the ratio of government
debt to total capital to 0.27 so that given the equilibrium interest rate, total interest
payments on government debt are around 3% of output. The parameter values of the
Gouveia–Strauss tax function are taken from Cagetti and De Nardi [2009].
26 Annuity and Estate Taxation in an Entrepreneurship Model
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the target moments in the data.
The discount factor, β, is taken to be 0.8982. We assume that the income process and
the entrepreneurial ability process evolve independently. The entrepreneurial ability
takes only two values, θ ∈ {0, 1.09}.9 β and θ govern the level of capital and hence pin
down the capital-to-GDP ratio. The transition matrix, Pθ , is set to
[
0.97 0.03
0.2 0.8
]
so
that the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy matches the data. The decreasing
returns to scale in the entrepreneurial sector, ν, is 0.88. The share of income going
to entrepreneurial working capital, γ, is 0.84. These two parameters determine the
fraction of entrepreneurs who hire on the labor market and the ratio of the median
net worth of entrepreneurs to that of the workers. The estate tax rate, τb, is 16% and
the exemption level, ex, is around $4.5 million. These tax values would differ from
those of the statutory estate tax rate and exemption level as they reflect the legal tax
avoidance behavior. They allow us to match the percentage of the estate tax revenue
to GDP and the percentage of estates paying taxes. The borrowing limit, d, is 1.1 so
that entrepreneurs can borrow up to 2.1 times their current net worth.10 In the data,
the annuity load is somewhere between 10% and 15% (see Mitchell et al. [1999]). In
our calibration exercises, we set the annuity load to 10%. It affects the percentage of
the annuity ownership in the economy. Table 2.2 displays the calibrated parameters
and Table 2.3 displays the target moments and the model-generated moments.
Calibrated parameters Values
β 0.898
θ 1.09
Pθ
[
0.97 0.03
0.2 0.8
]
ν 0.88
γ 0.84
τb 0.16
ex 100
d 1.1
λ 10 %
Table 2.2: Calibrated parameters
9We use only two values because the addition of annuity contract increases computational time
significantly even without imperfect enforceability.
10Evans and Jovanovic [1989] set d = 0.5 in a static model where the production function does not
include hired labor decision. We set d = 1.1 to match the data moments.
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Targets Data Model
Capital to GDP ratio 3 2.99
% Entrepreneurs 7.5 7.71
% Exiting Entrepreneurs 22–24 22.18
% Workers to Entrepreneurs 2–3 2.35
Ratio of median net worth of entrepreneur to worker 6–7 6.71
%Zero wealth 7–13 14.93
%Bequest revenue to GDP 0.2–0.3 0.29
%Estates paying taxes 1.5–2.0 1.91
%Entrepreneur hiring workers 50–60 50
%Annuity ownership in economy 5 5.45
Table 2.3: Target moments
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Annuity Ownership
Our benchmark model economy successfully generates the annuity holding rate
and the wealth distribution simultaneously. In the model economy, 5.45% of individ-
uals own annuities, which is close to the 5% annuity ownership rate we observed in
the data.11
Since the model distinguishes between entrepreneurs and workers, we can ob-
serve their annuity holdings separately: the percentage of annuity ownership for
retired and entrepreneurial households are 5.55% and 1.88%, respectively. It is clear
that most of the annuity demand comes from retired workers, while only a small
fraction of the entrepreneurs demand annuities.
As we can see from Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1, the benchmark model (model with
annuities) can capture the wealth distribution very well. From Table 4, we can also
see that the model without annuities, which is quite similar to that of Cagetti and
De Nardi [2009], can also capture the wealth distribution.
11In the data, the annuity load is somewhere between 10% and 15% (see Mitchell et al. [1999]). In
our calibration exercises, we set the annuity load to 9.75%.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of wealth
% Top Wealth
Wealth Gini 1% 5 % 20 % 40 % %zero wealth
Data 0.85 35.5 62.9 81 95 14
Model with annuities 0.83 32.9 63.3 87.07 95.37 14.93
Model without annuities 0.84 33.1 63.5 87.13 95.4 14.94
Table 2.4: Wealth distribution from the top (SCF(2013) data)
The annuity ownership rate is substantially low. In the steady state, equilibrium
interest rate is 3.38%. At this interest rate, fully altruistic households need to make
an up-front payment of $20, 500 to buy an annuity contract that pays $2, 500 annu-
ally. This up-front payment, in turn, reduces the amount of bequests that can be left.
Since old individuals face the probability of dying, they would prefer not buying
annuities in order to increase the amount of bequests they would like to leave, that
is, they prefer leaving higher bequests over short-term higher personal consumption
levels. In other words, fully altruistic individuals’ bequest motives restrict the per-
centage of annuity ownership as it is demonstrated in the previous literature (see,
e.g., Lockwood [2012] and Pashchenko [2013]).
In the model, the estate tax exemption level is $4, 500, 000, which means that
individuals whose net worth is above this level are taxed on their estates. Retired
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households whose net worth is below $943, 000 and above $2, 600, 000 do not buy
annuities (see Table 2.6). This is because individuals who have net worth above
$2, 600, 000 regard their bequests as luxury goods, that is, high-net-worth individuals
enjoy leaving bequests more since this generates higher lifetime utilities than an
increase in the personal consumption level. On the other hand, individuals whose
net worth is below $943, 000 find the annual government transfer of $22, 000 enough
for protection against the longevity risk and hence do not buy annuities.12 According
to Iacoviello [2011], housing wealth is about one half of total household net worth
and is almost two- thirds of the total net worth for the median households. If we
consider this , the amount of annuity purchase in our model is about 7–14 % of non-
housing wealth, which is close to what Butrica and Mermin [2006] found by using
the HRS data. When we account for housing wealth, old retirees whose net worth is
less than $300,000 and higher than $900,000 (see Figure 2.2).
In general, old entrepreneurs who can maintain their businesses (θ > 0) do not
buy annuities. This is because it is not worthwhile for them to use a portion of
their assets to buy annuities because they already receive substantial entrepreneurial
incomes. The intuition is similar to the one given above. Most entrepreneurs receive
high entrepreneurial income and they would like to leave bequests. Since annuities
cannot be bequeathed, they prefer not buying annuities. Old entrepreneurs facing
negative entrepreneurial shocks (θ = 0) have a similar annuity purchase decision as
retired workers. This is because when old entrepreneurs become retired, they stay
retired till they die.
Annual annuity payments received ranges from $2, 500 to $14, 500. The aver-
age annual contract payment of old retirees is $8, 909, which is in line with what
we observed in data.13 The amount of annuity purchase is not monotonically in-
creasing with an increase in net worth. This is in line with the earlier findings in
the literature.14 The non-monotonic behavior probably comes from the fact that be-
quest is a luxurious good. Individuals who buy annuities buy higher amount of
annuities when their net worth increases. However, when their net worth reaches a
12This transfer captures all types of transfers to individuals, and hence, it is the same for every
retiree.
13Mitchell et al. [1999] reports that the average annuity premium is $79,600 by using the data pro-
vided by Life Insurance Marketing Research Association in 1995. This is equivalent to $9,600 annual
contract payment when we set the interest rate to the benchmark rate we computed. Butrica and Mer-
min [2006] reports that 14% of average net worth among married adults is private annuity, which equals
to $52,831 or equivalent to $6,400 annual contract payment by using the HRS Data for years 2000 and
2001. The annual contract payment of old retirees generated from the model falls between these two
values. This suggests that the amount of annuity purchase generated from the benchmark model is
sufficiently realistic.
14For instance, Pashchenko [2013] shows that annuity purchases are not monotonically increasing
and the maximum annual payment is less than $5, 000 when only bequest motives are considered. Our
model differs from that of Pashchenko by considering entrepreneurial decisions and estate taxes .
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certain level, they value bequests more than increases in their consumption levels.
Our model captures bequest motives in buying annuities only. It is possible that
some other factors that are not considered in the model would be responsible for
non-monotonicity.
Figure 2.2: Annuity ownership among those who buy annuities
2.5.2 Policy Experiments
2.5.2.1 Abolishing the Estate Tax
In this section, we explore the effects of abolishing the estate tax on the annuity
purchase decisions. We do this under three different scenarios. In the first sce-
nario, we increase the proportional income tax rate τbal to compensate the loss in
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the government’s revenue by assuming that the government’s expenditures are kept
constant. In the second scenario, we increase the consumption tax rate τc to keep the
government’s budget balanced. In the third scenario, we cut the government’s ex-
penditures as the revenue from the estate tax disappears. Table 2.5 shows the effects
of abolishing estate taxation under these three different scenarios.
K Y τbal τc r
Annuity
ownership
Annuity
ownership
Annuity
ownership
% Wealth held by top
(All) (Retired) (Entrep) 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark Economy
9.32 3.11 3.32 11 3.38 5.45 5.55 1.87 32.9 63.3 76.4 87.1
No estate tax, higher τbal
-5.8% -3.9% 4.56 11 3.70 0.79 0.81 0.33 33.1 63.1 76.3 86.9
No estate tax, higher τc
+0.9% +0.3% 3.32 11.4 3.29 5.70 5.81 1.84 33.6 64.1 76.8 87.3
No estate tax, lower g/Y
+0.9% +0.3% 3.32 11 3.28 5.69 5.81 1.84 33.6 64.1 76.8 87.3
Table 2.5: Abolishing the estate tax and annuity ownership
In the first scenario, the proportional income tax rate increases from 3.32% to
4.56% to balance the budget. The annuity ownership rate decreases substantially
from 5.45% to 0.79%. This decrease in the annuity ownership is mainly caused by
the change in the old retirees’ annuity demand. The old entrepreneurs’ annuity de-
mand does not change substantially. The increase in interest rate makes the annuity
product cheaper than before. However, the increase in the proportional income tax
rate makes individuals relatively poorer. Since the latter effect is stronger than the
former effect, the annuity demand decreases. Table 2.6 shows that the policy change
affects both the threshold levels and the minimum and maximum amount of annuity
contracts bought. In the benchmark, individuals who have net worth over $943, 000
(i.e., the minimum net worth required to buy the annuity contract) buy annuity con-
tracts. However, in the new regime, the minimum net worth required to buy the
annuity contract increased to $2, 066, 000. In the benchmark, the upper bound of net
worth is $2, 676, 000. Over this value, individuals do not buy annuities. Under the
new policy, this upper bound decreases and becomes $2, 422, 000. Table 2.7 shows
that in the benchmark economy, when individuals have $1, 000, 000 net worth, they
buy an annuity contract that pays $4, 500 annually. When they have $2, 000, 000,
they buy a contract that pays $13, 500 annually. In the new policy, they do not buy
the annuity contract when they have $1, 000, 000 net worth. When their net worth
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increases to $2, 000, 000, they buy a contract that pays $4, 000 annually. These two
tables demonstrate that a higher income tax rate strongly affects the relatively low
income individuals and hence they end up having less resources to allocate for an-
nuity purchase.
Minimum
net worth
Maximum
net worth
Minimum
Purchase
Maximum
Purchase
Benchmark
943,000 2,676,000 2,500 14,500
No estate tax (adjusting proportional income tax)
2,066,000 2,422,000 4,000 14,500
Table 2.6: Minimum and maximum net worth to buy annuities and minimum and maximum
contract for annual payment (in dollars)
Net worth (millions) Benchmark
No estate tax
(adjusting proportional income tax)
1 4,500 0
2 13,500 4,000
Table 2.7: Annual contract payment for those having net worth at 1 and 2 millions
In the second scenario, the consumption tax rate is increased slightly from 11% to
11.4% to keep the government’s budget balanced.15 This increase in the consumption
tax rate is not substantial compared to the increase in the proportional income tax
rate. The relatively higher consumption tax rate causes a lower equilibrium interest
rate. The lower interest rate makes the annuity product more expensive than before.
Although the annuity product is now more expensive, individuals do not decrease
their annuity demand. In fact, the annuity demand increases slightly. This is because
the positive revenue effect generated by a lower estate tax rate is larger. The slightly
lower interest rate promotes a higher investment level, and hence, the aggregate
output is higher.
In the third scenario, we decrease the government’s expenditures while keeping
the income and consumption tax rates constant. The annuity ownership structure in
this case is very similar to that of scenario 2.
In the next section, we conduct further counterfactuals to understand the complex
dynamics between annuity holdings and estate taxes. For simplicity, whenever we
15This is close to the value in the model without annuities, although the consumption tax time path
is different. See Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] for more details.
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change the parameters of the estate tax, we adjust the proportional income tax rate
to keep the government’s budget balanced.
2.5.2.2 Additional Experiments
In this section, we conduct the following experiments: increasing the estate tax
rate, removing the exemption level pertaining to the estate tax, increasing the amount
of preannuitized assets, and increasing the minimum purchase requirement of the
annuity contracts. In this section, for simplicity, whenever we change the estate tax
rate, we adjust the proportional income tax rate to keep the government’s budget
balanced. The main results are given in Table 2.8. Table 2.9 displays the minimum
and maximum amounts of net worth required to buy annuities along with maximum
and minimum annual annuity contract payments.
Increasing the effective estate tax rate from 16% to 20% yields more revenue from
the estate tax system and causes a decrease in the proportional income tax rate.
Therefore, relatively low-net-worth individuals end up with more resources to al-
locate to the purchase of annuity contracts. In this case, the minimum amount of
net worth required to buy an annuity contract decreases to $803, 000, which is much
lower than that of the benchmark case. The annuity ownership rate increases to
6.71%, which is much larger than that of the benchmark economy. As in the bench-
mark economy, the main demand comes from the old workers.
When we decrease the exemption level from $4, 500, 000 to 0, all individuals in
this economy face estate taxes. Therefore, the revenue comes from the estate tax sys-
tem increases that cause a decrease in the proportional income tax rate. In this case,
the minimum amount of net worth required to buy an annuity contract decreases to
$216, 000. In this regime, all individuals face estate taxes, and hence, leaving estates
becomes more expensive for all spectrum of net worth groups. Because of an increase
in the relative price of bequests, individuals find annuity products more attractive
and start buying them even when their net worth levels are relatively low. More
interestingly, the annuity ownership rate increases to 24.1%. This spectacular in-
crease is caused by an increase in old workers’ annuity demand. The entrepreneurs’
demand slightly decreases compared to the benchmark case. Our results here re-
garding the exemption level do not correspond to those of Section 2. This is because
in Section 2, we ignore the general equilibrium effects. When we consider the gen-
eral equilibrium effects, we show that the annuity purchase increases because of a
decrease in the proportional income tax rate.16
16When the exemption is removed and the estate tax rate is reduced from 16% to 8%, the percentage
of annuity ownership declines from 24.1% to 13.5%. When the exemption is removed and the estate tax
rate is raised from 16% to 24%, the percentage of annuity ownership increases from 24.1% to 29%.
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% Ownership
(All)
%Ownership
(Retired)
%Ownership
(Entrep)
τbal r
Benchmark
5.45 5.55 1.87 3.32 3.38
No estate tax
0.79 0.81 0.33 4.56 3.70
Increase in estate tax rate
6.71 6.86 1.37 2.93 3.32
No exemption level
24.1 24.7 1.37 2.37 3.41
Increase in preannuitized assets
0.08 0.05 0.88 7.17 4.71
Increase in minimum purchase
4.83 4.97 0.03 3.32 3.38
Table 2.8: Counterfactual analyses when the proportional income tax is adjusted
Now, we increase the social security replacement rate from 40% to 60% so that
each retiree receives $31,500 annually instead of $22,500. To finance this increase, the
proportional income tax rate raises to 7.17%. This increase in the amount of prean-
nuitized assets decreases demand for annuities substantially. The annuity ownership
rate becomes closer to zero. This abrupt decrease is caused by the decrease in the old
workers’ annuity demand.
In the benchmark case, the minimum annual contract can be less than $2,500.
Now, we increase this minimum contract requirement to $5,000. Since this change
does not affect the government’s budget, the proportional income tax rate does not
change. The increase in the minimum purchase requirement decreases the annuity
ownership rate from 5.48% 4.83%. Interestingly, this change affects entrepreneurs’
annuity demands relatively more than those of workers: entrepreneurs’ annuity own-
ership rate decreases from 1.87% to 0.03%. This indicates that the entrepreneurs in
general demand lower annual payment annuity contracts when they buy annuities.
In summary, Table 2.8 displays that most of the changes in the annuity demand
come from the old retirees. This means that entrepreneurs do not have considerable
interest in purchasing annuities.
2.5.3 Transitional Dynamics and Welfare Analysis
In this section, we direct our attention to the experiment in which we set the
estate tax rate to zero. For each policy option, we describe the transition path to the
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Minimum
net worth
Maximum
net worth
Minimum
Purchase
Maximum
Purchase
Benchmark
943,000 2,676,000 2,500 14,500
No estate tax,
2,066,000 2,422,000 4,000 14,500
Increase in estate tax
676,000 2,676,000 6,500 14,500
No exemption level
216,000 2,676,000 2,500 14,500
Increase in preannuitized assets
0 0 0 0
Increase in minimum purchase
1,018,000 2,676,000 5,000 14,500
Table 2.9: Minimum and maximum net worth to buy annuities and minimum and maximum
contract for annual payment (in dollars)
steady state and analyze the welfare implications.17
We use a standard compensating equivalent variation (CEV) welfare measure: a
fraction of consumption is required to make someone indifferent between the new
and the old policies while considering the whole transition path . If the CEV is a
positive number, this indicates a welfare gain. The horizontal axis represents one’s
net worth when the policy change is announced. The solid line represents the cu-
mulative distribution of individuals at the time of the announcement of the policy
reform. The scale for the cumulative distribution function is given on the right-hand
side of the graph. The black line displays the welfare changes for an individual with
the middle ability level as a worker and the lowest ability level as an entrepreneur.
The red line displays the welfare changes for an individual with the highest ability
level as an entrepreneur.
Adjusting the Proportional Income Tax Rate Figure 2.3 displays time paths for
the proportional income tax rate, total capital in the economy, the retirees’ annuity
ownership rates, and the entrepreneurs’ annuity ownership rates, respectively. Fig-
ure 2.3a plots the implied path of the proportional income tax rate over time. During
the transition, the proportional income tax rate reaches its lowest level in year 5 and
raises to its final steady state level (4.56%) in year 10. Since the government budget
needs to be satisfied in present value terms, the presence of annuities causes a reduc-
17We first compute the initial steady state and the final steady state, and then, we compute wel-
fare along the transition path. We look at how households optimize their policy function along the
transition.
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tion in the proportional income tax rates in early years. Figure 2.3b displays that total
capital stock in the economy overshoots after the first few years of the abolishment
of estate tax but it eventually declines to its final steady state level. The increase
in the proportional income tax rate affects all of the individuals in the economy
since it decreases non-entrepreneurs’ return from asset holdings and entrepreneurs’
return from investing in capital. As in Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] , the young
entrepreneurs and relatively poor entrepreneurs do not benefit from the estate tax
elimination. Hence, non-entrepreneurs reduce their asset holdings and young and
relatively poor entrepreneurs reduce their capital investments. Since the increase in
the proportional income tax rate is quite high, total capital in the economy declines
to a certain degree. In Cagetti and De Nardi [2009], the increase in the proportional
income tax rate is relatively low and hence, the benefit of abolishing the estate tax ex-
ceeds the cost of increasing the proportional income tax rate, that is, the total capital
increases slightly. The time path for aggregate output is similar to the capital.
Figure 2.3: Time path of proportional income tax, capital, and annuity ownership rates
when eliminating the estate tax and increasing proportional income tax
Figures 2.3c and 2.3d show the time paths for annuity ownership for retirees and
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entrepreneurs. The annuity ownership rates for both groups decrease over time and
reaches their corresponding final steady state levels. The overall annuity ownership
rate in the economy is almost equal to that of retirees since retirees are responsible
for most of the annuity demand.
Figures 2.4a and 2.4b report the CEVs for this policy change. The majority of
young individuals either lose or not gain substantially from this policy change. In
4a the c.d.f. indicates that 90% of the young are below $1,000,000 net worth. Work-
ers (low θ) who have net worth up to $1,000,000 either does not gain or lose from
this reform. Entrepreneurs (high θ) up to $1,000,000 net worth are slightly better
off. Intuition here is similar to that of Cagetti and De Nardi [2009]. Young work-
ers do not get any benefit at all from the removal of the estate tax while their net
income decreases due to the increase in the proportional income tax rate. Young
entrepreneurs do not gain substantially because they are still at early stages of their
life-span and removal of estate tax does not provide much benefit for them. Majority
of old non-entrepreneurs face welfare losses because of the policy change. Majority
of old entrepreneurs face slight welfare gains. Only a small number of wealthy old
entrepreneurs face a substantial welfare gain. For these individuals leaving bequests
are much cheaper and hence, they can leave more bequests at a lower cost (revenue
effect) and increase their own private consumption (substitution effect). The average
CEV under this regime is -0.0043%.18
18The average CEV is computed by
∫
st
[(
V2(st)
VINITIAL(st)
) 1
1−γ − 1
]
dΦt(st), where V2 is the value
function in the second period computed backward for the final steady state.
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Figure 2.4: Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and increasing
proportional income tax
Adjusting the Consumption Tax Rate Figure 2.5 displays time paths for the con-
sumption tax rate, total capital in the economy, the retirees’ annuity ownership rates,
and the entrepreneurs’ annuity ownership rates, respectively when we adjust the
consumption tax rate to balance the government’s budget. The consumption tax rate
increases linearly to its final steady state level. Total capital increases starting year
1 and overshoots its final steady state value in year 40. After year 40, total cap-
ital starts decreasing slightly and reaches to its final steady state level. The time
path for aggregate output looks similar. The annuity ownership rate of retirees over-
shoots in the first few years and then moves to its final steady state value, which is
slightly higher than its initial steady state value. The annuity ownership rate of en-
trepreneurs drops over time. With an increase in total capital, the equilibrium interest
rate decreases. Although this makes annuities more expensive, the positive general
equilibrium feedback effects due to increased capital stock results in higher annuity
purchase. Entrepreneurs on the other hand, decrease their annuity purchases over
time. This is because especially young entrepreneurs find that investing in capital is
cheaper and prefer capital investment over annuities.
Figure 2.6a displays that young individuals (both entrepreneurs and workers)
lose from this reform because they pay higher consumption taxes and are not wealthy
enough to benefit from abolishing the estate tax. The decrease in the interest rate low-
ers young workers and old retirees’ income whose net worth consist of a large share
of capital. In addition to this, they pay higher consumption taxes. Non-entrepreneur
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Figure 2.5: Time path of consumption tax, capital, and annuity ownership rates when elim-
inating the estate tax and increasing consumption tax
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Figure 2.6: Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and increasing
consumption tax
young individuals should have a higher net worth than $15 million and entrepreneur
young individuals need $8 million to benefit from the estate tax break.
Old entrepreneurs gain from the policy change when their net worth exceeds
approximately $2 million and old workers gain from the policy change when their
net worth exceeds approximately $6 million. The welfare losses are no more than
1% of yearly consumption for most of individuals. Magnitudes of young and old
individuals’ welfare gains are similar to those of the earlier case. The average CEV
under this regime is -0.25%.
Adjusting the Government Spending Figure 2.7 displays the time paths for total
capital in the economy, the retirees’ annuity ownership rates, and the entrepreneurs’
annuity ownership rates, respectively. The time paths for total capital and the re-
tirees’ annuity ownership rates are very similar to those of the case in which we
adjusted the consumption tax rate. The time path of the entrepreneurs’ annuity
ownership rate differs because in this case, the entrepreneurs do not decrease their
annuity holdings significantly.
§2.5 Results 41
Figure 2.7: Time path of capital and the annuity ownership rates when eliminating the estate
tax and decreasing government expenditures
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Figure 2.8: Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and decreas-
ing government expenditures
Figure 2.8a shows that most of the young workers face welfare losses unless they
have a high net worth more than $20 million. The decrease in the interest rate makes
young workers worse off since the return from the asset holdings is an important
income source for this group. Most of the young entrepreneurs, on the other hand,
gain from this policy change. Young entrepreneurs as in the earlier case face lower
interest rates and can borrow at lower rates, which is welfare improving for them.
Notice that young workers do not have this option. Since the proportional income
and consumption taxes are kept constant, there is no counter mechanism that would
affect young entrepreneurs’ welfare negatively. Hence, in contrast to the earlier two
cases, young entrepreneurs’ welfare increase substantially in this case.
Relatively poor old entrepreneurs do not face welfare losses and rich ones face
substantial welfare gains. The relatively poor do not gain substantially because their
wealth is lower than the effective exemption level. Since they do not face an increase
in the tax rates, they do not lose as well. Wealthy entrepreneurs gain substantially
from the estate tax break as usual. Old retirees need to have more than $5 million
to benefit from the estate tax break. They face welfare loss most of the time because
of lower return from their investments due to the decrease in the interest rate. The
average CEV for this case is -0.09%.
In order highlight the role of annuities in our welfare calculations, we conducted
a welfare analysis for the model that does not incorporate the annuity market (this
model is quite similar to that of Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] without imperfect en-
forceability). Since time paths are virtually same in the two models, we do not report
the time paths but report figures pertaining to welfare only (see Appendix). When
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we compare Figures 2.4, 2.6, and 2.8 with Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 in Appendix, we
see that the old entrepreneurs in the economy without annuities are relatively worse
off than the old entrepreneurs in the economy with annuities. This substantiates the
claim that the old retirees are worse off than the old entrepreneurs because change
in government policies affects annuity purchase.
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we conduct several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our
results. We start this section with setting the altruism parameter, η to 0.96, that is, the
individuals are less altruistic. In Table 2.10, the annuity ownership rate substantially
increases and becomes 15.8%. As one can expect, when individuals become less
altruistic, they increase their annuity purchases. Interestingly, this increase is solely
driven by the increase in the old retirees’ demand. The less altruistic entrepreneurs,
on the other hand, decrease their annuity purchases.
% Ownership
(All)
%Ownership
(Retired)
%Ownership
(Entrep)
τbal r
Decrease in degree of altruism
15.8 16.2 1.1 2.81 3.35
Table 2.10: Sensitivity analysis when the degree of altruism decreases
Now, we vary the values of coefficient of risk aversion, σ, and the social security
replacement rate. For an easier comparison, we generate Table 2.11, which displays
the target moments for the benchmark case, and the three experiments we conducted
earlier: removing the estate tax exemption and setting the estate tax rate to 0% and
20%, respectively.
As we can see from Table 2.12, an increase in σ, increases the annuity ownership
rate. Higher risk aversion implies more consumption smoothing, which in turn mo-
tivates a higher annuity purchase. When we compare Tables 2.11 and 2.12, we see
that the directions of our results do not change.
When we decrease the social security replacement rate, we observe an increase
in the annuity ownership rate (see Table 2.13). A decrease in public- provided pen-
sions increases the demand for privately provided annuities which provide insurance
against the longevity risk. Comparing Tables 2.11 and 2.13 reveals that the directions
of the results do not change with a change in the social security replacement rate.
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σ = 1.5, repl.rate=0.40
Moments Benchmark No exemption τb = 0 τb = 20
Capital/GDP 2.99 3.00 2.94 3.00
%Entr 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
%Exit entr 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2
%Worker to entr 2.35 2.34 2.35 2.35
Median net worth entr/worker 6.71 6.71 6.71 6.71
%Zero wealth 14.93 15.32 14.87 14.91
%Entr hiring worker 50 50 48 50
%Estate tax revenue/GDP 0.29 0.88 0 0.41
%Estates paying taxes 1.91 100 0 1.92
%Annuity ownership 5.45 24.06 0.78 6.71
Table 2.11: Target moments for benchmark and other experiments under original
parameter values
σ = 1.65, repl.rate=0.40
Moments Benchmark No exemption τb = 0 τb = 20
Capital/GDP 3.15 3.14 3.15 3.15
%Entr 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
%Exit entr 22.4 22.3 22.4 22.4
%Worker to entr 2.4 2.35 2.36 2.37
Median net worth entr/worker 6.15 6.42 6.42 6.15
%Zero wealth 15.01 15.21 15.11 14.99
%Entr hiring worker 48 46 46 48
%Estate tax revenue/GDP 0.34 0.83 0 0.47
%Estates paying taxes 2.17 100 0 2.17
%Annuity ownership 11.84 25.54 9.85 11.98
Table 2.12: Target moments for benchmark and other experiments when σ changes
σ = 1.5, repl.rate=0.38
Moments Benchmark No exemption τb = 0 τb = 20
Capital/GDP 3.02 3.01 3.02 3.02
%Entr 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
%Exit entr 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2
%Worker to entr 2.4 2.34 2.35 2.35
Median net worth entr/worker 6.42 6.71 6.71 6.42
%Zero wealth 14.88 15.26 15.08 14.86
%Entr hiring worker 50 50 50 50
%Estate tax revenue/GDP 0.28 0.90 0 0.41
%Estates paying taxes 1.95 100 0 1.96
%Annuity ownership 15.73 29.35 13.79 19.18
Table 2.13: Target moments for benchmark and other experiments when replacement
rate decreases
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2.7 Conclusion
We study the interaction between estate taxation and annuity demand both ana-
lytically and quantitatively. Our quantitative model is rich enough to capture the im-
portant features of the economy such as business investment, borrowing constraints,
estate transmission, and wealth inequality. Having entrepreneurs in the model is
essential to generate a realistic wealth distribution and analyze non-entrepreneurs
(workers) and entrepreneurs’ annuity demands separately.
The simple analytical model gives the direction of the relationship between es-
tate tax rates and annuity demand: lower estate tax rates result in lower annuity
demands.
Our quantitative results show that old entrepreneurs have low annuity ownership
rates. We find that raising the income tax rate to keep the budget balanced affects
the retirees’ annuity purchase decisions substantially. On the other hand, raising the
consumption tax rate or cutting the government’s spending increases the retirees’
annuity demand slightly. The intuition is as follows. An increase in the proportional
income tax rate causes an increase in the equilibrium interest rate, while an increase
in the consumption tax rate and a decrease in the government’s spending cause a
decrease in the interest rate. The higher interest rate makes the annuity product
cheaper than before (substitution effect). The increase in the proportional income tax
rate makes individuals poorer (revenue effect). Since the revenue effect is larger, the
annuity demand decreases when we adjust the proportional income tax rate. When
we adjust the consumption tax rate and the government’s spending, the annuity
product becomes more expensive than before. Although this is the case, individuals
do not decrease their annuity holdings, because the positive revenue effect generated
by a lower estate tax is larger.
The estate tax break makes the entrepreneurs better off in general because be-
quests become relatively cheaper (substitution effect) and their relative wealth in-
creases (income effect). As in Cagetti and De Nardi [2009], the estate tax break
redistributes the welfare from workers to entrepreneurs.
Interestingly, we find that removing the exemption level generates the most strik-
ing result: the annuity ownership rate increases from 5.45% to 24.1%. This result
indicates that if all individuals face the estate tax, the annuity ownership rate in-
creases dramatically. A universal estate tax rate would be a solution to the thin
annuity market problem.
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2.8 Appendix
Figure 2.9: Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and increasing
proportional income tax in the economy without annuities
Figure 2.10: Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and increas-
ing consumption tax in the economy without annuities
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Figure 2.11: Welfare gain for the initial individuals when eliminating estate tax and decreas-
ing government expenditure in the economy without annuities
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Chapter 3
Revisiting Tax on Top Income
3.1 Introduction
Optimal taxation of top income has gained a lot of attention as a natural con-
sequence of the increasing inequalities in income and wealth in the U.S. in the last
40 years.1 This was also a period when marginal income tax rates decreased sub-
stantially.2 Diamond and Saez [2011] survey the static models of optimal taxation of
labor income and argue that the marginal tax rate on top earners in the U.S. should be
about 73%. A number of studies from the quantitative dynamic tax literature reach
significantly different conclusions about optimal tax rates on top income. For exam-
ple, while Badel and Huggett [2015] and Guner et al. [2016] find optimal marginal
tax rates for top income earners to be around 49% and 42% respectively, Kindermann
and Krueger [2017] report an optimal tax rate on the top 1% of earners that is more
than 90%.3
In this paper, we examine the optimal taxation of top income earners in a model
with an entrepreneurial decision making process in the spirit of Cagetti and De
Nardi (2009) and Quadrini [2000]. There are two major reasons why modeling
entrepreneurial activities may be important for this question. First, although en-
trepreneurs represent only 7% of the population, they earn 17% of the total income.
Second, 40% of the top 1% of income earners are entrepreneurs (see Survey of Con-
sumer Finances [2010]). Hence, taking entrepreneurs into account could be poten-
tially important for understanding the implications of top income taxation on wel-
fare, inequality, and government revenues.
We develop a simplified life-cycle model with stochastic aging that includes en-
trepreneurial activity, individual heterogeneity, and endogenous labor supply. In-
dividual heterogeneity stems from differences in entrepreneurial abilities and unin-
1Piketty and Saez [2003] and Alvaredo et al. [2013] provide empirical evidence for this trend.
2Alvaredo et al. [2013] state that the United States experienced a reduction of 47 percentage points
in its top income (federal and local income) tax rate between 1960 and 2009.
3See also Ales et al. [2017]; Ales and Sleet [2016].
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surable productivity shocks. A young individual can choose to be either a worker
or an entrepreneur while an old individual can choose to stay as an entrepreneur
provided that she/he was previously an entrepreneur or become a retiree. The exis-
tence of entrepreneurs helps the model generate a wealth inequality that mimics the
data well.4 We use a parametric tax function proposed by Benabou [2002] to model
the relationship between income and income taxes paid at the federal level as well
as a flat rate income tax that captures state and local taxes, a flat corporate income
tax, and a flat consumption tax. The distribution of income, wealth, and the share
of tax payments by different income quantiles that is generated by the model mimic
the data reasonably well. In this framework we conduct two types of changes in tax
policy: changing the overall progressivity of taxes versus changing the tax rate of the
richest 1% of the population. We examine the impact of these changes on output,
government revenues, wealth inequality, and welfare. First, we shift the tax burden
toward high income earners by increasing the value of the progressivity parameter
and calculate the welfare and revenue-maximizing marginal and average tax rates.
Second, we calculate the welfare and revenue-maximizing tax rate by changing the
tax rate for the top 1% of income earners only. Our results indicate substantial dif-
ferences in output, government revenues, wealth inequality, and welfare across these
experiments.
We find that if the purpose of the government is to maximize government rev-
enues, then increasing the tax rate on the richest 1% of the population to 55% is more
effective then increasing the overall progressivity of taxes. Changing the overall pro-
gressivity of taxes yields the revenue-maximizing effective marginal tax rate for the
richest 1% of households to be 33.1%. In this case, tax revenues from Federal income
tax increase by 5.33%. When we search for the revenue-maximizing marginal tax rate
that targets the richest 1% of the households, we find the optimal marginal tax rate
to be 55%. In this case, revenues from federal income increase by 16.3%. Note that
both of these tax rates are higher than the 22.9% used in the benchmark economy
that is calibrated to the U.S. economy. The stark differences in revenues that we find
are due to the impact of the changes in taxes on labor supply, capital stock, and
output. When the tax rate on the richest 1% of the population is increased to 55%,
labor supply, capital, and output in the economy decline by 0.7%, 8.2%, and 3.9%,
respectively. If overall progressivity is changed, however, labor supply, capital, and
output decline by 1.1%, 15.1%, and 6%, respectively. As we noted before, about 40%
4As a result, models with entrepreneurs are used to explain the implications of tax policies and
financial frictions. See Buera et al. [2015] for a detailed review of the literature on entrepreneurship. In
models without entrepreneurial activity, an appropriate calibration of the income process incorporating
a luck factor, as in Castaneda et al. [2003], is needed to achieve a meaningful distribution of earnings
and wealth.
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of the top earners are entrepreneurs. Therefore, an increase in the overall progressiv-
ity of taxes affects a larger number of entrepreneurs compared to an increase in the
tax rate facing the richest 1% of the individuals. The capital stock and hours worked
by the entrepreneurs takes a larger hit in this case. Consequently, output declines
more and government revenues increase less when the overall progressivity of taxes
is increased. If, instead, only the tax rate for the richest 1% is increased, the capital
stock and output decline less, resulting in larger tax collections.
If the purpose of the government is welfare maximization, however, we find an
increase in the overall progressivity of taxes to be more effective. Welfare-maximizing
progressivity parameter results in a marginal tax rate of 42.2% for the richest 1% of
households. This is lower than the optimal marginal tax rate found for this group
(55%) if the government only targets the tax rate of the richest 1% of the population.
Households in the lower income distribution benefit more when the overall progres-
sivity is changed. Wealth inequality goes down and lower income households are
able to smooth their consumption better. In fact, increasing the tax rate on the rich-
est 1% of the households has a negligible effect on the wealth distribution whereas
increasing the overall progressivity of taxes reduces the wealth Gini from 0.84 to 0.79.
We are also able to clarify some of the differences in the findings of seemingly
similar papers on this topic. Badel and Huggett (2015) analyze the change in the
top tax rate on general income (capital and labor) without changing the tax rate
schedule below the bracket. They search for both revenue and welfare-maximizing
rates. Guner et al. (2016), on the other hand, alter the overall progressivity of in-
come (capital+labor) tax function to find revenue maximizing tax schemes. Kinder-
mann and Krueger (2017) alter the top tax rate on labor earnings and calculate both
revenue and welfare-maximizing rates. Guner et al. [2016] report that the revenue-
maximizing progressivity parameter implies an effective federal income marginal
tax rate of 36.6% for the richest 5% of households. They also report that the revenue-
maximizing federal income marginal tax rate that applies to the top 5% is 42%. Badel
and Huggett [2015] report that the peak of Laffer curve happens at a tax rate of 49%
for the top 1%. In our framework, the revenue-maximizing progressivity parameter
implies 27.8% and 33.1% effective marginal tax rates for the top 5% and 1% of the
individuals, respectively. All of these findings are significantly different from the
over the 90% optimal revenue and welfare-maximizing tax rate for the richest 1% of
the population found in Kindermann and Krueger (2017). In our experiments where
only the marginal tax rate on the top 1% of the population is changed, we find the
revenue and welfare-maximizing tax rate to be 55%.5 In our counterfactual experi-
5Using a similar model, Bruggemann [2017] finds the welfare maximizing tax rate for the top 1% of
the population to be 52.5%.
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ments, we show that the source of the income that is taxed plays an important role
in the findings in Kindermann and Krueger (2017). In their experiments, they only
alter the tax rate that is applicable to labor income. In our paper as well as in Guner
et al. (2016), both labor and capital income are subject to the same tax rate as it is in
the current tax code. In a counterfactual experiment, we find the welfare-maximizing
tax rate on the top 1% of the population to be 80% when only the labor income is
subject to this tax.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the model. Section 3.3
describes a calibration procedure. Section 3.4 discusses the features of the benchmark
economy. Section 3.5 evaluates the model experiments. Section 3.6 discusses our
sensitivity analysis. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Demographics
The model is a simplified life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. The
model period is one year. We assume that there are young and old cohorts in the
economy, and aging is stochastic. The young stay young with a constant probability
piy and get old with a probability 1 − piy in the next period. The old continue to
live with a constant probability pio and die with a probability 1 − pio in the next
period. These probabilities are calibrated to match the proportion of young and
old households in the economy. When the old die, their offsprings receive after tax
bequests and enter the economy in the next period. For simplicity, we assume that
each household has only one offspring. We do not consider cases that differentiate
between single households, married households, or households with no offspring.
The measure of households is normalized to 1.
3.2.2 Preferences
We assume that preferences are time-separable with a discount factor β. The
instantaneous utility function is given by:
u(ct, 1− lt) = c
1−σ1
t
1− σ1 + χ
(1− lt)1−σ2
1− σ2
where ct is consumption and lt is labor supply. We assume lt of the retirees equals
zero. The total time endowment is 1. σ1 is the coefficient of risk aversion and σ2 is
the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply. χ is the disutility from working.
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3.2.3 Technology
Following Quadrini [2000], we assume that there are two production sectors: the
corporate sector and the entrepreneurial sector. Each person has two types of ability:
working and entrepreneurial. Types are stochastic, positively correlated over time,
and uncorrelated with each other. Productivity of an individual as an entrepreneur
is given by θt, while yt represents the capacity to produce income out of labor by
working in the corporate sector.
At the beginning of the period, current ability levels are revealed to individuals.
Next period ability levels remain unknown. A young individual with an an asset
level at, an entrepreneurial ability θt, and a worker productivity yt makes a decision
regarding whether she will be a worker or an entrepreneur in the current period.
Entrepreneurs can borrow subject to a borrowing limit, invest capital, hire labor,
and run a technology. The return from the production technology is dependent on
an entrepreneurial ability. When the entrepreneur invests kt, the output is given by:
f (kt, nt) = θt
(
kγt (lt + nt)
1−γ)ν , (3.1)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the share of entrepreneurial capital. ν < 1 indicates the
decreasing returns to scale from investing in capital and labor as in Lucas [1978].
Capital depreciates at a rate of δ. Entrepreneurs provide their own labor lt and also
hire labor at the amount of nt ≥ 0.
The corporate sector is represented by a Cobb-Douglas functional form:
F(Kct , L
c
t) = A(K
c
t )
α(Lct)
1−α, (3.2)
where KCt and L
C
t are total capital and labor inputs used in the corporate sector. A
represents the level of technology and is constant, whereas α is the capital share in
the corporate sector.
3.2.4 Credit Markets
We assume that young workers and old retirees cannot borrow, i.e., at+1 ≥ 0. The
size of capital that entrepreneurs can borrow depends on their current net worth. De-
fault is not an option in this setting. We assume there are no financial intermediaries.
Hence, there is no difference between the saving and borrowing interest rates.
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3.2.5 Government
The government is assumed to live forever. It collects taxes, pays a pension benefit
p to each retiree, provides goods and services g, and pays interest on the debt, (1+
rt)Dt. Households do not derive utility from consumption of government goods
and services. During every period, tax revenues are equal to government purchases,
pension payments, and interest payments on the debt.
We use Benabou’s (2002) functional form to model the progressive income tax
schedule. The total amount of federal income tax Tt(Yt) for total taxable income
income Yt is given by:
Tt(Yt) = (1− λY−τt )Yt + τbalt Yt + τkt rtat (3.3)
where τbalt is a proportional income tax rate (other than the federal income tax rate)
that captures state and local income taxes. The parameter λ captures the revenue
requirement and τ governs the curvature of the tax function. In addition to the
income tax, the government collects corporate income and consumption taxes. The
corporate income and consumption tax rates are denoted by τkt and τ
c
t , respectively.
Denoting yH and τH as the income threshold for those having income in the
top 1% and the marginal tax rate at top 1%, respectively, the tax function takes the
following form:
Tt(Yt) =

(1− λY−τt )Yt + τbalt Yt + τkt rtat if Yt < YH
(1− λY−τH )YH + τbalt YH + τH ∗ (Yt −YH) + τkt rtat if Yt > YH
(3.4)
Our tax function and tax base are the same as those of Guner et al. [2016]. Kinder-
mann and Krueger [2017] use a different functional form (two bracket tax function)
and choose labor earnings as the income tax base.
3.2.6 Household’s Problem
Households are divided into two groups: young and old. A young individual
can choose to be either a worker or an entrepreneur. An old individual can choose to
stay as an entrepreneur provided that she/he was an entrepreneur before getting old
or become a retiree. If an old individual was a worker before retirement, he cannot
become an entrepreneur when he is old. Notice that the bequest the young receive in
the next period is what the old decide to save in the current period given by at + 1.
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With probability pio, the old stay alive. With probability 1− pio, the old reincarnate
as the young and start making economic decisions as the young with initial assets
equal to at + 1.
The value function of a young individual is given by:
VYt (at, yt, θt) = max
{
VY,et (at, yt, θt),V
Y,w
t (at, yt, θt)
}
. (3.5)
The young individual decides whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur at
the beginning of the period. VY,et (·) is the value function of a young individual who
becomes an entrepreneur and VY,wt (·) is the value function of a young individual
who becomes a worker.
The young worker’s problem can be written as:
VY,wt (at, yt, θt) = maxct,lt,at+1
{u(ct, 1− lt)+ βpiyEt
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
+ β(1−piy)VO,rt+1(at+1)},
(3.6)
subject to
Ywt = wtltyt + rtat, (3.7)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = wtltyt + (1+ rt)at − Tt(Ywt ), (3.8)
0 ≤ lt ≤ 1, (3.9)
0 ≤ at+1, (3.10)
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate and rt is the equilibrium interest rate. The term
VO,rt+1(at+1) is the value function of the retirees. The expected value of V
Y
t+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
is conditional on the joint distribution of yt and θt. The young entrepreneur’s prob-
lem can be written as:
VY,et (at, yt, θt) = maxct,lt,kt,nt,at+1
{u(ct, 1− lt)+ βpiyEt
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
+ β(1−piy)EtVOt+1(at+1, θt+1)},
(3.11)
subject to
Yet = θt
(
kγt (lt + nt)
1−γ
)ν − δkt − rt(kt − at)− wtnt, (3.12)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tt(Yet ) + at, (3.13)
0 ≤ at+1, (3.14)
0 ≤ nt, (3.15)
0 ≤ lt ≤ 1, (3.16)
0 ≤ kt ≤ (1+ d)at. (3.17)
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Working capital kt includes own and borrowed assets. Yet is the entrepreneur’s
total profit. Following Kitao [2008], we set d as an exogenous borrowing limit. The
term VO,et+1(at+1, θt+1) is the value function of the old entrepreneur at the beginning of
the next period before deciding whether to stay as an entrepreneur or retire. This is
different from the young worker’s decision since he has no choice but to retire. The
expected value of VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1) is taken similarly as the young workers. The
expected value of VOt+1(at+1, θt+1) is conditional only on θt.
The old individual’s problem is given as follows:
VOt (at, θt) = max
{
VO,et (at, θt),V
O,r
t (at)
}
(3.18)
VOt is the value function of the old individual in the current period before deciding
whether to stay as an entrepreneur or retire. VO,et is the value function for the old
entrepreneur who stays as an entrepreneur and VO,rt is the value function for the
retirees.
The old retiree’s problem is given by:
VO,rt (at) = maxct,at+1
{u(ct, 1) + βpioVO,rt+1(at+1) + β(1− pio)Et[VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)]}
(3.19)
subject to
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = (1+ rt)at + p− Tt (rtat + p) (3.20)
0 ≤ at+1. (3.21)
The old retired individual receives a social security transfer payment p in every
period. Since the old retiree in this case in not an entrepreneur, the probability of
a retiree’s offspring being an entrepreneur depends on the joint invariant distribu-
tion of yt and θt. The expected value of the offspring’s value function is given by:
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1).
The old entrepreneur’s problem is given by:
VO,et (at, θt) = maxct,lt,kt,nt,at+1
{u(ct, 1− lt)+ βpioEt[VOt+1(at+1, θt+1)]+ β(1−pio)Et
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
},
(3.22)
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subject to
Yet = θt
(
kγt (lt + nt)
1−γ
)ν − δkt − rt(kt − at)− wtnt, (3.23)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tt(Yet ) + at, (3.24)
0 ≤ at+1, (3.25)
0 ≤ nt, (3.26)
0 ≤ łt ≤ 1, (3.27)
0 ≤ kt ≤ (1+ d)at. (3.28)
An entrepreneur’s offspring is born with ability levels (yt+1, θt+1). The expected
value of the offspring’s value function with respect to yt+1 is computed using the
invariant distribution of yt. However, its expected value with respect to θt+1 is condi-
tional on the parent’s θt and evolves according to the same Markov process governing
the entrepreneurial abilities (see subsection Endowments). This reflects the fact that
the offspring inherits her parent’s business.
3.2.7 Equilibrium Definition
Each individual’s state vector is given by st = (at, yt, θt, ξt). at stands for the
current asset holdings. Idiosyncratic productivity shocks yt ∈ Y. θt ∈ Θ = {0, θ1, θ2}
is an entrepreneurial ability. We can think of θt as an idea to start or maintain a
business. An individual with no idea or ability to maintain a business has θt = 0.
ξt ∈ Ξ = {YW,YE,OE,OW} stands for an occupational status: young workers,
young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retirees, respectively. The entire
state space is given by S = R+ ×Y×Θ× Ξ. We can generate the transition matrix,
Γt(st, st+1) by using the decision rules that solve the maximization problems and the
exogenous Markov process for income and entrepreneurial ability. The transition
function provides the probability distribution of the next period’s state conditional
on the current state.
A stationary equilibrium is given by a risk-free interest rate rt; wage rate wt; tax
functions Tt(·); tax rates τct , τbalt , and τkt ; social security payment p; allocations of
consumption ct(st); labor supply lt(st); savings at(st); investment kt(st); labor hired
by the entrepreneurs nt(st); and a constant distribution of households over the state
variables Φ∗ such that given rt,wt, and taxes:
• The allocations ct, at, lt, kt and nt solve the individual’s optimization problem
for each state st ∈ S.
• rt = ∂F(K
c
t ,L
c
t )
∂Kct
− δ: the marginal product of capital net of depreciation in the
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corporate sector is equal to the risk-free interest rate.
• wt = ∂F(K
c
t ,L
c
t )
∂Lct
: the marginal product of labor employed in the corporate sector
is equal to the wage rate.
• The capital markets clear, i.e.,∫
st
kt(st)dΦt(st) + Kct + Dt =
∫
st
at(st)dΦt(st). (3.29)
• Total assets, ∫st at(st)dΦt(st), are equal to the sum of the total capital in en-
trepreneurial sector,
∫
st
k(st)dΦt(st), the total capital in the corporate sector, Kct ,
and the total government debt, Dt.
• Labor markets clear i.e.∫
st
nt(st)dΦt(st) + Lct =
∫
st
l(st)dΦt(st). (3.30)
• Total efficient labor, ∫st l(st)dΦt(st), is equal to the sum of the total hired labor
in the entrepreneurial sector,
∫
st
nt(st)dΦt(st), and the total labor employed in
the corporate sector, Lct .
• The sum of income, consumption, and corporate income tax revenues, and net
borrowing is equal to the sum of government purchases, total transfers, and
interest payments on debt. pir is the fraction of retirees in the population and it
is determined endogenously. In the steady state, we must have Dt = D¯.∫
st
[Tt(Ys) + τct ct(st)] dΦt(st) + Dt+1 = gt + ppir + (1+ rt)Dt. (3.31)
• The invariant distribution of individuals is given by Φ, where:
Φ′t+1 = Γt(st, st+1)
′Φ′t. (3.32)
In the steady state, Φt = Φ∗.
3.3 Calibration
In this section, we explain how we map the model initial steady state to the data.
Table 3.1 shows the model parameters that we choose exogenously so that they are
not used to match the moments in the data. Parameters in Table 3.2 are chosen such
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that the model-generated moments from the initial steady state are matched with
their corresponding moments in the data. In modeling high productivity workers,
we follow Kindermann and Krueger [2017], which helps generating right income dis-
tributions. In order to match the percentage of entrepreneurs at the 1% of income
distribution successfully, we need to have superstar entrepreneurs. Hence, we extend
Cagetti and De Nardi’s (2009) entrepreneurial ability transition matrix by incorpo-
rating superstar entrepreneurs.
Preferences
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ1, is set to 1.5, which is a common value
in the literature.6 The parameter σ2 is set to 1.67 to make the Frisch elasticity equal
to 0.6. The disutility from working parameter, χ, is chosen to match work hours of
1/3 of time endowment. Discount factor β is chosen to match the capital to output
ratio of 2.9.
Demographics
Since the model period is set to be one year, the probability of aging and death
are given as 1− piy and 1− pio. These probabilities are chosen in such a way that
the average working and retirement periods are 45 and 11 years, respectively. This
implies that in the equilibrium, 80% of the population are young individuals.
Technology
The capital share in corporate sector, α, is set to 0.33 as in Kindermann and
Krueger [2017]. Level of technology, A, is normalized to one. The depreciation rate,
δ, is set to 0.06 as in Stokey and Rebelo [1995]. The entrepreneurial exogenous bor-
rowing constraint, d, is set to 0.5 as in Kitao [2008], which implies that entrepreneurs
cannot borrow more than 1.5 times their current assets. The degree of decreasing re-
turns to scale, ν, is set to 0.88 as in Bassetto et al. [2015]. The entrepreneurial capital
share, γ, is chosen to equal 0.45.
6See, for example, Attanasio et al. [1999].
60 Revisiting Tax on Top Income
Table 3.1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value
Preferences, technology, and demographics
Risk aversion σ1 1.5
Inverse of Frisch elasticity σ2 1.67
Capital share α 0.33
Technology A 1
Probability of staying young piy 0.978
Probability of staying old pio 0.911
Depreciation δ 0.06
Entr. return to scale ν 0.88
Entr. borrowing constraint d 0.5
Labor income process and social security payments
Autocorrelation ρ 0.958
Pension/average annual income p 40%
Public purchases, government debt, and taxes
Fraction of government spending to output g 0.035
Fraction of government debt to total capital D 0.27
Consumption tax τc 5%
Capital tax τk 7.4%
State and local tax τbal 5%
Revenue requirement λ 0.911
Tax progressivity τ 0.053
Endowments
In order to generate income and wealth distributions and the share of entrepreneurs
at the top 1% of income realistically, we introduce highly productive workers and
highly successful entrepreneurs to the model. In every period, a worker is endowed
with one unit of time to be used as a leisure and work time. One unit of work time
yields a wage earning wy, where y is the idiosyncratic labor productivity.
We assume that y can take 6 values. The first five {y1, ..., y5} are associated with
normal labor earnings and y6 represents very high earnings observed in household
data sets such as the SCF. For the normal labor productivity states {y1, ..., y5} we
use a discretized Markov chain of a continuous AR (1) process with persistence ρ
and standard deviation, σy. We use Rouwenhorst’s method in discretization, and
set ρ = 0.958 as in Kaplan [2012]. We assume that the income process and the
entrepreneurial ability processes evolve independently. The following 6 x 6 transition
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matrix captures the very high earning realizations where from any lower state there
is a small probability, pi6, to jump to a high productivity state that has earnings
realization of y6. Thus, each individual has the same probability of reaching this high
productivity. At the same time, we assume that with probability 1− pi66 workers in
a high productivity state can fall below to the median earnings state, y3.
Overall, there are four parameters - σy, y6,pi6,pi66 - to be calibrated. We choose
σy, y6,pi6, and pi66 to be 0.18, 11.5, 0.002, and 0.931 to match income and wealth
distributions and the Gini coefficient of labor earnings of 0.51 in SCF(2010) data. The
exact numerical values for the transition matrix is shown in the appendix.
Py =

pi11(1− pi6) pi12(1− pi6) pi13(1− pi6) pi14(1− pi6) pi15(1− pi6) pi6
pi21(1− pi6) pi22(1− pi6) pi23(1− pi6) pi24(1− pi6) pi25(1− pi6) pi6
pi31(1− pi6) pi32(1− pi6) pi33(1− pi6) pi34(1− pi6) pi35(1− pi6) pi6
pi41(1− pi6) pi42(1− pi6) pi43(1− pi6) pi44(1− pi6) pi45(1− pi6) pi6
pi51(1− pi6) pi52(1− pi6) pi53(1− pi6) pi54(1− pi6) pi55(1− pi6) pi6
0 0 1− pi66 0 0 pi66

We also introduce highly successful entrepreneurs, whose entrepreneurial abil-
ity, θ2, is much higher than that of standard entrepreneurs, θ1. Notice that θ0 = 0
captures the no entrepreneurial ability. We choose θ1 = 1.8 and θ2 = 2.75. pi(θi|θj) is
the probability of having the ability, θi, conditional on having the ability, θj, in the
previous period. This implies no worker can be a highly successful entrepreneur be-
fore becoming a standard entrepreneur. Similarly, no highly successful entrepreneur
can be a worker without being a standard entrepreneur first. Finally, we impose
pi(θ0|θ0) = pi(θ2|θ2) to reduce the number of calibrated parameters. Hence, we
choose pi(θ0|θ0) = 0.9775,pi(θ1|θ1) = 0.759925, and pi(θ2|θ1) = 0.000075. In total,
there are 5 parameters, including θ1 and θ2, to be calibrated for the entrepreneurial
ability process. The entrepreneurial transition matrix is given by:
 pi(θ0|θ0) pi(θ1|θ0) pi(θ2|θ0)pi(θ0|θ1) pi(θ1|θ1) pi(θ2|θ1)
pi(θ0|θ2) pi(θ1|θ2) pi(θ2|θ2)
 =
 0.98 0.023 00.24 0.76 0.000075
0 0.025 0.9775
 (3.33)
Government Policies
The social security replacement rate, p, is set to 40% of average gross income as
in Kotlikoff et al. [1999]. The fraction of government debt to total capital, D, is set
to equal 0.27 as in Bassetto et al. [2015]. The fraction of government spending to
output, g, is chosen to satisfy the budget and τbal and τk are fixed at 5% and 7.4%,
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respectively, as in Guner et al. [2016]. The tax rate on consumption, τc, is set to equal
5% as in Kindermann and Krueger (2017). The Benabou’s tax function parameters,
λ, which represents the revenue requirement, and τ, which represents the overall
progressivity of taxes, are set to equal 0.911 and 0.053 as in Guner et al. [2016]. These
estimates imply an average federal tax rate of 8.9% and marginal federal tax rate of
13.7% for households with mean income.
Table 3.2 summarizes the parameters calibrated to match the seventeen targets in
the data that are presented in the next section.
Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Calibrated parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.9396
Entrepreneurial ability {θ0, θ1, θ2} {0, 1.8, 2.75}
Entr. transition probabilities see eq. 3.33
Entr. capital share γ 0.45
Disutility from working χ 1.9
Standard deviation of productivity shock σy 0.18
Value of highest productivity y6 11.5
Probability of having highest productivity pi6 0.002
Probability of staying highest productivity pi66 0.9307
3.4 Features of the Benchmark Economy
In this section, we discuss the aggregate and distributional properties of the
benchmark economy. In order to conduct meaningful policy experiments regard-
ing changes in the progressivity and the top tax rate, we need to make sure that
the model delivers realistic income and wealth distributions. Table 3.3 compares
the model-generated moments with those in the data.7 Table 3.4 summarizes the
key macroeconomic aggregates in the benchmark economy. In the table, the labor
tax rate represents the tax burden that workers face in percentage terms. The low
interest rate corresponds to the federal funds rate during 2011-2016.
7The percentage of entrepreneurs at the top 1% of income is taken from Malm and Sanandaji [2015],
Table 7.
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Table 3.3: Target Moments
Targets Data Model
Capital to output ratio 2.9 2.9
% Entrepreneurs 7.5-7.6 7.2
% Exiting entrepreneurs 22-24 24
% Workers to entrepreneurs 2-3 2.34
% Hiring entrepreneurs 57.4-64.6 65
% Average worked hours 33 33.4
Income distribution
Income Gini 0.55 0.56
Entr. income Gini 0.66 0.62
Worker earnings Gini 0.51 0.51
99-100% income 17.2 21.2
95-99% income 16.6 18.9
% entr. in top 1% 40 35.3
Wealth distribution
Wealth Gini 0.85 0.84
99-100% wealth 34.1 34.5
95-99% wealth 26.8 28.7
% People at zero wealth 7-13 13.8
Ratio of median net worth entr. to workers 5.3-6.5 5.2
Table 3.4: Macroeconomic Aggregates
Variable Value
Capital 289.5%
Government debt 78.2%
Consumption 79.2%
Investment 17.4%
Government consumption 3.5%
Average hours worked 33%
Interest rate 0.27%
Tax revenues
- Consumption tax 4.0%
- Labor tax 8.9%
- Proportional capital tax 7.9%
Pension system
- Total pension payment 11.8%
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 summarize the model-generated income and wealth distribu-
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tions together with their counterparts in the data.8 The standard life-cycle models
often fail to generate income and wealth distributions correctly at the upper end.9
Our model with workers and entrepreneurs is able to generate a realistic wealth and
income distribution.
Table 3.5: Income Distribution in the Benchmark Economy
Share of income (in %)
Income quintiles Top
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 90-95% 95-99% 99-100% Gini
Data 3 6.5 10.9 18.1 61.4 10.7 16.6 17.2 0.58
Model 4.1 7.7 11.5 16.9 59.8 8.5 18.9 22.2 0.56
Table 3.6: Wealth Distribution in the Benchmark Economy
Share of wealth (in %)
Wealth quintiles Top
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 90-95% 95-99% 99-100% Gini
Data -0.7 0.7 3.3 9.9 86.7 13.5 26.8 34.1 0.85
Model 0.2 0.8 3.8 7.9 87.2 13.1 28.7 34.5 0.84
Table 3.7 shows the distribution of income taxes paid in the data and the model
generated distribution.10 The distribution of tax payments is more concentrated than
the income distribution but is less concentrated than the wealth distribution. In
the data, first and second income quantiles are responsible for 2.5% of income tax
payments. In the model this equal to 4.6%. Also in the data, fifth income quantile is
responsible for 74.6% of income tax payments. The corresponding value in the model
is 77.5%. The concentration in income tax payments is the natural consequence of
the concentration in income and wealth distribution.
8Both income and wealth distribution data are taken from Khun and Rios-Rull [2016].
9Guner et al. [2016] introduce superstar individuals who are extremely productive but have a small
share in the population. This leads to a labor income distribution that is in line with the data. Yet
the model does not generate the wealth distribution well. Guner et al. [2016] report that the top 1%,
5%, and 10% own 15.2%, 35.1%, and 49.1% of the total wealth respectively, which is less than what we
observe in data. According to SCF (2010), the top 1%, 5%, and 10% own 34.1%, 60.9%, and 74.4% of the
total wealth. Kindermann and Krueger [2017] follow Castaneda et al. (2003), and their model generates
earnings and wealth distributions quite realistically.
10The share of tax payments are taken from Guner et al. [2016], which is based on Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) data.
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Table 3.7: Share of Tax Payments in the Benchmark Economy
Share of tax (in %)
Income quintiles
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
Data 0.3 2.2 6.9 15.9 74.6
Model 1.2 3.4 6.6 11.4 77.5
Overall our model matches income and wealth distributions quite well.
3.5 Experiments
In this section, we present results from two tax experiments. In the first exper-
iment, we examine the impact of changes in the overall progressivity of taxes on
government revenues and welfare. For both of these experiments, we search for the
revenue and welfare-maximizing tax rates. In searching for the revenue-maximizing
tax rate, we keep the value of all other tax parameters constant except for the tax
progressivity parameter (in the first experiment) and the top marginal tax rate (in
the second experiment). To satisfy the government budget condition, we vary the
ratio of government expenditures to GDP, g as in Guner et al. [2016].
In searching for the welfare-maximizing tax rate, we keep the government rev-
enues constant and maximize the ex-ante expected utility of the agent under the
two experiments.11 We follow Heer and Trede [2003] and compute the consumption
equivalent variation (∆c) as:
∆c =
 W(Ω′)−W(Ω)∫
X E0
[
∑∞t=0 βt
c1−σt
1−σ
]
dΨ(Ω)
+ 1

1
1−σ
− 1 (3.34)
where W(Ω′) and W(Ω) are the value functions after and before (benchmark) the
policy changes. Here, X refers to the state space; Ω refers to the initial steady state,
and Ω′ refers to the final steady state.12
If the utility function is separable in consumption and leisure, Heer and Trede
11We keep the revenues constant by varying the proportional income tax rate that captures all other
(state and local) in the economy (τbal). This is similar to Kindermann and Krueger (2017) who use a
lower tax bracket, τl , as an adjustment parameter.
12Note that if there is no labor-leisure choice, the welfare measure in Heer and Trede [2003] becomes
equivalent to the standard welfare measure ∆c =
(
W(Ω′)
W(Ω)
) 1
1−σ − 1.
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[2003] propose the following CEV measure:13
W(Ω′) =
∫
X
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
βt
((1+ ∆c)ct)1−σ1
1− σ1 + χ
(1− lt)1−σ2
1− σ2
]
dΨ(Ω). (3.35)
Figure 3.1 presents the optimal tax rates generated by our experiments under
these alternative tax experiments that are discussed in detail in the rest of this sec-
tion. Panel (a) in Figure 3.1 displays the average federal income tax rates implied
by the first experiment where τ, the overall progressivity of taxes is altered. Panel
(b) displays the average federal income tax rates implied by the second experiment
where the only tool the government has is the marginal tax rate (τH) that the richest
1% of the households face.
Figure 3.1: Tax Rates
3.5.1 Revenue-Maximization
In this section, we present the impact of the two experiments on government
revenues. In the first experiment, we fix the level parameter, λ, of the tax function
at its benchmark value and search for the revenue-maximizing progressivity of taxes
13In the non-separable Cobb-Douglas specification, there is no need for the generalized formula as
the labor in the numerator and the denominator get canceled.
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by varying the parameter, τ. In the second experiment, we calculate the revenue-
maximizing marginal tax rate that applies to the top 1% of income.
Revenue-Maximizing Progressivity of Taxes
Table 3.8 displays the implications of the changes in the tax progressivity param-
eter, τ, on a number of economic outcomes. All variables, except for the interest rate,
are normalized to 100 at the benchmark level of tax progressivity (τ = 0.053). Thus,
τ > 0.05 displays the properties of economies where progressivity of taxes is higher
than the benchmark and τ < 0.05 summarizes the findings where progressivity is
reduced.
Table 3.8: Changes in Progressivity-Revenue Maximizing
Progressivity τ=0.035 τ=0.05 τ=0.07 τ=0.09 τ=0.10 τ=0.12 τ=0.15
Output 104.4 100.3 99.0 94.9 94.0 91.8 88.4
Labor supply 104.8 100.0 99.9 99.0 98.9 98.4 98.0
Capital 109.6 101.3 97.3 86.3 84.9 80.9 74.7
Revenues
Federal income tax 96.0 99.0 102.7 105.27 105.33 104.0 97.7
State and local taxes 102.9 100.1 98.2 96.9 96.2 94.6 92.0
Corporate income tax 23.0 80.4 196.6 275.8 296.3 350.3 415.9
All taxes 98.9 99.5 101.0 102.0 101.8 100.5 96.2
Additional targets
Interest rate 0.06% 0.22% 0.58% 0.87% 0.95% 1.18% 1.52%
Worker avg. hours worked 104.8 100 99.4 99 98.9 98.4 98.1
Entr. avg. hours worked 100.7 100 95.2 94 91.5 87.7 86.2
Labor supply in corp sector 106 100.3 97.8 96.7 98.2 100.1 102.4
Labor supply in entr. sector 101.5 99.7 100.4 100.6 99.6 98.1 95
Capital in corp sector 111.9 101.5 91.1 84.5 84.3 81.9 78.2
Capital in entr. sector 107.1 100.7 93.7 88.2 85.5 79.9 71.2
∆%entr. in overall economy 97.7 100 100.2 101.5 101.6 100.1 101.8
We find that revenues from the federal income tax schedule is maximized when
τ = 0.10 and tax revenues from all sources are maximized when τ = 0.09. Both
values are much larger than the benchmark value of 0.053. When τ = 0.10, the federal
income tax revenues increase by 5.33% and tax collected from all sources increase
by 1.8% relative to the benchmark. The significant rise in marginal federal income
tax rates in comparison to the average tax rates leads to standard disincentives in
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labor supply and saving decisions.14 At this revenue-maximizing rate, capital, labor
supply, and output decrease by 15.1%, 1.1%, and 6%, respectively. Local and state
taxes and corporate income taxes are proportional to output and capital and hence,
reductions in capital stock and output affect them negatively.
Higher tax progressivity reduces the capital stocks in both corporate and en-
trepreneurial sectors by 15.7% and 14.5%, respectively. The decrease in average hours
worked is more pronounced in the entrepreneur sector, 8.5% compared 1.1% in the
corporate sector. The more progressive federal income tax leads to a moderate in-
crease (1.6%) in the population share of entrepreneurs through its effect on the in-
terest rate. In the benchmark case, the interest rate is equal to 0.27%. It increases to
0.95% when τ = 0.10 due to the decrease in the capital stock. When the interest rate
is higher, workers who have high abilities as entrepreneurs can earn higher returns
from their savings. Hence, they can become entrepreneurs more quickly. Although
the capital stock decreases, the corporate income tax revenue increases substantially
due to the large increase in the interest rate.
Our finding that a more progressive federal income tax schedule, relative to the
benchmark (that is calibrated to the U.S) maximizes revenue is in line with the find-
ings of Guner et al. [2016]. They show that the federal income tax revenue is max-
imized when τ = 0.13 and revenues from all income sources are maximized when
τ = 0.10. Similar to our results, they observe significant reductions in economic ag-
gregates as well.
Revenue-Maximizing Top Tax Rate
In the second experiment, we vary the marginal tax rate for the richest 1% of
the population only. We normalize the values of all the economic aggregates, except
for the interest rate, in Table 3.9 to 100 at the benchmark value of τH = 0.229 and
report changes from this benchmark. Our findings indicate that both federal income
tax revenue and overall tax revenue are maximized when the marginal income tax
rate for the top 1% is 55%. At this rate, Federal income tax revenue increases by
16.3% and the tax revenue from all sources increases by 5.4%. Note that tax revenues
from federal income and all sources increase substantially more in this case. In other
words, a targeted increase in the marginal tax rate of 1% generates much more tax
revenue than the experiment that affects larger income groups. Imposing a 55%
marginal tax rate reduces capital stock, labor supply, and output by 8.2%, 0.7%, and
3.9%, respectively. These reductions are substantially lower than what we observe
in the earlier case where overall progressivity was altered. Lower reductions lead to
14See Table 3.10 for a summary of the average and marginal tax rates at τ = 0.10.
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relatively higher tax revenues in this case.15
Higher tax progressivity, reduces the capital stocks in corporate and entrepreneurial
sectors by 5.2% and 11.2% respectively. Average hours worked decline by 0.7% for
the workers and 2.2% for the entrepreneurs.
Table 3.9: Changes in Tax for Top 1% - Revenue Maximizing
Marginal tax for top 1% τH = 0.2 τH=0.4 τH=0.55 τH=0.6 τH=0.8
Output 101.1 98.2 96.1 92.4 88.7
Labor supply 100.2 99.7 99.3 98.7 97.7
Capital 104.6 95.8 91.8 87.9 84.4
Revenues
Federal income tax 88.7 107.3 116.3 109.8 95.7
State and local taxes 86 86.4 86.5 86.9 86.6
Corporate income tax 49.6 141.1 195.8 248.8 314.9
All taxes 90.6 100.7 105.4 101.5 93.3
Additional targets
Interest rate 0.13% 0.40% 0.58% 0.63% 1.02%
Worker avg. hours worked 100.2 99.7 99.3 98.7 97.7
Entr. avg. hours worked 100.5 98.8 97.8 99.6 98.6
Labor supply in corp sector 102.4 98.6 101.7 114 125.9
Labor supply in entr. sector 99 99.3 97 88 79.6
Capital in corp sector 106 95.8 94.8 101.7 106.7
Capital in entr. sector 103.1 95.8 88.8 73.9 61.6
∆%entr. in overall economy 97.9 100.1 100.1 101.6 101.7
Table 3.10 summarizes the average and marginal income tax rates and share of
tax payments for various income quantiles for three economies: 1) the benchmark,
2) the economy where revenues from the federal income tax schedule is maximized
(τ = 0.10), and 3) the economy where the revenue-maximizing marginal income tax
for the top 1% is equal to 55%. In the benchmark economy, average tax rates are
12.3%, 15%, and 18.6% and marginal tax rates are 16.9%, 19.5%, and 22.9% for the
richest 10%, 5%, and 1% of households, respectively. In the second economy, average
15This result is slightly different than that of Guner et al. [2016] who claim that there is not much
revenue available from shifting the tax burden towards top earners. Our results show that more revenue
can be extracted imposing a higher marginal tax to 1% instead of increasing progressivity in a way that
affects relatively larger income group. The revenue maximizing marginal income tax rate we find is
closer to the 49% found by Badel and Huggett [2015]. In contrast, Kindermann and Krueger [2017]
report revenue maximizing tax rates for the top 1% to be 86% in the short run and 98% in the long run.
In calculating this rate, Kindermann and Krueger [2017] maximize revenues focusing on labor earnings
only. We discuss this case in detail in Section 3.6.
70 Revisiting Tax on Top Income
tax rates are 14.9%, 19.7%, and 25.6% and marginal tax rates are 23.4%, 27.8%, and
33.1%, respectively. In the third economy, average tax rates are 14.1%, 15.8%, and
28.4% and marginal tax rates are 20.3%, 22.7%, and 55%, respectively. In both tax
experiments, summarized by the second and third cases, average and marginal tax
rates increases substantially, which explain the large decreases found in economic
aggregates. When the overall progressivity is altered, (τ = .10), tax rates faced by all
groups increase somewhat more uniformly. As discussed earlier, this results in more
entrepreneurs being affected by the changes in taxes and leads to larger decreases in
economic aggregates relative to the case where the tax rate of the richest 1% of the
population is targeted.
Table 3.10: Average and Marginal Tax Rates and Share of Tax Payments
Percentiles of income Benchmark τ=0.10 τH=0.55
Average tax rate
Top 10% 12.3 14.9 14.1
Top 5% 15.0 19.7 15.8
Top 1% 18.6 25.6 28.4
Marginal tax rate
Top 10% 16.9 23.4 20.3
Top 5% 19.5 27.8 22.7
Top 1% 22.9 33.1 55.0
Share of tax payments
Income quintiles
0-20% 1.2 -1.0 1.1
20-40% 3.4 0.4 3.1
40-60% 6.6 3.5 6.0
60-80% 11.4 8.0 10.3
80-100% 77.5 89.2 79.5
The contribution to income tax payments by households at different income levels
shift from lower income quintiles to the higher ones at a substantial degree in the
second experiment. For instance, the poorest 20% of households now make negative
contributions while the richest 20% of household’s share of tax payments increase
from 77.5% to 89.2%. This change, on the other hand, is somewhat limited in the
third case. The poorest 20% of household’s contribution decreases from 1.2% to 1.1%
and the richest 20% of household’s contribution increases from 77.5% to 79.5%.
Table 3.11 displays the changes in wealth and income distributions for various
income quantiles for these three economies. The wealth share of the top 1% decreases
§3.5 Experiments 71
the most in the third economy. The wealth Gini falls in both cases.
Table 3.11: Changes in Wealth and Income Distribution - Revenue Maximizing
Benchmark τ=0.10 τH=0.55
Wealth distribution
Wealth quintiles
0-20% 0.2 0.2 0.2
20-40% 0.8 1.4 1.0
40-60% 3.8 4.7 4.4
60-80% 7.9 9.6 9.4
80-100% 87.2 84.1 85.1
Top
10% 76.3 71.9 72.8
5% 63.2 58.6 58.6
1% 34.5 31.0 28.8
Wealth Gini 0.84 0.81 0.82
Income distribution (all)
Income quintiles
0-20% 4.1 4.3 4.3
20-40% 7.7 7.7 7.8
40-60% 11.5 11.6 11.6
60-80% 16.9 16.8 17.0
80-100% 59.8 59.6 59.3
Top
10% 49.7 49.2 48.9
5% 41.2 40.7 40.1
1% 22.2 21.3 19.8
Income Gini 0.56 0.55 0.55
Comparison of the Two Tax Experiments
Figure 3.2 summarizes the impact of the two experiments on economic outcomes.
As discussed earlier, increases in the overall progressivity of taxes (panel a) imply a
larger decline, especially in capital and output compared to the increase in the tax
rate that targets the richest 1% of the population (panel b). This is partly due to the
fact that an increase in the overall progressivity of taxes affects a larger number of
entrepreneurs compared to an increase in the tax rate facing the richest 1% of the
individuals. In the benchmark economy, the percent of entrepreneurs in the top 1%
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of income is 35%. Thus, an increase in the tax rate that the richest 1% face does
not impact all the entrepreneurs in the economy. On the contrary, an increase in
the overall progressivity of taxes impacts all the entrepreneurs. Therefore, the capital
stock and the hours worked by the entrepreneurs react more negatively to an increase
in the overall progressivity of taxes. Thus, revenue maximizing through imposing a
higher marginal tax rate to the richest 1% of households creates fewer distortions on
economic aggregates, resulting in relatively more revenues.
Figure 3.2: Changes in Output, Labor Supply, and Capital
3.5.2 Welfare Maximization
In this section, we search for the welfare maximizing progressivity of taxes by
varying the parameter, τ in the first experiment. In the second experiment, we calcu-
late the welfare-maximizing marginal tax rate that applies to the top 1 % of income.
Welfare-Maximizing Progressivity of Taxes
Table 3.12 summarizes the changes in economic aggregates and welfare as the
progressivity parameter τ is changed. All variables, except for the interest rate, are
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normalized to 100 at the benchmark level of tax progressivity (τ = 0.053). Welfare
increases with increases in τ and peaks at τ = 0.15. This value is higher than the
value found in the first experiment focusing on revenue maximization (τ = .10).
At this level of progressivity, capital, labor supply, and output decrease by 25.9%,
8.4%, and 12.9%, respectively. Both capital and labor in the entreprenurial sector
decline more relative to the corporate sector. Compared to the benchmark, this level
of progressivity leads to a decrease in the federal income tax revenue by 3.2% and
the total tax revenue by 5.8%.
Table 3.12: Changes in Progressivity - Welfare Maximizing
Progressivity τ=0.035 τ=0.06 τ=0.09 τ=0.12 τ=0.15 τ=0.18 τ=0.21
Output 104.3 99.2 95.1 92.1 87.1 80.3 75.1
Labor supply 104.8 99.9 99.0 98.4 91.6 90.8 90.3
Capital 109.0 97.8 87.5 81.4 74.1 64.0 56.3
Revenues
Federal income tax 95.9 101.5 105.3 104.6 96.8 74.1 53.1
State and local taxes 113.5 94.6 77.9 73.9 87.2 129.7 168.9
Corporate income tax 34.4 134.9 249.4 336.2 385.8 501.3 593.4
All taxes 101.3 99.6 97.6 96.1 94.2 90.9 87.9
Local tax rate, τbal 5.5 4.8 4.0 3.9 4.8 7.6 10.4
Average CEV
CEV (All) -1.06 0.38 2.02 3.48 4.25 2.39 1.03
CEV (Work) -1.07 0.37 1.99 3.45 4.28 2.38 1.01
CEV (Entr.) -0.98 0.51 2.46 3.79 3.93 2.59 1.19
Additional targets
Interest rate 0.09% 0.38% 0.78% 1.13% 1.43% 2.14% 2.89%
Worker avg. hours worked 104.8 99.9 99.0 98.4 91.6 90.8 90.3
Entr. avg. hours worked 102.1 98.5 93.1 88.5 86.8 77.9 71.0
Labor supply in corp sector 106.2 100.7 96.0 99.1 99.2 110.1 120.2
Labor supply in entr. sector 101.4 99.8 100.3 98.3 93.2 84.1 77.4
Capital in corp sector 111.2 98.1 85.7 81.9 77.2 74.7 70.5
Capital in entr. sector 106.6 97.5 89.4 81 70.8 53.1 41.7
∆%entr. in overall economy 97.7 100.1 101.5 100.1 101.7 102.2 102.3
Table 3.13, explores the forces behind the welfare gains despite the fact that there
are large drops in economic aggregates. In our model, there are four distinct groups:
young workers (YW), young entrepreneurs (YE), old workers (OW), and old en-
trepreneurs (OE). YW make up the largest share of the population, 73%, followed
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by 19.5% OW, 6.7% YE, and 0.5% OE.16 Panel A of Table 3.13 documents average
consumption and hours worked for the whole economy as well as for different in-
come groups. All the information provided is relative to the benchmark, which is
normalized to 100. Panel B of Table 3.13 documents variances of consumption and
average hours worked, again relative to the benchmark. In the overall economy, aver-
age consumption of the young entrepreneurs decrease by 28.5% while young work-
ers experience a more moderate drop of 6.5%. The economy-wide changes, however,
mask the rich heterogeneity in the responses of different groups. For example, young
entrepreneurs who are at the top 1% of incomes experience a 31.5% decline in their
consumption while young workers in the same income group experience only a 4.1%
decline in their consumption. Young workers in the lowest 33% of income expe-
rience a 20.8% decline in consumption while the middle income YW experience a
45.7% increase in consumption. Since the middle 33% of YW make up 36.6% of the
population, an increase in their consumption contributes to the welfare improvement
we observe. Our results indicate a decline in hours worked for most of these groups
and in particular for the poorest YW, which contributes to the decline in their av-
erage consumption. For all groups, the variance of consumption declines. These
large declines in consumption variances, substantial increases in leisure time, and
the increase in the average consumption of a large group of workers all contribute
to the overall welfare gains we observe. Although young and old entrepreneurs are
affected quite negatively, their small share in the population reduces their impact on
the overall welfare results.
Table 3.13: Consumption and Hours - Welfare Maximizing Progressivity
Panel A Average consumption Average hours worked
Experiment τ = 0.15 YW YE OW OE YW YE OE
whole economy 93.5 71.5 95.4 57.4 87.2 87.2 72.7
top 1% 95.9 68.5 N/A 55.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
bottom 99% 95.2 98.0 95.1 92.3 85.8 85.8 71.0
67-100% 99.4 70.0 95.4 57.1 96.2 85.5 73.0
34-66% 145.7 95.6 N/A 112.2 93.2 101.5 100.0
0-33% 79.3 N/A 92.9 N/A 89.8 N/A N/A
Panel B Variance consumption Variance hours worked
YW YE OW OE YW YE OE
whole economy 54.2 19.0 49.0 18.7 58.3 94.4 65.8
bottom 99% 41.1 81.0 30.0 65.4 57.7 96.3 66.6
16These shares do not vary much across experiments.
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Table 3.14: Changes in Tax for Top 1% - Welfare Maximizing
Marginal tax for top 1% τH = 0 τH=0.2 τH=0.4 τH=0.55 τH=0.7 τH=0.8
Output 104.4 100.7 98.5 96.2 92.7 88.7
Labor supply 105.7 100.4 99.6 99.2 98.9 97.7
Capital 108.9 102.7 96.6 93 89 83.7
Revenues
Federal income tax 62.9 88.5 107.6 114.9 110.1 95.9
State and local taxes 189 127.9 80.5 61.6 69 96.3
Corporate income tax 85 92 127.4 155.6 236.8 334.3
All tax 101.1 100.3 99.5 98.8 97.5 95.7
Local tax rate, τbal 11 7.5 4.7 3.5 4 5.6
Average CEV
All -5.97 -2.48 -0.04 0.72 -0.81 -3.79
Workers -5.98 -2.48 -0.07 0.66 -0.97 -4.07
Entr. -5.89 -2.52 0.35 1.58 1.29 -0.18
Additional targets
Interest rate 0.2% 0.25% 0.36% 0.46% 0.73% 1.1%
Worker avg. hours worked 105.7 100.4 99.6 99.2 99 97.7
Entr. avg. hours worked 104.8 103 98.8 97.6 97.5 98.4
Labor supply in corp sector 109.4 103.3 98.2 100.4 104 125.8
Labor supply in entr. sector 101.6 99.1 99.5 96.4 93.9 80.2
Capital in corp sector 111.2 104.2 96.5 95.7 97.8 105.6
Capital in entr. sector 106.6 101.1 96.8 90.3 85.5 61.3
∆% entr. in overall economy 97.3 99.8 100.1 100 100.1 101.7
Welfare-Maximizing Top Tax Rate
Results of the second experiment, where we vary the tax rate at the top, are pre-
sented in Table 3.14. The welfare maximizing marginal tax rate for the top 1% is
found to be 55%, the same rate as in the revenue-maximizing tax rate for the top
1%. At this tax rate, capital, labor supply, and output decrease by 7%, 0.8%, and
3.8%, respectively. Targeting the top 1% generates a moderate welfare gain (CEV
increases by 0.72%) compared to the experiment where the overall progressivity is
increased (CEV increases by 4.25%). At the welfare-maximizing rate, workers and
entrepreneurs’ average hours worked decrease slightly, by 0.8% and 2.4%, respec-
tively. Capital stock in the corporate sector decreases by 4.3%, and capital stock in
the entrepreneur sector decreases by 9.7%. As discussed earlier, changing the tax rate
for the richest 1% creates smaller distortions than changing the overall progressivity
of taxes. This fact also contributes to the smaller welfare gains found in this case.
Table 3.15 presents the changes in the level and the variance of consumption and
hours worked for different types of individuals in the economy at the welfare
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Table 3.15: Consumption and Hours - Welfare-Maximizing Tax at the Top
Panel A Average consumption Average hours worked
Experiment τH = 0.55 YW YE OW OE YW YE OE
whole economy 100.2 82.2 100.1 74.3 99.2 97.8 89.2
top 1% 76.2 61.4 N/A 54.6 115.2 100.0 100.0
bottom 99% 102.9 92.4 100.1 99.6 99.5 98.7 90.1
67-100% 109.8 80.2 100.0 73.6 97.2 99.1 90.8
34-66% 139.4 88.1 N/A N/A 98.4 103.8 N/A
0-33% 89.2 N/A 102.7 N/A 99.0 N/A N/A
Panel B Variance consumption Variance hours worked
YW YE OW OE YW YE OE
whole economy 75.3 40.7 67.1 40.4 99.3 108.1 89.1
bottom 99% 79.2 66.9 67.1 112.0 99.7 108.7 91.2
maximizing level of τH relative to the benchmark. Average consumption of the
entrepreneurs at the top 1% falls by 38.6%. Average consumption by the richest 1%
young workers’ decrease by 23.8%. Hours worked declines for most groups, except
for those on the top 1% of incomes. Variance of consumption declines for all except
the old workers.
Comparison of the Two Tax Experiments
Our results indicate that the optimal tax rate that targets the richest 1% of the
population generates a moderate welfare gain (CEV increases by 0.72%) compared to
the experiment where the overall progressivity is increased (CEV increases by 4.25%).
Figure 3.3 summarizes the welfare results from these experiments. Panel A displays
the welfare gain/loss as we increase the progressivity of taxes by varying τ. Panel B,
summarizes changes in welfare as we increase the tax rate that applies to the top 1%
of income levels.
To delve deeper into the reasons behind the welfare results, in Table 3.16, we
display the income and wealth distributions in the three economies considered: the
benchmark economy, the economy where welfare is maximized by changing the over-
all progressivity of taxes (τ= 0.15), and the economy where the welfare-maximizing
marginal income tax rate for the top 1% is found to be equal to 55%. While the
income distribution is not very different across these three economies, the wealth
distribution displays important differences. While the Wealth Gini in the benchmark
economy is 0.84, the second economy where the overall progressivity of taxes is al-
tered produces a Wealth Gini of 0.79. Increasing only the tax rate of the richest 1%
results in a small change in the Wealth Gini (0.82) relative to the benchmark. While
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Figure 3.3: Welfare Maximizing
the wealth share of the top 1% does not change much across two experiments, the
wealth share of the top 10% decreases and the wealth share of most of the lower
quantiles increases in the progressivity maximization case. Overall, we find that an
improvement of the overall progressivity of taxes generates a much larger welfare
gain than imposing a very high marginal tax at the top 1%.
Information on the share of tax payments by different income groups summarized
in Table 3.17 provides further evidence on how lower income groups benefit more
under a change in the progressivity of taxes. In this case, the share of tax payments
by lower income groups is negative, indicating they are receiving transfers.17
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results to certain parameters
used and modeling choices that are made. In doing so, we also investigate the po-
tential reasons for the different findings in Kindermann and Krueger [2017], Guner
et al. [2016], and Badel and Huggett [2015]. In general, our findings are closer to
what is reported in Guner et al. [2016] and Badel and Huggett [2015]. Badel and
17Total taxes paid are calculated net of transfers. Consequently, payment made by richer households
may exceed 100%.
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Table 3.16: Changes in Wealth and Income Distribution - Welfare Maximizing
Benchmark τ=0.15 τH=0.55
Wealth distribution
Wealth quintiles
0-20% 0.2 0.1 0.2
20-40% 0.8 1.6 1.0
40-60% 3.8 5.7 4.2
60-80% 7.9 11.2 9.2
80-100% 87.2 81.4 85.4
Top
10% 76.3 68.2 73.2
5% 63.2 54.8 58.8
1% 34.5 28.1 28.6
Wealth Gini 0.84 0.79 0.82
Income distribution (all)
Income quintiles
0-20% 4.1 4.0 4.2
20-40% 7.7 7.4 7.9
40-60% 11.5 11.8 11.7
60-80% 16.9 17.4 17.2
80-100% 59.8 59.4 59.1
Top
10% 49.7 48.7 48.7
5% 41.2 39.8 39.9
1% 22.2 19.7 19.4
Income Gini 0.56 0.55 0.55
Table 3.17: Share of Tax Payments and Tax Rates - Welfare Maximizing
Percentiles of income Benchmark τ=0.15 τH=0.55
Average tax rate
Top 10% 12.3 17.2 14.1
Top 5% 15.0 24.2 15.7
Top 1% 18.6 32.0 28
Marginal tax rate
Top 10% 16.9 29.6 20.1
Top 5% 19.5 35.6 22.3
Top 1% 22.9 42.2 55.0
Share of tax payments
Income quintiles
0-20% 1.2 -4.2 0.9
20-40% 3.4 -3.2 2.7
40-60% 6.6 0.1 5.5
60-80% 11.4 5.2 9.8
80-100% 77.5 102.2 81.0
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Huggett [2015] assess the consequences of increasing the marginal tax rate on top
earners using a human capital model. They calculate a revenue-maximizing top tax
rate of 49%. Our revenue-maximizing tax rate of 55% is comparable to their findings.
Kindermann and Krueger [2017], on the other hand, find the revenue-maximizing
top marginal tax rate to be 98% in the long-run. Our study distinguishes from Kin-
dermann and Krueger [2017] in two important ways. First, our model as in Guner
et al. [2016], uses Benabou’s tax function to generate a realistic share of tax payments
by income quintiles. In this process, we define taxable income as both labor and cap-
ital income. In Kindermann and Krueger [2017], taxes apply to labor income only.
Second, in our model, the entrepreneurship sector is the main driving factor generat-
ing the right income and wealth distribution. The role of the lucky high productivity
state is somewhat limited compared to that of Kindermann and Krueger [2017].
In order to investigate the sensitivity of the results to the tax base that is used,
we repeat our exercise by taxing labor income only. We re-calibrate the model to the
same target moments and search for the welfare-maximizing tax rate for the richest
1% of the population.
Table 3.18 shows the results of this experiment where we find the welfare-maximizing
top marginal tax rate to be 80%.18 This rate is much higher than the welfare-
maximizing 55% marginal tax rate found in Section 3.5.2 where the tax base was
total earnings (labor and capital income). It is also closer to the results reported in
Kindermann and Krueger [2017]. 19 Compared to the results in Table 3.14, capital
stock remains fairly flat in this experiment as τH increases. In Table 3.14, where total
earnings is taxed, capital stock declines by 16.5% at τH = 0.8. In Table 3.18 where
the tax base is composed of labor earnings only, capital stock declines by 3.5% at
τH = 0.8.
18Entrepreneurial earnings is given by (1− γ){θt
(
kγt (lt + nt)
1−γ)ν − δkt − rt(kt − at)− wtnt}. En-
trepreneurial capital income is given by γ{θt
(
kγt (lt + nt)
1−γ)ν − δkt − rt(kt − at)− wtnt}.
19The revenue-maximizing top marginal income tax rate that applies to the top 1% of earnings is
also higher (85%) when the tax base is composed of labor earnings only.
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Table 3.18: Change in Tax at the Top 1% earnings - Welfare Maximizing
Marginal tax for top 1% τH =0 τH =0.1 τH =0.2 τH =0.4 τH =0.6 τH =0.8 τH =0.9 τH =1
Output 102.6 102.8 102.4 99.3 97.3 97.1 95.8 95.1
Labor supply 105.1 105.1 104.8 99.9 99.7 99.7 99.5 99.2
Capital 103.8 103.5 103.2 98.7 96.2 96.6 95.1 94.2
Interest rate 0.86% 0.85% 0.86% 0.81% 0.85% 0.82% 0.9% 0.93%
Tax revenues
Federal income tax 79.7 90.7 99.1 110.5 115.5 123.4 122.2 120.9
State and local taxes 129.9 112.1 99.2 83.5 76.6 65.0 67.0 69.4
Corporate income tax 102.8 103.2 103.2 100.1 98.6 97.1 96.2 95.3
All taxes 100.1 100.1 100.1 99.9 99.7 99.7 99.5 99.3
Local tax rate, τbal 7.4 6.3 5.6 4.7 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.9
Average CEV
CEV (ALL) -2.7 -1.6 -0.8 0.2 0.5 1.3 0.9 0.6
CEV(Work) -2.7 -1.6 -0.9 0.2 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.6
CEV(Entr) -2.3 -1.2 -0.4 0.4 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.4
We also find that our results are not very sensitive to small changes in the values
of risk aversion and Frisch elasticity parameter. Risk aversion of 1.7 and a Frish
elasticity of 0.71 results in the same revenue maximizing value of the progressivity
parameter and the marginal tax rate that applies to top 1% of income.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we study optimal income taxation in a model with an entrepreneur-
ship decision that allows the model to generate realistic wealth and income dis-
tributions. We develop a simplified life-cycle model with stochastic aging that in-
cludes explicit modeling of entrepreneurial decisions, individual heterogeneity, and
endogenous labor supply. Individual heterogeneity stems from differences in en-
trepreneurial abilities and uninsurable productivity shocks. We use a parametric tax
function proposed by Benabou [2002] to model the relationship between income and
income taxes paid at the federal level. We study revenue and welfare-maximizing
changes in the overall progressivity of taxes versus changing the tax rate that applies
to the richest 1% of individuals only.
The revenue and welfare-maximizing tax rates we find in this environment are
higher than the existing tax rates in the U.S. Furthermore, we show that focusing
on the tax rates facing the richest 1% of the population results in larger government
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revenues but lower welfare compared to increasing the overall progressivity of taxes.
When only the tax rate at the top increases, fewer entrepreneurs are impacted. As a
result, the distortions created are lower and revenues are higher. However, targeting
the tax rate of the richest 1% does not generate big welfare gains. An increase in the
overall progressivity of taxes, on the other hand, results in a lower Wealth Gini and
higher welfare.
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Appendix A: Markov Chain for Labor Productivity
We approximate the idiosyncratic labor productivity process as explained in the
main text. The process is assumed to be AR(1) and a Rouwenhorst’s method is used
to discretize it into a five-point Markov chain. Then it is augmented for another grid
point to represent exceptionally high productivity workers. The grid points y for the
idiosyncratic labor productivity, which is normalized to one, are:
[
0.1612 0.3043 0.5744 1.0840 2.0459 11.4870
]
.
The Markov matrix for idiosyncratic labor productivity is then
0.9168 0.0787 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020
0.0197 0.9180 0.0590 0.0013 0.0000 0.0020
0.0004 0.0393 0.9185 0.0393 0.0004 0.0020
0.0000 0.0013 0.0590 0.9180 0.0197 0.0020
0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0787 0.9168 0.0020
0.0000 0.0000 0.0693 0.0000 0.0000 0.9307

.
Appendix B: Computational Algorithm
The algorithm we use to solve the benchmark of the model is as follows.
1. We construct a grid for all state and control variables. The grid points for
the asset level is chosen such that the grid is more refined early in the area
where the value function is steeper. The grid grows more sparsely as the value
function becomes flatter. The maximum value of assets is chosen such that in
the invariant distribution there is no significant probability mass falling on the
highest level. This level is much higher than those levels in a standard OLG
model.
2. Given the initial guesses value for interest rate r, we solve for the policy func-
tions using value function iteration.
3. We construct the transition matrix, Γ, for all possible choices of state variables.
The matrix is big and contains a lot of zeroes, so it is constructed using a sparse
matrix method. Given the initial guess of the invariant distribution, denoted Φ,
we iterate on Φ′ = ΓΦ. The invariant distribution satisfies Φ∗ = ΓΦ∗.
4. We compute the total household savings and total capital in the entrepreneurial
sector. Then we use the equilibrium clearing condition in capital market (see
main text) to compute total capital in the corporate sector.
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5. We compute hired labor in the entrepreneurial sector and total efficient labor.
Then we compute total labor in the corporate sector from the labor market
clearing condition.
6. We iterate on g to satisfy the government budget constraint. We keep r and w
implied by total capital and labor in the corporate sector.
7. After we satisfy the government budget constraint, we update the equilibrium
interest rate using the r implied above. We iterate over the equilibrium interest
rate until the interest rate from the previous iteration and the current iteration
is less than the convergence criteria.
The experiments are conducted as follows.
1. For experiments regarding progressivity and revenue maximizing, we change
τ, which is the progressivity parameter in Benabou’s tax function. Then we
compute the federal income tax and total tax revenue. All other parameters
remain fixed. We keep varying τ until we find the maximized level of tax
revenues.
2. For experiments regarding tax at the top 1% and revenue maximizing, we first
compute the income threshold from the benchmark. Then we compute the
model by imposing the top tax rate, τH, only if individuals have income higher
than the threshold level. All other parameters also remain fixed. We keep
varying τH until we find the maximized level of tax revenues.
3. For experiments regarding progressivity and welfare maximizing, we imple-
ment similar process as above except that we now iterate on τbal , which is a
state and local tax rate, to satisfy the government budget constraint. We then
compute CEV until we find the maximizing progressivity.
4. For experiments regarding tax at the top 1% and welfare maximizing, we im-
plement similar process as above and we iterate on τbal . We compute CEV and
keep searching for the τH that maximizes CEV.
84 Revisiting Tax on Top Income
Chapter 4
Implications of Wealth Taxation
and Entrepreneurs
4.1 Introduction
There is a recent surge of interest regarding capital taxation due to its important
role in affecting wealth inequality and economic growth. Capital taxation is a widely
used tax instrument and generates substantial revenue. For instance, in the U.S., 27%
tax revenues come from capital taxation which are equivalent to 8% of GDP.1 Capital
taxation’s role of distorting saving and investment decisions from the equity and
efficiency point of view is well analyzed in various model settings (see for example
Conesa et al. [2009]). Although efficiency and equity analysis of capital taxation are
important, if the return from capital differs, particular ways of taxing capital matter
too. Capital taxation can take many forms: taxing income flow generated by capital
(capital income tax), taxing stock of wealth (wealth tax), and taxing stock of wealth at
the time of death (estate tax). On top of this capital can be distinguished as housing
and non-housing capital and can be taxed differently. This paper is concerned with
analyzing the implications of the capital income tax, the wealth tax, and the estate tax
on economic aggregates and welfare, and searches for the optimal wealth tax rate.
Judd [1985] and Chamley [1986] show that the optimal capital income taxation
should be zero by employing complete market and infinite horizon models. Judd
and Chamley’s zero capital income tax result does not survive when models in-
corporate incomplete markets, life-cycle frameworks, transitional dynamics, human
capital, etc. (see Imrohoroglu [1998], Erosa and Gervais [2002], Garriga [2003], and
Conesa et al. [2009], Kitao [2010]). All these studies reach the conclusion that optimal
capital income taxation can be positive. If the return heterogeneity exists in models,
capital income and wealth taxation would generate different outcomes. In a recent
paper, Guvenen et al. [2017] analyze the quantitative implications of wealth taxation
1See table 4.19 in appendix A.
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and Rotberg [2017] studies taxation of wealth and capital income in a model that
housing and non-housing capital are treated differently. It is a well-known fact that
life-cycle models suffer from generating wealth distribution incorrectly, especially at
the top end. One way to overcome this problem is to incorporate a luck factor fol-
lowing Castaneda et al. [2003] as in Kindermann and Krueger [2017]. Another way
to overcome this problem is to incorporate entrepreneurship as in Cagetti and De
Nardi [2009] and Quadrini [2000]. Guvenen et al. [2017] and Rotberg [2017] gener-
ate realistic wealth distribution through generating the return heterogeneity in the
model.
In this paper, I examine the welfare and aggregate implications of the three forms
of capital taxation in a model with an entrepreneurial decision making process in
the spirit of Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] and Quadrini [2000]. There are three major
reasons why modeling entrepreneurial activities may be important for this question.
First, although entrepreneurs represent only 7% of the population, they earn 21% of
the total income. Second, 46% of the top 1% of income earners and 58% of the top
1% of wealth holders are entrepreneurs (see Survey of Consumer Finances [2013]).
Hence, taking entrepreneurs into account can be potentially important for under-
standing the implications of various capital taxation on welfare, inequality, and gov-
ernment revenues.2 Third, with the help of entrepreneurial decision making process,
I generate a quite realistic wealth distribution.
I develop a simplified life-cycle model with stochastic aging that includes en-
trepreneurial activity and individual heterogeneity. Individual heterogeneity stems
from differences in entrepreneurial abilities and uninsurable productivity shocks. A
young individual can choose to be either a worker or an entrepreneur while an old
individual can choose to stay as an entrepreneur provided that she/he was previ-
ously an entrepreneur, or become a retiree. The existence of entrepreneurs helps
the model generate a wealth inequality that mimics the data well.3 In the bench-
mark model, I use a parametric tax function proposed by Benabou [2002] to model
progressive labor income tax. In addition to the labor income tax, the government
collects a proportional capital income tax, a consumption tax, and a flat rate estate
tax. We conduct the following experiments: 1. replacing the capital income tax with
the wealth tax; 2. replacing the estate with the wealth tax; 3. replacing the capital tax
with the wealth tax at the top; and 4. replacing the estate tax with the wealth tax at
2See table 4.18 in appendix A regarding the stylized facts about entrepreneurs.
3As a result, models with entrepreneurs are used to explain the implications of tax policies and
financial frictions. See Buera et al. [2015] for a detailed review of the literature on entrepreneurship. In
models without entrepreneurial activity, an appropriate calibration of the income process incorporating
a luck factor, as in Castaneda et al. [2003], is needed to achieve a meaningful distribution of earnings
and wealth.
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the top. In all these experiments I fixed the revenue. On top of these experiments, I
also search for the optimal wealth tax rate.
When I replace the capital income tax with the wealth tax, the economy receives
a modest welfare gain. In this scenario, while young workers, young entrepreneurs,
and old workers face welfare gain, old entrepreneurs face welfare loss. This change
does not affect the wealth distribution in the benchmark. In contrast, replacing the
current estate tax system with a wealth tax system leads to an overall welfare loss. In
this case, young workers and young entrepreneurs lose while old entrepreneurs gain
due to switching of the tax burden from the old wealthy to the young. If I replace
the current capital income tax with a system that taxes wealth at the top only, wealth
distribution is improved. On top of that this move generates a substantial welfare
gain. When I switch from the estate tax system to the top wealth tax, a substantial
welfare loss is observed since the system will ease the burden of the old wealthy
individuals at the expense of any individuals with high wealth. my results regarding
switching from capital income taxation to wealth taxation is in line with Guvenen
et al. [2017] and Rotberg [2017] . Both studies show that replacing the capital income
tax with the wealth tax is welfare improving since wealth taxation decreases the tax
burden of productive investors at the expense of unproductive wealthy investors.
Rotberg [2017] shows that adding housing into the model makes the welfare gain
more pronounced. In this paper, in contrast to Guvenen et al. [2017] and Rotberg
[2017] I explicitly model an entrepreneurial sector. Hence, in my model, not only
return differentials but the entrepreneurial entry constraint also matters. Imposing
wealth taxation in my model makes the entrepreneurial entry constraint harder to
satisfy. This is reflected as lower welfare gain from switching from capital income
tax to wealth tax in my model. My model reveals that more productive and less
wealthy individuals can be better off if I switch from the capital income tax to the
top wealth taxation.
My paper also provides important insights regarding replacing the estate tax
with the wealth taxation. Cagetti and De Nardi [2009] study the implications of the
estate tax break by using a model that incorporates business investment, borrowing
constraints, estate transmission, and wealth inequality. They find that the estate tax
distorts the saving and investment decisions of the very rich who hold a large fraction
of total wealth. Thus, it reduces aggregate output and savings. Farhi and Werning
[2010] show that the optimal estate tax should be progressive and the marginal estate
taxes should be negative. Piketty and Saez [2013] study the optimal inheritance
tax and find that low net worth households benefit from high inheritance tax rates,
while relatively large groups at the top income benefit from inheritance subsidies.
De Nardi and Yang [2016] use an earnings process proposed by Castaneda et al.
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[2003] to evaluate the increase in the estate tax rate by merging bequest motives
and inheritance ability across generations. I distinguish from the aforementioned
studies by analyzing the implications of replacing the estate tax with the wealth tax.
I show that replacing the estate tax with the wealth tax leads to substantial welfare
loss as a result of an increase in the tax burden of young productive workers and
entrepreneurs.
This paper is also connected to the literature regarding top income taxation. Badel
and Huggett [2015], Guner et al. [2016], and Kindermann and Krueger [2017] search
for revenue and/or welfare maximizing top income tax rates in different model set-
tings. I distinguish from those studies focusing the implications of replacing the
capital income tax with a top wealth taxation. I show that among the four experi-
ments, the highest welfare gain is realized when the capital income tax is replaced
with the top wealth taxation. By doing this I decrease the tax burden of productive
entrepreneurs with relatively lower net worth and ease their entry constraints. As a
result, I generate the highest welfare gain.
My paper is also related to the literature on optimal capital taxation.4 I found
the optimal wealth tax rate as 5.75%. Although the optimal wealth tax increases
welfare substantially, it makes wealth inequality even worse. In the optimal wealth
tax system, young workers and retirees gain most while young an old entrepreneurs
lose.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the model. Section 4.3
describes a calibration procedure. Section 4.4 discusses the features of the bench-
mark economy. Section 4.5 evaluates the model experiments. Section 4.6 discusses
sensitivity analysis. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Demographics
The model is a simplified life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. The
model period is one year. I assume that there are young and old cohorts in the
economy, and aging is stochastic. The young stay young with a constant probability
piy and get old with a probability 1 − piy in the next period. The old continue to
live with a constant probability pio and die with a probability 1 − pio in the next
4Optimal capital taxation is quite rich. Conesa et al. [2009] calculate the optimal capital income tax
rate as 36% in a heterogeneous agent incomplete market model. Farhi and Werning [2014], and Piketty
and Saez [2013] calculate optimal inheritance tax rates.There is also a line of literature that follows
Mirleesian approach to calculate optimal capital taxation (see for instance Golosov et al. [2003] and
Shourideh [2012]).
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period. These probabilities are calibrated to match the proportion of young and
old households in the economy. When the old die, their offsprings receive after-tax
bequests and enter the economy in the next period. For simplicity, I assume that
each household has only one offspring. I do not consider cases that differentiate
between single households, married households, or households with no offspring.
The measure of households is normalized to 1.
4.2.2 Preferences
I assume that preferences are time-separable with a discount factor β. The instan-
taneous utility function is given by:
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ
where ct is consumption and σ is the coefficient of risk aversion. Labor is supplied
inelastically and thus normalized to 1 for both workers and entrepreneurs. I assume
the households are perfectly altruistic.
4.2.3 Technology
Following Quadrini [2000], I assume that there are two production sectors: the
corporate sector and the entrepreneurial sector. Each person has two types of ability:
working and entrepreneurial. Types are stochastic, positively correlated over time,
and uncorrelated with each other. Productivity of an individual as an entrepreneur
is given by θt, while yt represents the capacity to produce income out of labor by
working in the corporate sector.
At the beginning of the period, current ability levels are revealed to individu-
als. Next period ability levels remain unknown. A young individual with an asset
level at, an entrepreneurial ability θt, and a worker productivity yt, makes a decision
regarding whether she will be a worker or an entrepreneur in the current period.
Entrepreneurs can borrow subject to an exogenous borrowing limit, invest cap-
ital, hire labor, and run a technology. The return from the production technology
is dependent on an entrepreneurial ability. When the entrepreneur invests kt, the
output is given by:
f (kt, nt) = θt
(
kγt (1+ nt)
1−γ)ν , (4.1)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the share of entrepreneurial capital. ν < 1 indicates the
decreasing returns to scale from investing in capital and labor as in Lucas [1978].
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Capital depreciates at a rate of δ. Entrepreneurs provide their own labor which is
normalized to 1, and also hire labor at the amount of nt ≥ 0.
The corporate sector is represented by a Cobb-Douglas functional form:
F(Kct , L
c
t) = A(K
c
t )
α(Lct)
1−α, (4.2)
where KCt and L
C
t are total capital and labor inputs used in the corporate sector. A
parameter A represents the level of technology, whereas α is the capital share in the
corporate sector.
4.2.4 Credit Markets
I assume that young workers and old retirees cannot borrow, i.e., at+1 ≥ 0. The
size of capital that entrepreneurs can borrow depends on their current net worth.
Default is not an option in this setting. I assume there are no financial intermediaries.
Hence, there is no difference between the saving and borrowing interest rates.
4.2.5 Government
The government is assumed to live forever. It collects taxes, pays a pension benefit
p to each retiree, provides goods and services g, and pays interest on the debt, (1+
rt)Dt. Households do not derive utility from consumption of government goods
and services. During every period, tax revenues are equal to government purchases,
pension payments, and interest payments on the debt.
I use Benabou’s [2002] functional form to model the progressive earnings tax
schedule. The total amount of federal income tax Tt(Yt) for total taxable earnings Yt
is given by:
Tt(Yt) = (1− λY−τt )Yt + τbalt Yt + τkt rtat (4.3)
where τbalt is a proportional earnings tax rate that helps to close the budget. The
parameter λ captures the revenue requirement and τ governs the curvature of the
tax function. In addition to the earnings tax, the government collects a proportional
capital income and consumption taxes. The capital income and consumption tax
rates are denoted by τkt and τ
c
t , respectively. The government collects tax from estates
larger than the exemption level, ex at a proportional rate τbt for the amount of asset
only exceeding exemption. In my experiments, I replace the capital income tax and
estate tax with the wealth tax, respectively. In each experiment I fix the government
revenue and everything else is constant. The wealth tax is adjusted accordingly to
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satisfy the government budget constraint. When I search for optimal wealth taxation,
τbalt is adjusted in order to satisfy the government’s budget constraint.
4.2.6 Household’s Problem
Households are divided into two groups: young and old. A young individual
can choose to be either a worker or an entrepreneur. An old individual can choose to
stay as an entrepreneur provided that she/he was an entrepreneur before getting old
or become a retiree. If an old individual was a worker before retirement, he cannot
become an entrepreneur when he is old. Notice that the bequest the young receive
in the next period is what the old decide to save in the current period net of estate
tax given by ant + 1 = at+1 − τbt+1 max{0, at+1 − et+1}. With probability pio, the old
stay alive. With probability 1−pio, the old reincarnate as the young and start making
economic decisions as the young with initial assets equal to ant+1.
The value function of a young individual is given by:
VYt (at, yt, θt) = max
{
VY,et (at, yt, θt),V
Y,w
t (at, yt, θt)
}
. (4.4)
The young individual decides whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur at
the beginning of the period. VY,et (·) is the value function of a young individual who
becomes an entrepreneur and VY,wt (·) is the value function of a young individual
who becomes a worker.
The young worker’s problem can be written as:
VY,wt (at, yt, θt) = maxct,at+1
{u(ct) + βpiyEt
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
+ β(1− piy)VO,rt+1(at+1)},
(4.5)
subject to
Ywt = wtyt, (4.6)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = wtyt + (1+ rt)at − Tt(Ywt ), (4.7)
0 ≤ at+1, (4.8)
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate and rt is the equilibrium interest rate. The term
VO,rt+1(at+1) is the value function of the retirees. The expected value of V
Y
t+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
is conditional on the joint distribution of yt and θt. The young entrepreneur’s prob-
lem can be written as:
VY,et (at, yt, θt) = maxct,kt,nt,at+1
{u(ct)+ βpiyEt
[
VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
+ β(1−piy)EtVOt+1(at+1, θt+1)},
(4.9)
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subject to
Yet = θt
(
kγt (1+ nt)
1−γ
)ν − δkt − rtkt − wtnt, (4.10)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tt(Yet ) + (1+ rt)at, (4.11)
0 ≤ at+1, (4.12)
0 ≤ nt, (4.13)
0 ≤ kt ≤ (1+ d)at. (4.14)
Working capital kt includes own and borrowed assets. Yet is the entrepreneur’s
total profit. Following Kitao [2008], I set d as an exogenous borrowing limit. The
term VOt+1(at+1, θt+1) is the value function of the old entrepreneur at the beginning of
the next period before deciding whether to stay as an entrepreneur or retire. This is
different from the young worker’s decision since he has no choice but to retire. The
expected value of VYt+1(at+1, yt+1, θt+1) is taken similarly as the young workers. The
expected value of VOt+1(at+1, θt+1) is conditional only on θt.
The old individual’s problem is given as follows:
VOt (at, θt) = max
{
VO,et (at, θt),V
O,r
t (at)
}
(4.15)
VO,et is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays as an entrepreneur and
VO,rt is the value function for the retirees.
The old retiree’s problem is given by:
VO,rt (at) = maxct,at+1
{u(ct) + βpioVO,rt+1(at+1) + β(1− pio)Et[VYt+1(ant+1, yt+1, θt+1)]} (4.16)
subject to
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = (1+ rt)at + p− Tt (p) (4.17)
0 ≤ at+1. (4.18)
The old retired individual receives a social security transfer payment p in every
period. Since the old retiree in this case is not an entrepreneur, the probability of
a retiree’s offspring being an entrepreneur depends on the joint invariant distribu-
tion of yt and θt. The expected value of the offspring’s value function is given by:
VYt+1(a
n
t+1, yt+1, θt+1).
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The old entrepreneur’s problem is given by:
VO,et (at, θt) = maxct,kt,nt,at+1
{u(ct)+ βpioEt[VOt+1(at+1, θt+1)]+ β(1−pio)Et
[
VYt+1(a
n
t+1, yt+1, θt+1)
]
},
(4.19)
subject to
Yet = θt
(
kγt (lt + nt)
1−γ
)ν − δkt − rtkt − wtnt, (4.20)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tt(Yet ) + (1+ rt)at, (4.21)
0 ≤ at+1, (4.22)
0 ≤ nt, (4.23)
0 ≤ kt ≤ (1+ d)at. (4.24)
An entrepreneur’s offspring is born with ability levels (yt+1, θt+1). The expected
value of the offspring’s value function with respect to yt+1 is computed using the
invariant distribution of yt. However, its expected value with respect to θt+1 is condi-
tional on the parent’s θt and evolves according to the same Markov process governing
the entrepreneurial abilities (see subsection Endowments). This reflects the fact that
the offspring inherits her parent’s business.
4.2.7 Equilibrium Definition
Each individual’s state vector is given by st = (at, yt, θt, ξt). at stands for
the current asset holdings. Idiosyncratic productivity shocks yt ∈ Y. θt ∈ Θ =
{0, θ1, θ2, θ3} is an entrepreneurial ability. We can think of θt as an idea to start or
maintain a business. An individual with no idea or ability to maintain a business
has θt = 0. ξt ∈ Ξ = {YW,YE,OE,OW} stands for an occupational status: young
workers, young entrepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retirees, respectively. The
entire state space is given by S = R+ ×Y×Θ× Ξ. I can generate the transition ma-
trix, Γt(st, st+1) by using the decision rules that solve the maximization problems and
the exogenous Markov process for income and entrepreneurial ability. The transition
function provides the probability distribution of the next period state conditional on
the current state.
A stationary equilibrium is given by a risk-free interest rate rt; wage rate wt; tax
functions Tt(·); tax rates τct , τbalt , and τkt ; social security payment p; allocations of con-
sumption ct(st); savings at(st); investment kt(st); labor hired by the entrepreneurs
nt(st); and a constant distribution of households over the state variables Φ∗ such that
given rt,wt, and taxes:
• The allocations ct, at, kt and nt solve the individual’s optimization problem for
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each state st ∈ S.
• rt = ∂F(K
c
t ,L
c
t )
∂Kct
− δ: the marginal product of capital net of depreciation in the
corporate sector is equal to the risk-free interest rate.
• wt = ∂F(K
c
t ,L
c
t )
∂Lct
: the marginal product of labor employed in the corporate sector
is equal to the wage rate.
• The capital markets clear, i.e.,∫
st
kt(st)dΦt(st) + Kct + Dt =
∫
st
at(st)dΦt(st). (4.25)
• Total assets, ∫st at(st)dΦt(st), are equal to the sum of the total capital in en-
trepreneurial sector,
∫
st
k(st)dΦt(st), the total capital in the corporate sector, Kct ,
and the total government debt, Dt.
• Labor markets clear i.e.∫
st
nt(st)dΦt(st) + Lct =
∫
st
l(st)dΦt(st). (4.26)
• Total efficient labor, ∫st l(st)dΦt(st), is equal to the sum of the total hired labor
in the entrepreneurial sector,
∫
st
nt(st)dΦt(st), and the total labor employed in
the corporate sector, Lct .
• The sum of earnings, consumption, corporate income, estate tax revenues, and
net borrowing is equal to the sum of government purchases, total transfers, and
interest payments on debt. pir is the fraction of retirees in the population and it
is determined endogenously. In the steady state, Dt = D¯.∫
st
(
Tst (Y
s) + τct ct(st) + 1o(st)τ
b(1− pio)max{0, ant+1(st)− ex}
)
dΦt(st) + Dt+1
= g+ ppir + (1+ rt)Dt
• The invariant distribution of individuals is given by Φ, where:
Φ′t+1 = Γt(st, st+1)
′Φ′t. (4.27)
In the steady state, Φt = Φ∗.
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4.3 Calibration
In this section, I explain how I map the model initial steady state to the data.
Table 4.1 shows the model parameters that I choose exogenously so that they are not
used to match the moments in the data. Parameters in Table 4.2 are chosen such that
the model-generated moments from the initial steady state are matched with their
corresponding moments in the data. As I focus on the experiment regarding the
wealth taxation, in order to match the percentage of entrepreneurs along the wealth
distribution especially at the top 1%, I adopt the 4x4 entrepreneurial transition matrix
as in Kitao [2008]
Preferences
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is set to 1.5, which is a common value
in the literature.5 Discount factor β is chosen to match the capital to output ratio of
3.0.
Demographics
Since the model period is set to be one year, the probability of aging and death
are given as 1− piy and 1− pio. These probabilities are chosen in such a way that
the average working and retirement periods are 45 and 11 years, respectively. This
implies that in the equilibrium, 80% of the population are young individuals.
Technology
The capital share in corporate sector, α, is set to 0.33 as in Kindermann and
Krueger [2017]. Level of technology, A, is normalized to one. The depreciation rate,
δ, is set to 0.06 as in Stokey and Rebelo [1995]. The entrepreneurial exogenous bor-
rowing constraint, d, is set to 0.5 as in Kitao [2008], which implies that entrepreneurs
cannot borrow more than 1.5 times their current assets. The degree of decreasing re-
turns to scale, ν, is set to 0.88 as in Bassetto et al. [2015]. The entrepreneurial capital
share, γ, is chosen to equal 0.7.
5See, for example, Attanasio et al. [1999].
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Table 4.1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Value
Preferences, technology, and demographics
Risk aversion σ 1.5
Capital share α 0.33
Technology A 1
Probability of staying young piy 0.978
Probability of staying old pio 0.911
Depreciation δ 0.06
Entr. return to scale ν 0.88
Entr. borrowing constraint d 0.5
Labor income process and social security payments
Autocorrelation ρ 0.958
Conditional Variance σ2y 0.091
Pension/average annual income p 40%
Public purchases, government debt, and taxes
Fraction of government spending to output g 17% GDP
Fraction of government debt to total capital D 0.27
Consumption tax τc 5%
Capital tax τk 25%
Estate tax τb 16%
Revenue requirement λ 0.911
Tax progressivity τ 0.053
Endowments
In every period, a worker is assumed to provide one unit of time inelastically.
One unit of work time yields a wage earnings wy, where y is the idiosyncratic labor
productivity. I assume that y can take 5 values, {y1, ..., y5}, which are associated
with normal labor earnings observed in household data sets such as the SCF. I use
a discretized Markov chain of a continuous AR (1) process with persistence ρ and
variance, σ2y . I use Rouwenhorst’s method in discretization, and set ρ = 0.958 as
in Kaplan [2012]. I assume that the income process and the entrepreneurial ability
process evolve independently. I set σ2y = 0.091 to capture the Gini coefficient of labor
earnings of 0.51 in Survey of Consumer Finances [2013] data. The exact numerical
values for the transition matrix is shown in appendix B.
We use the 4x4 transition matrix for entrepreneurial ability process. Notice that
setting θ0 = 0 captures no entrepreneurial ability. I choose θ1 = 0.20, θ2 1.32,, and
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θ3 = 1.58. pi(θi|θj) is the probability of having the ability, θi, conditional on having
the ability, θj, in the previous period. I follow Kitao [2008] for the assumption of
transition probabilities such that the non-zero elements in the 2nd and 3rd rows are
the same, i.e., pi(θ0|θ1) = pi(θ1|θ2) and pi(θ1|θ1) = pi(θ2|θ2), and pi(θi|θj)=0 if |i− j| >
1. In addition, I further assume that pi(θ0|θ0) = pi(θ3|θ3) in order to keep the number
of calibrated parameters at the minimum. Hence, I choose pi(θ0|θ0) = 0.8,pi(θ0|θ1) =
0.53, and pi(θ1|θ1) = 0.37. In total, there are 6 parameters, including θ1, θ2, and θ3 to
be calibrated for the entrepreneurial ability process. The entrepreneurial transition
matrix is given by:

pi(θ0|θ0) 1− pi(θ0|θ0) 0 0
pi(θ0|θ1) pi(θ1|θ1) 1− pi(θ0|θ1)− pi(θ1|θ1) 0
0 pi(θ1|θ2) pi(θ2|θ2) 1− pi(θ1|θ2)− pi(θ2|θ2)
0 0 1− pi(θ3|θ3) pi(θ3|θ3)

(4.28)
=

0.8 0.2 0 0
0.53 0.37 0.1 0
0 0.53 0.37 0.1
0 0 0.2 0.8

Government Policies
The social security replacement rate, p, is set to 40% of average gross income as in
Kotlikoff et al. [1999].The ratio of government consumption to output is set to 17% as
in Kindermann and Krueger [2017]. The fraction of government debt to total capital,
D, is set to equal 0.27 as in Bassetto et al. [2015]. The tax rate on consumption, τc, is
set to equal 5% as in Kindermann and Krueger [2017]. The proportional capital tax
is set to 25% as in Guvenen et al. [2017]. The estate tax, τb, is set to 16% as in Bassetto
et al. [2015]. The Benabou’s tax function parameters, λ, which represents the revenue
requirement, and τ, which represents the overall progressivity of taxes, are set to
equal 0.911 and 0.053 as in Guner et al. [2016]. These estimates imply an average
federal tax rate of 8.9% and marginal federal tax rate of 13.7% for households with
mean earnings. The exemption level, ex, is set to 75 to match the fraction of estates
paying estate taxes.
There are 9 parameters to match 9 moments in the data. Table 4.2 summarizes the
parameters calibrated to match the seventeen targets in the data that are presented
in the next section.
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Table 4.2: Calibrated Parameters
Calibrated parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.9155
Entrepreneurial ability {θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3} {0, 0.2, 1.32, 1.58}
Entr. transition probabilities see eq. 4.28
Entr. capital share γ 0.7
Estate tax exemption level ex 75
4.4 Features of the Benchmark Economy
In this section, I discuss the aggregate and distributional properties of the bench-
mark economy. In order to conduct meaningful policy experiments regarding the
implications of wealth taxation, we need to make sure that the model delivers realis-
tic wealth distribution. Table 4.3 compares the model-generated moments with those
in the data. Most data comes from SCF from 2010-2013, except the entrepreneurship
entry rate and the exit rate, which are calculated according to Quadrini [2000] using
PSID waves of 2011 to 2015. The percentage of people paying estate tax is taken from
Bassetto et al. [2015].
Table 4.3: Target Moments
Targets Data Model
Capital to output ratio 2.9-3.0 3.0
% Entrepreneurs 6.7-8.0 7.1
% Exiting entrepreneurs 34.3-36.1 32.9
% Workers to entrepreneurs 3.3-4.1 3.2
Ratio of median net worth entr. to workers 8.2-9.3 8.8
% Entr. on top 1% wealth 52.2-57.2 55.4
% Entr. wealth share 35.9-36.1 36.1
% People with zero wealth 12.9-13.1 12.6
% People paying estate tax 1.5-2.0 1.8
Moments not targeted
%Entr. on top 5% wealth 38.4-40.2 38.5
%Entr. on top 10% wealth 27.8-31.0 28.5
Table 4.4 summarizes the key macroeconomic aggregates, interest rate, tax rev-
enues, and pension payments for the benchmark economy. All values except the
interest rate are presented as a percentage of GDP. The values areas in line with
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those of the U.S. economy.
Table 4.4: Macroeconomic Aggregates
Variable Value
Capital 300%
Government debt 81%
Consumption 65%
Investment 18%
Interest rate 2.9%
Tax revenues
- Consumption tax 3.2%
- Labor income tax 5.2%
- Proportional capital income tax 2.7%
Pension system
- Total pension payment 9.9%
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the model-generated income and wealth distribu-
tion together with their counterparts in the data.6 The standard life-cycle models
often fail to generate income and wealth distributions correctly at the upper end.
My model with workers and entrepreneurs is able to generate a realistic wealth dis-
tribution. In addition to this, the model also hits other important moments of the
distribution of wealth, even though they were not targeted. For instance, the per-
centage of entrepreneurs on top 5% and top 10% are 38.5% and 28.5%, respectively,
compared to 38.4%-40.2% and 27.8%-31.0% in the SCF. This shows that the model
does reasonably well describing the U.S. economy.7
Table 4.5: Income Distribution in the Benchmark Economy
Share of income (in %)
Income quintiles Top
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 90-95% 95-99% 99-100% Gini
Data 3 6.5 10.9 18.1 61.4 10.8 16.5 19.7 0.58
Model 2.4 5.3 7.8 16.1 68.5 13.6 17.4 25.3 0.65
6Both income and wealth distribution data are taken from Khun and Rios-Rull [2016]. I use their
2013 data report.
7Even though the income distribution is not targeted, my model overestimates the income owned
by the top 1% of those along the income distribution. Without adding elastic labor supply, the en-
trepreneurship model usually overshoots the income owned by the top. Since my current focus is the
switch from the capital or estate tax to the wealth tax regime, I concentrate on the model with inelastic
labor supply.
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Table 4.6: Wealth Distribution in the Benchmark Economy
Share of wealth (in %)
Wealth quintiles Top
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 90-95% 95-99% 99-100% Gini
Data -0.7 0.6 3.2 9.8 87.0 12.1 27.4 35.5 0.85
Model 0.1 0.9 3.1 8.9 87.0 11.8 28.2 35.6 0.84
4.5 Experiments
In this section, I conduct the following five experiments:
• replacing the capital income tax with the wealth tax;
• replacing the estate tax with the wealth tax;
• replacing the capital income tax with the wealth tax at the top;
• replacing the estate tax with the wealth tax at the top;
• calculating the optimal wealth tax rate.
In the first two experiments, I set τk = 0 and τb = 0, and let τw adjust to satisfy
the government budget constraint, respectively. Note that τbal , which is varied to
satisfy the government budget constraint in the benchmark, is fixed at the benchmark
equilibrium value as well. Hence, the individuals’ budget constraints 4.7, 4.11, 4.17,
and 4.21 now become equal to the following constraints:
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = wtyt + (1− τw)(1+ rt)at − Tt(Ywt ), (4.29)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tt(Yet ) + (1− τw)(1+ rt)at, (4.30)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = (1− τw)(1+ rt)at + p− Tt (p) (4.31)
(1+ τct )ct + at+1 = Y
e
t − Tt(Yet ) + (1− τw)(1+ rt)at (4.32)
Now the equilibrium condition can be rewritten as
∫
st
(
τwt (1+ rt)at(st) + T
s
t (Y
s) + τct ct(st) + 1o(st)τ
b(1− pio)max{0, ant+1(st)− ex}
)
dΦt(st)
= g+ ppir + (1+ rt)Dt − Dt+1
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Table 4.7 shows the implications of the changes in tax regime compared to the
benchmark on important economic variables. The benchmark values are normalized
at 100. The exception is an interest rate which I choose to show the standard percent-
age as usual.8 Replacing the capital income tax with the wealth tax boosts savings
and hence aggregate capital and output increase compared to the benchmark case.
Taxing wealth instead of capital income affects entrepreneurs quite negatively: the
percentage of entrepreneurs in the economy decreases; more entrepreneurs exit; the
percentage of workers to entrepreneurs decrease; entrepreneurs median wealth in
comparison to workers decrease; entrepreneurs’ shares at top 1% , 5%, and 10% of
wealth distribution decrease; entrepreneurs wealth share decreases, and the num-
ber of people with zero wealth increases. Tax regime shift also has consequences
regarding the estate tax: the percentage of people paying the estate tax decreases
and the percentage of the estate tax to GDP increases slightly. My results indicate
that switching from the capital income tax to the wealth tax increases tax burden
of entrepreneurs and hence, we observe all these negative implications in the en-
trepreneur sector. This switch depreciates their wealth and makes it more difficult to
enter entrepreneurship. The wealth tax regime, on the other hand, increases the net
return from savings, and hence aggregate savings increases slightly.
Replacing the benchmark estate tax regime with the wealth tax regime does not
affect output, capital stock, and interest rate much. This is because in both cases taxes
are collected from the stock of wealth. The difference is the timing of tax collections.
In wealth tax regime, taxes are collected when agents are alive while in the estate tax
regime taxes are collected after the death realizes. Since estate taxes collected above
the certain threshold, replacing it with wealth tax distributes the burden to a larger
group of individuals. As a result, we see a substantial increase in the ratio of median
wealth of entrepreneurs to workers.
8The equilibrium interest rate in the benchmark equals 2.9 %.
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Table 4.7: Statistics for each tax reform
Moments τk = 0 τb=0
Output 100.8 100.0
Capital 101.3 100.4
Interest rate 2.8% 2.8%
Capital to GDP 100.6 100.3
% Entrepreneurs 92.5 99.7
% Exiting entrepreneurs 100.8 99.9
% Workers to entrepreneurs 92.6 99.6
Ratio of median wealth entr. to workers 80.6 107.7
% Entr. top 1% wealth 79.9 98.8
Entr. wealth share 85.6 100.2
% People with zero wealth 100.3 101.2
% People paying estate tax 99.0 0.0
% Entr. top 5% wealth 81.6 100.2
% Entr. top 10% wealth 83.2 100.0
% Estate tax to GDP 103.9 0.0
Table 4.8 shows the implications of tax regime changes on wealth distribution in
the economy. Overall, there is no substantial change in the wealth distribution across
the three economies. This is because the resulting wealth tax needed to satisfy the
government budget constraint is small and distributed to all individuals.
Table 4.8: Wealth distribution for each tax reform
Quintile Benchmark τk = 0 τb = 0
0-20 0.1 0.1 0.1
20-40 0.9 0.9 0.9
40-60 3.1 3.0 3.0
60-80 8.9 8.8 8.8
80-100 87.0 87.2 87.3
The top
90-95 11.8 11.6 11.6
95-99 28.2 27.8 28.1
99-100 35.6 36.6 36.3
Table 4.9 shows the welfare implications of changing the tax regime. When capital
income taxation is switched to wealth taxation in which the resulting wealth tax rate
is 0.67%, we observe overall welfare gain. Young workers, young entrepreneurs,
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and old workers benefit from the switch. Wealth taxation hurts old entrepreneurs
substantially. Since old entrepreneurs have relatively larger stock of wealth, this
result is expected as they have less wealth to leave as bequest if they die. Figures
4.2(a) and 4.2(b) in appendix C show the welfare gain (loss) for young and old when
the tax regime is switched from the capital income tax to the wealth tax. Both figures
confirm that individuals with high net worth are worse off from the switch. When
the estate tax regime is replaced with the wealth tax, we observe welfare loss. Young
workers and young entrepreneurs lose since they take over old wealthy individuals’
tax burden. Old entrepreneurs benefit most from this switch. Figures 4.3(a) and
4.3(b) in appendix C show the welfare gain (loss) for young and old when the estate
tax regime is replaced by the wealth tax. The welfare results in this case look pretty
much similar to that of Cagetti and De Nardi [2009]. What is new here is that the
high ability entrepreneurs seem to be better off than their lower counterparts, and
their net worth required to get benefit from the abolition of the estate tax is lower.
However, the whole economy faces a small negative welfare loss. The result that the
highest ability entrepreneurs are better off than others is consistent with Guvenen
et al. [2017] in that the individuals with the highest return gain most.
Table 4.9: Wealth tax rate and CEV
CEV τw(%) All W only E only YW YE OW OE
τk = 0 0.67 0.20 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.24 -0.23
τb = 0 0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.29 -0.09 -0.36 0.00 0.51
In the last two experiments, the capital income tax and the estate tax regimes
are replaced by the wealth tax which is collected above a certain exemption level.
According to table 4.3, this amounts to taxing the top 1.8% on the wealth distribution.
Table 4.10 shows the implications of the tax switch on the economic variables. When
the capital income tax is replaced with the wealth tax at the top, we see a substantial
decrease in the capital stock and percentage of entrepreneurs. Moments regarding
the estate tax (percentage paying estate tax and estate tax to GDP) decreases a lot
since the wealth tax at the top reduces assets previously qualified to be taxed for
estate. We can see that taxing the top wealth generate more pronounced economy
wide effect compared to taxing every household. Replacing the estate tax with the
wealth tax at the top decreases capital stock and all other statistics minimally. This is
because the tax is levied on the same group of wealthy individuals and the tax rate
does not differ much from the previous estate tax.
104 Implications of Wealth Taxation and Entrepreneurs
Table 4.10: Statistics for top tax reform
Moments τk = 0 τb=0
Output 98.9 99.7
Capital 95.2 99.1
Interest rate 3.2% 2.9%
Capital to GDP 96.3 99.4
% Entrepreneurs 96.1 100.0
% Exiting entrepreneurs 102.3 100.0
% Workers to entrepreneurs 97.9 100.0
Ratio of median wealth entr. to workers 95.6 99.8
% Entr. top 1% wealth 95.6 99.8
Entr. wealth share 83.5 100.6
% People with zero wealth 37.9 98.4
% People paying estate tax 78.9 0.0
% Entr. top 5% wealth 89.2 99.6
% Entr. top 10% wealth 86.2 101.0
% Estate tax to GDP 71.9 0.0
Table 4.11 shows the changes in wealth distribution due to replacing the capital
income tax with the top wealth tax and replacing the estate tax with the top wealth
tax. When the capital income tax is switched to the wealth tax at the top, we observe a
substantial improvement in wealth distribution. Since the main tax burden is shifted
to individuals with high net worth, this result is expected. When I switch from the
estate tax to the top wealth tax, wealth distribution is not much affected. The reason
is the same as explained previously.
Table 4.11: Wealth distribution for top tax reform
Quintile Benchmark τk = 0 τb = 0
0-20 0.1 0.3 0.1
20-40 0.9 1.3 0.9
40-60 3.1 4.1 3.1
60-80 8.9 10.8 8.9
80-100 87.0 83.6 86.9
The top
90-95 11.8 13.1 11.6
95-99 28.2 25.8 27.6
99-100 35.6 30.5 36.3
§4.5 Experiments 105
Table 4.12 shows the welfare implications of tax switches. Since the wealth tax
collected only above the wealth tax exemption level, τw increases as one can ex-
pect. Overall welfare seems to increase even more when the capital income tax is
changed to wealth tax at the top compared to the case in which the capital income
tax is replaced by the wealth tax for the whole economy. Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) in
appendix C show welfare gain or loss in a more detailed manner. This tax switch
favors workers and retirees substantially. This is reasonable since the highest ability
entrepreneurs are most likely on the top of the wealth distribution. Hence, the top
wealth tax hurts them most. When the estate tax is switched to the wealth tax at the
top, welfare decreases substantially. The old entrepreneurs gain here due to switch-
ing of the tax burden from the old wealthy to the young. Policy implication here
is that the wealth tax should be imposed above a certain exemption level in order
to generate the highest welfare gain. Figure 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) in appendix C show
welfare gains and losses for switching from the estate tax to the top wealth tax in a
more detailed manner.
Table 4.12: Wealth tax rate and CEV for top tax reform
CEV τw(%) All W only E only YW YE OW OE
τk = 0 2.22 0.76 0.66 2.05 0.82 2.11 0.01 1.33
τb = 0 0.17 -0.18 -0.20 0.04 -0.19 -0.04 -0.22 0.93
Finally, I search for the optimal wealth tax rate. In order to do this, I set τk = 0,
and change τw until I find the optimal rate. During the process, τbal is used to satisfy
the government budget constraint.
Table 4.13: Statistics for the optimal tax
Target moments Optimal %
Capital 86.5
Interest rate 4.9%
Capital to output 88.1
% Entrepreneurs 85.8
% Workers to entrepreneurs 82.3
Entr. wealth share 110.8
% People with zero wealth 225.1
% People paying estate tax 92.6
% Entr. top 10% wealth 90.1
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Figure 4.1 shows the optimal wealth tax rate and table 4.13 summarizes the con-
sequences of switching from the benchmark economy to the optimal wealth tax econ-
omy. It is clear that this switch decreases the capital stock substantially. From the
table, it is obvious that this switch affects entrepreneurs quite negatively as per-
centage of entrepreneurs and the percentage of workers to entrepreneurs decrease
substantially. This switch also increases the percentage of people with zero wealth
considerably since the optimal rate is quite high.
Table 4.14: Wealth distribution for optimal tax reform
Quintile Benchmark τw = 5.75%
0-20 0.1 0.0
20-40 0.9 0.2
40-60 3.1 1.6
60-80 8.9 6.4
80-100 87.0 91.8
The top
90-95 11.8 9.9
95-99 28.2 27.8
99-100 35.6 45.1
Table 4.14 shows the changes in the wealth distribution after the switch. From
the table, we see that wealth distribution is negatively affected by the optimal wealth
tax system. With the high rate, the optimal wealth tax depletes assets owned by
individuals in the lower quintile. However, as the wealth tax is high, the state and
local earnings tax rate, τbal , needed to satisfy government budget constraint must
become smaller. In my experiment, this results in a negative τbal , suggesting that the
welfare gain thus probably comes from subsidies.
Table 4.15: Wealth tax rate and CEV for optimal wealth tax
CEV τw(%) All W only E only YW YE OW OE
Optimal 5.75 6.3 6.9 -1.3 6.7 -0.7 7.5 -8.4
As we can see from table 4.15, the optimal wealth tax regime generates substantial
welfare gain. Yet, the switch affects old entrepreneurs negatively since they hold a
relatively large sum of wealth. Huge welfare loss arises for them since they lose more
asset due to high wealth tax rate, resulting in much less after-tax bequest than before.
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Figure 4.1: Welfare gain for optimal wealth tax
Figures 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) provide a more detailed account of welfare changes.
From the figures, we see that the optimal wealth tax regime generates quite large
welfare gain for those with low net worth. My results are in the same direction as
Guvenen et al. [2017] in which the highest ability gains most from switching to the
optimal wealth tax system, and the optimal wealth tax rate is also higher than that
in tax switching regime.
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I provide a brief sensitivity analysis by focusing on the tax switch
from the capital income tax to the wealth tax. In the first case, I increase the survival
probability. In the second case, I assume less altruistic individuals. Both cases fix all
other parameters at their benchmark level. Table 4.16 compares key economic aggre-
gates in three economies. In both cases, the ratio of median net worth and the per-
centage of people with zero wealth increase. Two such moments are quite sensitive
to these parameters. Increase in longevity makes entrepreneurs able to accumulate
even more wealth, but also make individuals run out of their asset. Decrease in al-
truism makes entrepreneurs care less for offspring and then accumulate more wealth
for their own consumption. However, more consumption depletes wealth even faster.
Table 4.17 shows the welfare implications of changing the capital income tax regime
with the wealth tax regime in new economies. In both cases, my main conclusion re-
garding the tax switch does not change. The tax switch increases welfare moderately.
This means my welfare results are reasonably robust to changes in parameters.
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Table 4.16: Target Moments
Targets
Baseline
pio=0.91
η=1.0
Sensitivity 1
pio=0.95
η=1.0
Sensitivity 2
pio=0.91
η=0.7
Capital to output ratio 3.0 2.9 2.9
% Entrepreneurs 7.1 6.0 7.1
% Exiting entrepreneurs 32.9 32.6 32.8
% Workers to entrepreneurs 3.2 3.1 3.1
Ratio of median net worth entr. to workers 8.8 13.8 10.2
% Entr. on top 1% wealth 55.4 54.1 57.1
% Entr. wealth share 36.1 34.2 36.3
% People with zero wealth 12.6 27.3 19.6
%People paying estate tax 1.8 1.3 1.5
Moments not targeted
%Entr. on top 5% wealth 38.5 38.3 39.1
%Entr. on top 10% wealth 28.5 26.6 28.4
Table 4.17: Wealth tax rate and CEV for wealth tax reform
CEV τw(%) All W only E only YW YE OW OE
Sensitivity 1 0.82 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.07 -0.10
Sensitivity 2 0.79 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.18 -0.19
4.7 Conclusion
This paper is concerned with analyzing the implications of the capital income tax,
the wealth tax, and the estate tax on economic aggregates and welfare and searches
for the optimal wealth tax rate. I develop a simplified life-cycle model with stochastic
aging that includes an entrepreneurial activity and individual heterogeneity. When
the capital income tax is replaced by the wealth tax, we see a modest welfare gain.
In this scenario, while young workers, young entrepreneurs, and old workers face
welfare gain, old entrepreneurs face welfare loss as they hold relatively larger assets.
This change does not affect the wealth distribution in the benchmark. In contrast, re-
placing the current estate tax system with a wealth tax system leads to an overall wel-
fare loss as a result of an increase in tax burden of young workers and entrepreneurs.
The highest welfare gain realizes when the capital income tax is replaced by top
wealth taxation. Finally, I found the optimal wealth tax rate as 5.75%. Although the
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optimal wealth tax increases welfare substantially, it makes wealth inequality even
worse. In the optimal wealth tax system, young workers and retirees gain most while
young an old entrepreneurs lose.
Appendix A: Stylized facts regarding entrepreneurs from 1989
to 2013.
Table 4.18: SCF and PSID data regarding relevant moments usually used in en-
trepreneurship
Moments 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
% Entr. in economy 7.6 8.1 6.7 7.4 7.8 7.5 7.8 8.0 6.7
% Exiting entrepreneurs 24.1 33.6 25.6 34.6 34.4 35.6 31.1 36.1 34.3
% Entering entrepreneurs 4.1 3.4 4.8 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.1 3.3
Ratio median net worth 6.5 4.9 4.1 5.3 6.1 6.7 6.1 8.2 9.3
% People w/ zero wealth 11.4 10.3 9.7 10.4 9.5 8.9 9.7 13.1 12.9
% Hiring entr. 70.7 65.6 63.9 64.8 69.3 65.1 65.8 66.4 66.7
Wealth Gini 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.85
Income Gini 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.58
Worker’s Earnings Gini 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.51
Entr’s income Gini 0.67 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.64 0.69
Entr’s wealth Gini 0.73 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.77
% Entr. top1% income 50.0 46.5 38.5 38.5 39.9 44.7 47.3 39.5 45.5
% Entr. top5% income 34.0 32.1 24.1 31.0 36.0 29.2 33.5 31.9 33.0
% Entr. top10% income 23.9 26.4 16.5 21.8 25.6 23.1 26.2 23.1 22.0
% Entr. top1% wealth 53.6 44.8 49.2 46.7 47.3 52.8 46.9 52.2 57.4
% Entr. top5% wealth 39.1 41.4 31.1 35.8 36.3 34.2 42.0 40.2 38.4
% Entr. top10% wealth 32.3 30.9 23.9 29.2 28.7 28.2 31.5 31.0 27.8
% Entr income share 21.3 17.3 14.0 17.9 17.9 18.3 20.8 18.7 20.8
% Entr wealth share 33.1 31.3 29.2 30.7 30.8 31.8 33.6 36.1 35.9
Note: % Exiting entrepreneurs and % entering entrepreneurs were computed
from the PSID dataset. Since they were collected on different time frame, e.g. SCF
was collected from 1989 and 1992, while % exit rate from PSID are chosen from
1989-1990, and 1992-1993 as 24.1% and 33.6%, respectively.
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Table 4.19: Capital Taxes, selected OECD countries
Country % of GDP % of taxes
USA 8.0 27.0
UK 11.4 31.5
France 10.7 24.3
Germany 6.5 16.8
Sweden 7.5 15.5
Norway 15.9 36.5
Luxembourg 11.2 31.3
EU-28 9.2 23.2
Source: European commission (2011, table 54, year 2006) and OECD (2011, USA)
Appendix B: Markov chain for labor productivity
I approximate the idiosyncratic labor productivity process as explained in the
main text. The process is assumed to be AR(1) and a Rouwenhorst’s method is used
to discretize it into a five-point Markov chain. The grid points y for the idiosyncratic
labor productivity, which is normalized to one, are:
[0.0718 0.2057 0.5889 1.6861 4.8277]
The Markov matrix for idiosyncratic labor productivity is then

0.9186 0.0788 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000
0.0197 0.9199 0.0591 0.0013 0.0000
0.0004 0.0394 0.9203 0.0394 0.0004
0.0000 0.0013 0.0591 0.9199 0.0197
0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0788 0.9186
 .
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Appendix C: Welfare figures
(a) Welfare gain for the young when switching from capital tax to wealth tax
(b) Welfare gain for the old when switching from capital tax to wealth tax
Figure 4.2: Welfare gain when switching from capital tax to wealth tax
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(a) Welfare gain for the young when switching from estate tax to wealth tax
(b) Welfare gain for the old when switching from estate tax to wealth tax
Figure 4.3: Welfare gain when switching from estate tax to wealth tax
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(a) Welfare gain for the young when switching from capital tax to top wealth tax
(b) Welfare gain for the old when switching from capital tax to top wealth tax
Figure 4.4: Welfare gain when switching from capital tax to top wealth tax
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(a) Welfare gain for the young when switching from estate tax to top wealth tax
(b) Welfare gain for the old when switching from estate tax to top wealth tax
Figure 4.5: Welfare gain when switching from estate tax to top wealth tax
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(a) Welfare gain for the young when switching from capital tax to optimal wealth tax
(b) Welfare gain for the old when switching from capital tax to optimal wealth tax
Figure 4.6: Welfare gain when switching from capital tax to optimal wealth tax
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Main findings
This thesis examines the role of taxation levied on those on either the top wealth
or income distribution. A simplified life-cycle model with stochastic aging along
with the explicit modeling of entrepreneurs and individual heterogeneity is the main
workhorse in this thesis in answering the policy implication. Individual heterogene-
ity stems from differences in entrepreneurial abilities and uninsurable productivity
shocks. In every chapter, the model successfully replicate the wealth distribution
in the U.S. economy. In each chapter, a counterfactual tax reform is conducted by
changing one tax parameter and welfare is computed. The optimal tax of interest is
also calculated in chapter 3 and 4 along with its associate welfare.
Chapter 2 study the interaction between estate taxation and annuity demand both
analytically and quantitatively. The result from analytical model corresponds to that
from the computational model i.e., lower estate tax rates result in lower annuity de-
mands. In quantitative results, with the abolition of the estate tax, raising the income
tax rate to keep the budget balanced decreases the annuity demand substantially. On
the other hand, raising the consumption tax rate or cutting the government’s spend-
ing increases the retirees’ annuity demand slightly. This can be explained by the
revenue effect dominates the substitution effect from the estate tax break. The most
striking result as a solution to the thin annuity market problem is to revoke the ex-
emption level. When each individual faces the estate tax, leaving bequests becomes
more expensive and thus leads to an increase in annuity demand substantially.
Chapter 3 enriches the model by adding endogenous labor supply to both work-
ers and entrepreneurs. With the luck factor in productivity processes, the model also
captures the income distribution along with some important moments regarding en-
trepreneurs. This chapter study revenue and welfare-maximizing progressivity and
the tax rate that applies to the top one percent of individuals along the income distri-
bution only. The revenue-maximizing top tax rate results in higher tax revenue than
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the revenue-maximizing progressivity because fewer entrepreneurs are affected. The
welfare-maximizing top tax rate does not generate big welfare gains compared to
the welfare-maximizing progressivity of taxes. The welfare-maximizing progressiv-
ity also results in less wealth inequality and tax subsidy to the poor. Finally, when
only earnings is taxed through the progressive tax function, the welfare-maximizing
top tax rate increases substantially, discovering why the top tax rate in the literatures
can be high.
Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of capital income tax, wealth tax, and estate
tax on economic aggregates and welfare and searches for the optimal wealth tax rate.
Five experiments in total are conducted. The tax switch from the current capital
income tax to the wealth tax levied on the top wealth household seems to be the
best alternative and most probable than other options. The top wealth tax increases
welfare moderately and also lessens the wealth inequality. The optimal wealth tax,
although it increases welfare substantially more than the top wealth tax, requires
government to give the income subsidies to all individuals so that the budget bal-
anced is satisfied. The optimal wealth tax in this current result also worsens the
wealth inequality.
5.2 Future research
Although this thesis provides intuitive results regarding tax policies focusing on
the top, there are still ways to improve and extend the paper in various directions. I
consider what follows as the directions for further investigation.
Endogenous borrowing constraint
In all chapters, the borrowing constraint of entrepreneurs is exogenous as in Kitao
[2008]. This is due to the increase in computational time regardless of the state-of-
the-art Fortran computing. The annuity purchase decision and the endogenous labor
supply make the computation too cumbersome to incorporate endogenous borrow-
ing constraint. In chapter 4, it might be possible to incorporate the endogenous
borrowing constraint as it may alter the decision rules of individuals when the tax
switching regime is implemented.
Transitional dynamics
Chapter 3 and 4 are silent on transitional dynamics. Having endogenous labor sup-
ply makes calculation of the transition even more difficult. The transition is impor-
tant in showing the welfare in the short-run for each tax reform.
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Incorporating other real world situations
Although the current model is computationally complicated enough, there can be
ways to make the model more sensible. For example, the aggregate uncertainty may
be incorporated along with entrepreneurship and may make results differ. The cur-
rent model is under closed economy while it might be possible that the top taxation
may make the high productivity individuals to leave and pay no tax, killing any
welfare gains. Another interesting view is the tax avoidance behavior. The high
productivity individuals may invest in an activity where it is easy to evade taxes.
Last and more possible in my view, there is an informal sector in the U.S. economy.
Roughly fifteen percent of households are of Latino sample and they can hide their
businesses easily to avoid being taxed.
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